面臨的重要挑戰之一。過往研究多聚焦於保險市場中的資訊不對稱問題及保險詐欺之因應對策，較少有文獻深入探討大眾對於保險詐欺的態度與看法。有鑑於此，本研究旨在探討民眾個人背景對於不同保險詐欺情境下態度的影響。
本研究採用問卷調查法，並運用順序羅吉斯迴歸模型進行統計分析，分析受訪者的性別、年齡、學歷、職業、年收入、可支配所得、投保險種數量等背景因素，對其保險詐欺態度之影響。此外，亦探討曾投保之特定險種是否會影響其對應之保險詐欺情境之認知與評價。
研究結果顯示，不同性別、年齡、學歷、職業、收入、可支配所得與投保險種數量，皆在部分保險詐欺情境中產生顯著影響；而曾投保特定險種者，對於與其投保內容相關之詐欺情境，亦展現出顯著的態度差異。

One of the major challenges currently facing the insurance industry is 
insurance fraud. While previous studies have primarily focused on issues such as information asymmetry in the insurance market and strategies for responding to fraud, relatively few have explored public attitudes toward insurance fraud in depth. In light of this gap, the present study aims to examine how individuals’ demographic backgrounds influence their attitudes toward various insurance fraud scenarios.
This research employs a questionnaire survey method and applies an ordinal logistic regression model for statistical analysis. It analyzes the influence of respondents’ gender, age, education level, occupation, annual income, available disposable money, and the number of insurance types purchased on their attitudes toward insurance fraud. In addition, the study investigates whether having purchased specific types of insurance affects respondents’ perceptions and evaluations of corresponding fraud scenarios.
The findings indicate that variables such as gender, age, education, occupation, income, available disposable funds, and the number of insurance types held significantly influence attitudes toward certain fraud scenarios. Moreover, individuals who have previously purchased specific types of insurance exhibit notable differences in their attitudes toward fraud situations related to those insurance types.

目錄	iv
表目錄	v
第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景	1
第二節 研究動機與目的	2
第三節 論文架構與研究流程	4
第二章 文獻回顧	5
第一節 詐欺文獻探討	5
第二節 訊息不對稱文獻探討	8
第三節 道德態度文獻探討	14
第三章 研究假說與問卷設計	17
第一節 研究假說	17
第二節 問卷設計	19
第三節 資料結構分析	23
第四章 實證模型與實證結果	39
第一節 實證模型	39
第三節 實證結果	43
第五章 結論	56
第一節 研究結論	56
第二節 研究建議	56
參考文獻	58
附錄	63
附錄一 研究變數之定義	63
附錄二 順序羅吉斯迴歸分析	68
表1-1 保險業理賠金額表	1
表1-2 詐欺金額估算表                                     	2
表1-3財團法人金融法制暨犯罪防治中心詐欺型態表	3
表3-1 受訪者基本資料統計	19
表3-3 年齡分布比較表	24
表3-4 性別分布比較表	24
表3-5 教育程度分布比較表	25
表3-6 職業分布比較表	25
表3-7 投保之險種分布比較表	26
表3-8 投保險種之數量分布比較表	27
表3-9 個人平均年收入分布比較表	28
表3-10 個人每年可支配所得分布比較表	29
表3-11 涉及車險理賠之犯罪詐欺(CF_1)填答狀況表	30
表3-12 涉及健康險之保險詐欺情境(1)(OF_1)填答狀況表	31
表3-13 涉及醫療險之犯罪詐欺(1)(CF_2)填答狀況表	31
表3-14 涉及健康險之保險詐欺情境(2)(OF_2)填答狀況表	32
表3-15 涉及醫療險之犯罪詐欺(2)(CF_3)填答狀況表	33
表3-16 涉及旅平險之犯罪詐欺(CF_4)填答狀況表	33
表3-17 涉及意外險之投機性詐欺(OF_3)填答狀況表	34
表3-18 涉及健康險之保險詐欺情境(3)(OF_4)填答狀況表	35
表3-19 涉及火險之嚴重的犯罪詐欺(SCF_1)填答狀況表	35
表3-20 EC填答狀況表	36
表3-21 涉及醫療險之犯罪詐欺(3)(CF_5)填答狀況表	37
表3-22 涉及壽險之嚴重的犯罪詐欺(SCF_2)填答狀況表	37

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