高階經理人的薪酬一直是一個備受關注且具有爭議性的議題。過去的文獻指出，高階經理人會因為自身的利益而利用盈餘管理手段來提高的薪酬水平，從而導致代理問題。為了解決此問題，金融監管機構要求上市及上櫃企業強制設立薪酬委員會，以監督和審核高階經理人的薪酬是否合理和公平。
本研究以2015年至2022年台灣上市上櫃公司作為研究對象，探討實質性盈餘管理與高階經理人薪酬之關聯性，其中，本文更將高階經理人薪酬總額區分為非激勵性薪酬及激勵性薪酬分別檢測。實證結果顯示，高階經理人可透過操縱實質盈餘管理的方式，獲致更高的薪酬水準，包括非激勵性薪酬或是激勵性薪酬方面均是如此。另外，研究中加入薪酬委員會品質，進而探討薪酬委員會品質，在實質盈餘管理與高階經理人薪酬之間，是否能發揮影響力。實證結果顯示，薪酬委員會品質愈佳時，愈能有效降低高階經理人使用實質盈餘管理來增加自身的激勵性薪酬；但未發現薪酬委員會品質有顯著影響實質盈餘管理與高階經理人非激勵性薪酬之關聯性。

The compensation of top executives has always been a highly scrutinized and controversial issue. Past literature has pointed out that top executives may use earnings management techniques to increase their compensation levels for personal gain, thereby leading to agency problems. To address this issue, financial regulatory authorities require publicly listed and over-the-counter companies to establish compensation committees to supervise and review whether the compensation of top executives is reasonable and fair. 
This study examines the relationship between real earnings management and executive compensation using data from Taiwan's listed and over-the-counter companies from 2015 to 2022. Specifically, this paper distinguishes between fixed and variable components of executive compensation. The empirical results indicate that executives can achieve higher levels of compensation by engaging in real earnings management both in terms of fixed and variable components. Furthermore, this study investigates the moderating effect of compensation committee quality on the relationship between real earnings management and executive compensation. The findings suggest that higher-quality compensation committees are more effective in reducing executives' use of real earnings management to increase their variable compensation. However, no significant impact of compensation committee quality on the relationship between real earnings management and executives' fixed compensation is found.

中文摘要	I
英文摘要	II
目錄		IV
圖目錄	V
表目錄	VI
第壹章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	4
第三節 研究流程	5
第四節 研究架構	6
第貳章 文獻回顧	7
第一節 高階經理人的薪酬	7
第二節 盈餘管理相關文獻	12
第三節 薪酬委員會	17
第四節 假說發展	20
第參章 研究方法	25
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取	25
第二節 變數定義與衡量	28
第三節 實證模型	36
第肆章 實證結果與分析	38
第一節 敘述性統計	38
第二節 相關係數表	41
第三節 迴歸結果分析	43
第四節 敏感性分析	46
第伍章 結論	58
第一節 研究結論與限制	58
第二節 研究貢獻	60
參考文獻	61

圖目錄
圖 1 研究流程圖	5

表目錄
表 1 樣本篩選過程	26
表 2 樣本之年度分佈表	26
表 3 樣本分布表	27
表 4 變數操作性定義	35
表 5 薪酬委員會單一品質特性之敘述性統計	38
表 6 各變數之敘述性統計	40
表 7 相關係數表	42
表 8 REM與薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬迴歸分析	45
表 9 REM與薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人後一期薪酬之迴歸分析	51
表 10 REM與薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸分析-電子業	52
表 11 REM與薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸分析-非電子業	53
表 12 REM與薪酬委員會單一品質特性對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸分析	54
表 13 REM與薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬迴歸分析-刪除薪酬委員會開會次數為1次的資料	55
表 14 REM與高階經理人薪酬迴歸分析	56
表 15 REM與薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬迴歸分析	57

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