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System No. U0002-1408201209451700
Title (in Chinese) 代理契約型式之探討-以醫院競爭為例
Title (in English) A Study on the Form of Delegation - the Case in Health Market
Other Title
Institution 淡江大學
Department (in Chinese) 產業經濟學系碩士班
Department (in English) Department of Industrial Economics
Other Division
Other Division Name
Other Department/Institution
Academic Year 100
Semester 2
PublicationYear 101
Author's name (in Chinese) 李庭萱
Author's name(in English) Ting-Hsuan Li
Student ID 697540366
Degree 碩士
Language Traditional Chinese
Other Language
Date of Oral Defense 2012-06-16
Pagination 50page
Committee Member advisor - Yi-Heng Chen
co-chair - Teng-Yuan Hu
co-chair - Shiou Shieh
Keyword (inChinese) 誘因契約
Keyword (in English) incentive contract
Other Keywords
Abstract (in Chinese)
Abstract (in English)
This model established a health care market with two hospitals. Each hospital has one physician in charge. The hospital provides two kinds of substituable medicine. One is called general medicine which is subsidized by Bureau of National Health Insurance. The other is called special medicine which is paid fully by the patient. The hospital owner can apply two different incentive contracts on its physician, either its rival’s profit or the hosipital’s own quantity sold. The market is playing the Cournot quantity competition. We found that both the hospital owner and the physician will prefer that the rival hospital also use the incentive contract, as well as the delegation design is the hospital’s own quantity. Also, when the market demand is large enough, the result holds from the social point of view.
Other Abstract
Table of Content (with Page Number)
第一章	緒論	                                     1
第一節 研究動機與目的	                            1
第二節 文獻回顧                                       	2
第二章 模型設定	                                     6
第三章 以對手利潤作為契約誘因相對績效參數之設計	9
第一節 兩家醫院皆有契約誘因相對績效參數設計	         9
第二節 僅本院有契約誘因相對績效參數設計	         18
第四章 以自身數量作為契約誘因相對績效參數之設計	25
第一節 兩家醫院皆有契約誘因相對績效參數設計    	25
第二節 僅本院有契約誘因相對績效參數設計       	32
第五章 誘因契約的比較分析	                           39
第一節 相同誘因契約的比較分析                 	40
第二節 不同誘因契約的比較分析	                  42
第六章	結論	                                    47
參考文獻		                                    49
Avenel, (2008), “Strategic Vertical Integration Without Foreclosure,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, LVI, 247-262
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer, (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100
Eaton, J. and G.M. Grossman, (1986), “Optimall Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,” Qurarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406
Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel and Javier Lopez-Cunat, (2001), “Delegation and Mergers in Oligopoly,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, 1263-1279
Krakel, Matthias and Dirk Sliwka, (2006), “Stategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests,” Journal of Economics and Business, 58, 119-136
McGuire, T.G., “Physician agency,” in Culyer, A.J. and Newhouse, J.P., eds, Handbook of Health Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science BV, 2000.
Miller, Nolan H. and Amit I. Pazgal, (2001), “The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 284-301
Miller, Nolan H. and Amit I. Pazgal, (2002), “Relative Performance as a Strategic Commitment Mechanism,” 23, 51-68
Miller, Nolan H. and Amit I. Pazgal, (2005), “Stragegic Trade and Delegated Competition,” Journal of International Economics, 66, 215-231
Newhouse, J.P., “Toward a theory of nonprofit institution: an economic model of hospital,” American Economic Review, 1970,60(1): 64-74
Sklivas,Steven D. (1987), “The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives,” RAND Journal of Economics, 18, 452-458
Ziss, Steffen, (2001), “Horizontal Mergers and Delegation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, 471-492
陳佩鈴, (2009), “管理授權、專利授權與策略性貿易政策”
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