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System No. U0002-1312202109242600
Title (in Chinese) 董事兼任經理人與投資效率之關聯性:以機構投資人為調節
Title (in English) The Relationship between Managers on the Board and Investment Efficiency: The Moderator Effect of Institutional Investors
Other Title
Institution 淡江大學
Department (in Chinese) 會計學系碩士班
Department (in English) Department of Accounting
Other Division
Other Division Name
Other Department/Institution
Academic Year 110
Semester 1
PublicationYear 111
Author's name (in Chinese) 王宥璇
Author's name(in English) You-Syuan Wang
Student ID 608600150
Degree 碩士
Language Traditional Chinese
Other Language
Date of Oral Defense 2021-12-08
Pagination 62page
Committee Member advisor - Ya-Chi Chang
co-chair - 徐志順
co-chair - 單珮玲
Keyword (inChinese) 經理人
投資效率
機構投資人
產業競爭度
Keyword (in English) Manager
Institutional investor
Industry competition
Investment efficiency
Other Keywords
Subject
Abstract (in Chinese)
企業為追求其價值之成長,需進行有效率的投資決策,因此如何促進企業投資效率之提升就成為重要的議題。董事會係為保護相關利害關係人之權益而設立的內部監督機制,且惟有當董事會具獨立性時,才能有效監控經理人所做之各項計畫和決策,以此確保這些相關計畫和決策能夠符合利害關係人之最大利益。經理人於公司中亦扮演重要的角色,負責組織決策執行與經營績效,因此董事兼任經理人席次將很可能同時對企業經營團隊之決策傾向與董事會的監督功能造成影響。此外,過去文獻發現企業所處產業競爭環境會形成一股無形的強大監督力量,影響經理人的行為,再加上企業追求持續進步的過程中,必然會受到外部產業競爭環境變化之影響,故本研究藉由實證研究分析董事兼任經理人席次比例與企業投資效率之關聯性,就產業競爭度將樣本區分為低競爭產業及高競爭產業來進行討論。另外,本研究亦加入主動機構投資人持股比例作為調節變數,欲瞭解董事兼任經理人席次比例與企業投資效率的關聯程度,經由主動機構投資人持股比例調節是否產生變化。
本研究係以2014年至2018年間台灣之上市、上櫃公司作為研究之對象,並進行實證分析,研究的結果顯示,董事兼任經理人席次比例愈高,企業投資效率愈低,在企業處於低競爭產業會比高競爭產業更為明顯。再者,就低競爭產業企業而言,主動機構投資人持股比例愈高,可降低董事兼任經理人席次比例對企業投資效率造成的不利影響,是以,對於經理人具有監督效果。
Abstract (in English)
To seek the growth of its value, a company needs to make efficient investment decisions. Therefore, how to boost the efficiency of corporate investment is an important issue. The board of directors is an internal oversight mechanism established to protect the interests of relevant stakeholders. Only when the board of directors is independent can it effectively monitor the plans and decisions made by managers to ensure the best interests of stakeholders. A manager also plays an important role in a company and is responsible for the execution of organizational decisions and operational performance. Hence, if managers on the board, it is likely to have an impact on both the decision-making preferences of the management team and the oversight function of the board of directors. Moreover, from previous literature, it has been found that the competitive environment where a company is engaged in forms an invisible and powerful supervisory force that affects the manager's behavior. In addition, as a company grows, it is bound to face changes from the external competitive environment. Therefore, this study uses empirical research to analyze the relationship between managers on the board and investment efficiency. The samples are classified into low-competitive and high-competitive industries according to the degree of competition of the industry they are in. Furthermore, this paper incorporates active institutional investors as a moderator variable and investigates the effect managers on the board on investment efficiency. With Taiwan’s listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research object. The empirical results indicate that the higher the proportion of managers on the board in a company, the lower the investment efficiency and it will be more obvious when the company is in a low-competitive industry than in a high-competitive industry. The findings also show that for the companies in low-competitive industries, active institutional investors with high shareholding ratios can lower the adverse effect of the high proportion of managers on the board on investment efficiency and it has a supervisory effect on managers.
Other Abstract
Table of Content (with Page Number)
第壹章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	3
第三節 研究架構與研究流程圖	4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展	5
第一節 董事兼任經理人席次比例	5
第二節 投資效率	9
第三節 產業競爭度	11
第四節 機構投資人	13
第五節 假說發展	16
第參章 研究設計	20
第一節 研究架構	20
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源	20
第三節 變數定義與衡量	22
第四節 實證模型之建立	27
第肆章 實證結果	30
第一節 敘述性統計	30
第二節 相關係數分析	32
第三節 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率之迴歸分析	34
第四節 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率之迴歸分析-主動機構投資人為調節	37
第五節 敏感性分析	39
第伍章 結論與建議	49
第一節 研究結論	49
第二節 管理意涵	50
第三節 研究限制與建議	51
參考文獻	52
中文文獻	52
英文文獻	54
	 
表目錄
表1 樣本篩選過程	21
表2 產業分布表	21
表3 樣本敘述性統計	31
表4 PEARSON 相關係數表	33
表5 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率之迴歸分析	36
表6 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率之迴歸分析-主動機構投資人為調節	38
表7 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率之敏感性分析	39
表8 低競爭產業進一步細分為單一家族主導樣本及非單一家族主導樣本之敏感性分析	42
表9 高競爭產業進一步細分為單一家族主導樣本及非單一家族主導樣本之敏感性分析	43
表10 低競爭產業進一步細分為單一家族主導樣本及非單一家族主導樣本之敏感性分析	44
表11 高競爭產業進一步細分為單一家族主導樣本及非單一家族主導樣本之敏感性分析	45
表12 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率內生性迴歸結果	47
表13 董事兼任經理人席次比例與投資效率內生性迴歸結果-主動機構投資人為調節	48
 
圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖	4
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