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System No. U0002-1302201200401800
Title (in Chinese) 訊息不對稱下R&D的嚇阻效果
Title (in English) The Effect of R&D on Deterring Entry under Asymmetric Information
Other Title
Institution 淡江大學
Department (in Chinese) 產業經濟學系碩士班
Department (in English) Department of Industrial Economics
Other Division
Other Division Name
Other Department/Institution
Academic Year 100
Semester 1
PublicationYear 101
Author's name (in Chinese) 顏佩珊
Author's name(in English) Pei-Shan Yen
Student ID 698540035
Degree 碩士
Language Traditional Chinese
Other Language
Date of Oral Defense 2012-01-09
Pagination 40page
Committee Member advisor - Yi-Heng Chen
co-chair - 謝修
co-chair - 鄭東光
Keyword (inChinese) 雙占
Keyword (in English) Duopoly
Perfect Information
Asymmetric Information
Cournot competition
Other Keywords
Abstract (in Chinese)
本文建立一個只有兩家廠商的雙占模型,主要參考Creane and Miyagiwa (2009)的文章,考慮廠商成本訊息完全以及訊息不對稱下,在研發會發生成本的假設下,既存廠商的研發策略是否為有效的阻嚇進入策略。
Abstract (in English)
Based on Creane and Miyagiwa (2009), this paper builds up a simple duopoly model under perfect and asymmetric information on production costs. We want to find that the effect of R&D on deterring entry when R&D strategy incurs cost. 
     We find that R&D is not an effectively entry-deterring strategy. Both in perfect and asymmetric information, if the incumbent adopts R&D strategy, it will accommodate the entrant to obtain a higher profit.
Also, when the incumbent has high production cost, using R&D and accommodating new entrant will be a better strategy both in perfect and asymmetric information. However, when the incumbent has low cost, giving up R&D to stay being monopoly will be the best choice in perfect information situation. While in asymmetric information, the incumbent should give up R&D and stay in monopoly when its production cost is at the middle level, and should choose R&D and accommodate entrant when its production cost is at the very low level.
Other Abstract
Table of Content (with Page Number)
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究動機與目的1
第二節 文獻回顧2
第三節 研究方法與架構4
第二章 模型理論6
第一節 基本模型6
第二節 賽局假設7
第三章 廠商之間存在完全訊息9
第一節 既存廠商不進行研發9
第二節 既存廠商進行研發12
第三節 最適均衡解的比較18
第四章 廠商之間存在訊息不對稱21
第一節 既存廠商不進行研發21
第二節 既存廠商進行研發25
第三節 最適均衡解的比較31
第五章 比較分析35
第六章 結論38
Creane, Anthony, and Kaz Miyagiwa. 2009. Forgoing invention to deter entry. International Journal of Industrial Organization 27 (5) : pp. 632-638. 
D'Aspremont, Claude, and Alexis Jacquemin. 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative R & D in duopoly with spillovers. The American Economic Review 78 (5): pp. 1133-1137.
Gabszewicz, Jean J. and Sougata Poddar.(1997). Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly. Economic Theory, 10(1) , pp. 131-146.
Ishida, Junichiro, Toshihiro Matsumura, and Noriaki Matsushima. (2011). Market Competition, R&D and Firm Profits in Asymmetric Oligopoly. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 59(3), pp. 484-505. 
Fahri Karakaya. and Stahl,Michael J. (1989) Barriers to Entry and Market Entry Decision in Consumer and Industrial Good market, Journal of Marketing, 53:pp. 80-91
Toshihiro Matsumura, and Noriaki Matsushima.(2010).When Small Firms Fight Back Against Large Firms in R&D. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1) .
Rosen, Richard J. 1991. Research and development with asymmetric firm sizes. The Rand Journal of Economics 22 (3): pp. 411-429.
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