近年來，ESG（環境、社會與公司治理）議題日益受到全球投資者與監管機構重視，各國亦相繼推動ESG資訊揭露相關規範。在臺灣，雖然主管機關已制定強制揭露規範，但多數企業仍處於非強制揭露範圍，其是否主動揭露ESG永續報告書，已成為企業永續治理與資訊透明度之重要指標。過往研究多聚焦於ESG評級與公司績效之關聯，對於企業自願揭露ESG永續報告書之影響因素則相對缺乏系統性探討。
本研究以2013年至2023年間臺灣上市公司為實證樣本，針對法規沿革與企業自願揭露行為探討董事會結構與家族持股對ESG永續報告書自願揭露之影響，並納入百大集團、內部人持股比例與公司特性，採用羅吉斯迴歸模型、固定效果模型及隨機效果模型進行多元實證分析與穩健性檢驗。
實證結果顯示，家族持股企業相較於非家族持股企業較不傾向自願揭露ESG永續報告書；董事結構對自願揭露有正向影響；隸屬百大集團之企業具備更多資源與制度支持，更有能力與誘因自願揭露ESG資訊；內部持股方面董事與經理人持股對自願揭露無顯著性，而監事持股展現出邊際顯著之負向關係；公司規模、盈餘表現、負債比率良好之公司，較傾向自願揭露ESG永續報告書。

In recent years, ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) issues have attracted increasing attention from global investors and regulators. In Taiwan, although mandatory disclosure rules have been established, many companies remain outside these requirements. As a result, whether firms voluntarily disclose ESG sustainability reports has become a key indicator of transparency and corporate governance.
This study uses data from publicly listed companies in Taiwan from 2013 to 2023 to examine the effects of board structure and family ownership on voluntary ESG disclosure. Control variables include group affiliation, insider ownership, and firm characteristics. Logistic regression, fixed effects, and random effects models are applied for analysis.
The empirical results show that family-owned firms are less likely to disclose ESG reports voluntarily. Board structure has a positive influence, while top business group affiliation increases the likelihood of disclosure. Insider ownership by directors and managers is insignificant, while supervisor ownership has a marginally negative effect.

目錄	i
表目錄	iii
圖目錄	iv
第壹章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	3
第三節 研究架構	4
第貳章 文獻回顧	6
第一節 ESG自願揭露	6
第二節 家族持股與ESG自願揭露	10
第三節 董事會結構與ESG自願揭露	13
第參章 研究方法	15
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源	15
第二節 變數定義	19
第三節 實證模型	22
第肆章 實證結果與分析	25
第一節 ESG永續報告書揭露趨勢分析	25
第二節 樣本產業概況	28
第三節 敘述性統計分析	30
第四節 相關性分析	33
第五節 迴歸分析結果	37
第伍章 結論與建議	52
第一節 結論	52
第二節 研究限制與建議	54
參考文獻	55
 
表目錄
表 2 1各國最新ESG資訊揭露強制性規範	7
表 3 1強制規範歷程	15
表 4 1各年份揭露數量	25
表 4 2樣本產業分布狀況	29
表 4 3研究變數敘述性統計分析	32
表 4 4 Pearson相關係數	35
表 4 5 2013年至2016年個年度迴歸結果	40
表 4 6 2017年至2020年個年度迴歸結果	41
表 4 7 2021年至2023年個年度迴歸結果	42
表 4 8全年度迴歸結果	45
表 4 9全模型迴歸結果	48
表 4 10固定效果與隨機效果	51
圖目錄
圖 1 1研究流程圖	5
圖 3 1強制揭露判斷流程圖	17
圖 4 1各年份揭露數量折線圖	26

一、 中文部分

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2.吳聲凱（2024）。ESG評級、股權結構與公司績效關係之研究（碩士論文，國立臺北商業大學財政稅務系碩士班）。台灣博碩士論文系統。
3.吳鴻德（2023）。家族企業永續基因：立家規、傳家訊、樹家風。產業管理評論，14(2)，2–5。
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5.戚靜玟、詹秋碧、張瑞晃、李馨蘋（2018）。家族持股與董事會結構對企業社會責任之影響。東吳經濟商學學報，(97)，1-34。
6.葉銀華（2017）。家族企業治理之道：家族永續、企業常青。會計研究月刊，(383)，20-24。

二、 英文部分

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