近年來，隨著投資人意識的提高以及全球企業ESG（環境、社會和治理）浪潮的興起，企業的治理結構和風險管理正面臨新的挑戰。董監事與高階主管責任保險（以下簡稱 D&O 保險）日益成為企業應對這些挑戰的重要工具。D&O保險旨在保護公司的董事會成員和高階管理人員免受在履行其職責過程中可能面臨的法律訴訟威脅，包括法律費用、和解費用及賠償金。
本論文探討D&O保險對企業信用評等的影響，並結合機器學習模型分析，揭示保險與企業治理及信用風險之間的關聯性。隨著投資人意識提高及ESG浪潮的興起，企業治理和風險管理面臨新挑戰，D&O保險成為應對這些挑戰的重要工具，但其在降低法律風險的同時也可能引發道德危機，增加治理風險。本研究選取2020至2023年台灣上市非金融保險公司為樣本，使用多元迴歸分析及多種機器學習方法（如決策樹、隨機森林、順序羅吉斯迴歸）探討投保金額及其佔比對企業信用評等（TCRI）的影響。研究發現，低投保總額佔比與較佳的信用評等呈正相關，高投保總額佔比與較差的信用評等呈負相關。根據分析結果，提出政策建議，幫助證券主管機關和外部債權人在提升公司治理和保護投資人權益的政策制定中提供參考。

In recent years, with increased investor awareness and the rise of the global ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) trend, corporate governance structures and risk management are facing new challenges. Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (D&O insurance) has increasingly become a crucial tool for companies to address these challenges. D&O insurance aims to protect board members and senior executives from potential legal threats arising from their duties, covering legal fees, settlement costs, and damages.
This thesis explores the impact of D&O insurance on corporate credit ratings, using machine learning models to analyze the relationship between insurance, corporate governance, and credit risk. With the rise of investor awareness and the ESG wave, corporate governance and risk management face new challenges. While D&O insurance is an essential tool to address these challenges by mitigating legal risks, it may also trigger moral hazards and increase governance risks. This study examines data from publicly listed non-financial insurance companies in Taiwan from 2020 to 2023, using multiple regression analysis and various machine learning methods (such as decision trees, random forests, and ordered logistic regression) to investigate the impact of D&O insurance amounts and their proportions on corporate credit ratings (TCRI). The research finds that a lower proportion of D&O insurance is positively correlated with better credit ratings, while a higher proportion is negatively correlated with credit ratings. Based on the analysis results, policy recommendations are proposed to assist securities regulators and external creditors in formulating policies that enhance corporate governance and protect investor interests.

目錄
第一章、緒論	1
第一節、研究動機與問題重要性	1
第二節、研究目的	2
第三節、研究架構概要	3
第二章、文獻探討	5
第一節、董監事責任保險金額與企業信用評等關聯性之爭議	5
第二節、負向文獻綜述	7
第三節、正向文獻綜述	8
第三章、研究方法	12
第一節、樣本選取及時間範圍界定	12
第二節、變數說明	13
第三節、 研究假設定義	18
第四節 、統計分析模型	19
第五節、 模型評估	23
第四章、實證結果	24
第一節、 資料整理與描述性統計	24
第二節、投保金額對信用評等影響的迴歸分析結果	27
第三節、 投保金額相對於公司淨值倍數的特徵萃取	28
第五章、結論	37
第一節、研究結果討論	37
第二節、研究限制與未來方向建議	39
參考文獻	41


圖目錄
圖 1研究架構圖	4
圖 2決策樹整體概況	29
圖 3 特徵重要性圖（Feature Importance Plot）	32


表目錄
表 1參考文獻正反總結	11
表 2資料整理與描述性統計	26
表 3  D&O 投保金額對信用評等影響之迴歸結果	28
表 4決策樹分析結果	30
表 5隨機森林之混淆矩陣結果	31
表 6隨機森林之準確率及結果	31
表 7順序羅吉斯迴歸結果	34
表 8順序羅吉斯迴歸之準確率及結果	35

中文文獻
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湯麗芬, 李建然和廖秀梅 (2023). 董監事暨重要職員責任保險對企業信用評等之	影響. 企業管理學報, 32(1), 99-123.
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