§ 瀏覽學位論文書目資料
系統識別號 U0002-0407202212330700
DOI 10.6846/TKU.2022.00086
論文名稱(中文) 美國壽險業功能性委員會與審計品質對風險承擔的影響
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of Functional Committee and Auditor Quality on Risk Taking of U.S. Life Insurance Industry
第三語言論文名稱
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中文) 風險管理與保險學系保險經營碩士班
系所名稱(英文) Master's Program, Department of Risk Management and Insurance
外國學位學校名稱
外國學位學院名稱
外國學位研究所名稱
學年度 110
學期 2
出版年 111
研究生(中文) 鄭雅文
研究生(英文) Ya-Wen Zheng
學號 609560049
學位類別 碩士
語言別 繁體中文
第二語言別
口試日期 2022-06-15
論文頁數 62頁
口試委員 指導教授 - 何佳玲(clho@mail.tku.edu.tw)
口試委員 - 高棟梁
口試委員 - 汪芳國
關鍵字(中) 公司治理
功能性委員會
審計品質
風險承擔
關鍵字(英) Corporate Governance
Functional Committee
Auditor Quality
Risk Taking
第三語言關鍵字
學科別分類
中文摘要
本文研究公司治理機制、功能性委員會與審計品質對公司風險承擔的影響,以1993年至2020年的33家美國壽險公司為樣本,共計468筆資料。實證結果表示,董事會成員平均年齡、獨立董事比例與總風險、權益風險呈顯著正相關。董事會平均任期與權益風險、投資風險呈顯著負相關。設置功能性委員會包含薪酬委員會、提名委員會、執行委員會、風險管理委員會、財務委員會、投資委員會皆與風險呈顯著負相關。其中設置薪酬委員會減少總風險,設置提名委員會減少權益風險,設置執行委員會減少總風險、投資風險、核保風險,設置風險管理委員會減少投資風險,設置財務委員會減少核保風險,設置投資委員會減少投資風險。審計品質部分,審計委員中財務專家之比例、四大會計師事務所與總風險、權益風險、投資風險呈顯著正相關。此外,沙賓法案的實施後相對於實施前對公司治理機制、功能性委員會、審計品質與風險承擔亦有所影響。
英文摘要
This paper studies the impact of corporate governance, functional committees, and auditor quality on risk taking, using a sample of 33 U.S. life insurance companies from 1993 to 2020, with a total of 468 data. The results of this research indicate that board age, independent director percentage on the board are significantly and positively correlated with total risk and equity risk. Board tenure is significantly and negatively correlated with equity risk and investment risk. Functional committees include compensation committee, nomination committee, executive committee, risk management committee, finance committee, and investment committee. All of functional committees are significantly and negatively correlated with risk. The compensation committee has lower total risk. The nomination committee has lower equity risk. The executive committee has lower total risk, investment risk, and underwriting risk. The risk management committee has lower investment risk. The finance committee has lower underwriting risk. The investment committee has lower investment risk. The proportion of financial experts on the audit committee, the Big-4 firms are significantly and positively correlated with total risk, equity risk, investment risk. In addition, the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will also have an impact on the corporate governance, functional committees, and audit quality on risk taking compared to before the implementation.
第三語言摘要
論文目次
目錄
第一章 緒論	1
第一節	研究背景與動機	1
第二節	研究目的	3
第三節	研究架構	4
第二章 文獻回顧	6
第一節	公司治理機制	6
第二節	功能性委員會	10
第三節	審計品質	12
第三章 研究方法	14
第一節	研究樣本與資料來源	14
第二節	研究方法與研究模型	15
第三節	變數定義	18
第四章 實證結果與分析	25
第一節	敘述性統計分析	25
第二節	相關係數分析	29
第三節	平均數差異檢定	36
第四節	迴歸分析	39
第五章 結論與建議	55
第一節	結論	55
第二節	建議	57
參考文獻	59
圖目錄
圖 1-1研究流程圖	5
表目錄
表 3-1 變數定義	23
表 4-1 樣本敘述性統計分析	27
表 4-2 風險承擔變數為三年標準差之相關係數分析	31
表 4-3 風險承擔變數為五年標準差之相關係數分析	33
表 4-4 變異數膨脹因子檢驗	35
表 4-5 平均數差異檢定	37
表 4-6 設置功能性委員會對公司風險承擔影響之迴歸分析	43
表 4-7 審計品質對公司風險承擔影響之迴歸分析	47
表 4-8 設置功能性委員會與審計品質對公司風險承擔影響之迴歸分析	50
表 4-9 設置功能性委員會與審計品質對公司風險承擔影響之結果	52
表 4-10 假說統計結果	54
參考文獻
參考文獻
中文文獻
王欣平,2018,美國壽險業功能性委員會對公司經營績效之影響,淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班碩士論文。
李馨蘋與張月瓊,2006,股權結構與公司風險之實證研究,中華管理學報,第7卷第4期,頁51-69。
林彣孺,2014,自願性設置審計委員會對企業價值與風險的影響,國立交通大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
邱雅涵,2016,股權結構、審計品質與風險承擔之關聯,銘傳大學會計學系碩士班碩士論文。
徐業坤,2010,董事會治理風險預警研究,山東大學碩士論文。
陳怡珮、林翠蓉、侯啟娉、張力與謝佩娟,2012,家族所有權、公司治理與風險承擔關係,輔仁管理評論,第19卷第2期,頁59-90。
莊雅涵,2016,公司治理與功能性委員會對臺灣壽險業經營績效的影響,淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班碩士論文。
黃勻萱,2013,薪酬委員會之設置對高階主管薪酬與公司治理、公司績效間關聯性之影響,中原大學會計研究所碩士論文。
楊艷艷,2008,非審計服務對資本市場影響的實證研究,哈爾濱工業大學碩士論文。
廖秀梅、王貞靜與戚務君,2012,一套臺灣完整的審計公費資訊告訴我們什麼? 中華會計期刊,第8卷第1期,頁49-88。
蔡坤煌,2016,台灣通信產業之公司治理對風險承擔與經營績效之關聯性研究,國立中正大學財務金融學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。 
英文文獻
Adams, R., Almeida, H., and Ferreira, D., 2005, Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance, The Review of Financial Studies, 18(4): 1403-1432.
Al-Hadi, A., Hasan, M. M., and Habib, A., 2016, Risk Committee, Firm Life Cycle, and Market Risk Disclosures, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(2): 145-170.
Bargeron, L. L., Lehn, K. M., Zutter, C. J., 2010, Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1/2): 34-52.
Bhuiyan, M. B. U., Cheema, M. A., Man, Y., 2021, Risk Committee, Corporate Risk-Taking and Firm Value, Managerial Finance, 47(3): 285-309.
Brick, I. E., and Chidambaran, N. K., 2008, Board Monitoring, Firm Risk, and External Regulation, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 33(1): 87-116.
Cole, C. R., He, E., McCullough, K. A., Semykina, A., and Sommer, D. W., 2011, An Empirical Examination of Stakeholder Groups as Monitoring Sources in Corporate Governance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(3): 703-730.
Cook, F. W., 2009, A Compensation Committee Framework for Conducting Executive Compensation Risk Assessments, The Corporate Governance Advisor, 17(1): 1-4.
Cozzolino, J., 1982, How Much Risk Will Your Finance Committee Take? Directors and Boards; Philadelphia, 6(3):41.
DeAngelo, L. E., 1981, Auditor Independence, Low Balling, and Disclosure Regulation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(2): 113-127.
DeFond, M., Francis, J., and Wong T., 2000, Auditor Industry Specialization and Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong, Auditing, 19(1): 49-66.
Eling, M., and Marek, S. D., 2014, Corporate Governance and Risk Taking: Evidence From the U. K. and German Insurance Markets, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 81(3): 653-682.
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., and Matos, P., 2012, Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(2): 389-411.
Faleye, O., and Krishnan, K., 2017, Risky Lending: Does Bank Corporate Governance Matter? Journal of Banking & Finance, 83: 57-69.
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., and Wu, Q., 2012, Do Corporate Boards Matter during the Current Financial Crisis?Review of Financial Economics, 21(2): 39-52.
Hausman, J. A., 1978, Specification Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46(6): 1251-1271.
Hillman, A. J.,and Dalziel, T., 2003, Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 383-396.
Ho, C. L., Lai, G. C., and Lee, J. P., 2013, Organizational Structure, Board Composition and Risk Taking in the U.S. Property Casualty Insurance Industry, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 80(1): 169-203.
Hsu, W. Y., Huang, Y. R.,and Gene, L.,2015, Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 82(3): 715-748.
Huang, L. Y., Lai, G. C., Lu, E., and McNamara, M., 2020, Auditor Quality, Audit Fees, Organizational Structure, and Risk Taking in the US Life Insurance Industry, Risk Management and Insurance Review, 23(2): 151-182.
Huang, L. Y., Lai, G. C., McNamara, M., and Wang, J., 2011, Corporate Governance and Efficiency: Evidence From U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(3): 519-550.
Jensen, M. C., 1993, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Finance, 48(3): 831-880.
Koh, W. C., and Lee, K. W., 2017, Do Auditors Recognize Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives? International Journal of Business, 22(3): 206-229.
Lumpkin, G. T., and Dess, G. G., 1996, Clarifying the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and Linking It to Performance, Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 135-172.
MacCrimmon, K., and Wehrung, D., 1990, Charactenstics of Risk taking Executives, Management Science, 36(4): 422-435.
Magee, S., Schilling, C., and Sheedy, E., 2019, Risk Governance in the Insurance Sector—Determinant and Consequences In An International Sample, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 86(2): 381-413.
McMullen, D. A., 1996, Audit Committee Performance: An Investigation of the Consequences Associated with Audit Committees, Auditing, 15(1): 87-96, 98, 100-103.
Merle, J. A., 2010, An Examination of the Relationship Between Board Characteristics and Capital Adequacy Risk Taking at Bank Holding Companies, Anderson University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 124.
Miller, D., and Friesen, P. H., 1978, Archetypes of Strategy Formulation, Management Science, 24(9): 921.
Muller-Kahle, M. I., and Lewellyn, K. B., 2011, Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(5): 405-417.
O’Sullivan, N., 2000, The Impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality: Evidence from Large UK Companies, British Accounting Review, 32(4): 397-414.
Pathan, S., 2009, Strong Boards, CEO Power and Bank Risk-Taking, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(7): 1340-1350.
網站
中華公司治理協會,https://www.cga.org.tw/main/f_1_01_company_govern.aspx,最後瀏覽日:2022年6月29日。
金融監督管理委員會,2022,證券商財務報告編製準則,https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=G0400026,最後瀏覽日:2022年6月29日。
紐約證券交易所,2014,NYSE:Corporate Governance Guide,https://www.nyse.com/site-search?q=Corporate+Governance+Listing+Guidelines&page=1,最後瀏覽日:2022年6月29日。
PensionsWeek, 2006, Virtual Investment Committee: Issue Two: Liability Risk Management, https://www.proquest.com/docview/215540555/46AE91B7C13D432BPQ/1?accountid=14237,最後瀏覽日:2022年6月9日。
論文全文使用權限
國家圖書館
不同意無償授權國家圖書館
校內
校內紙本論文立即公開
電子論文全文不同意授權
校內書目立即公開
校外
不同意授權予資料庫廠商
校外書目立即公開

如有問題,歡迎洽詢!
圖書館數位資訊組 (02)2621-5656 轉 2487 或 來信