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System No. U0002-0407201213391000
Title (in Chinese) 雙占市場下獨家交易契約的效果
Title (in English) The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
Other Title
Institution 淡江大學
Department (in Chinese) 產業經濟學系碩士班
Department (in English) Department of Industrial Economics
Other Division
Other Division Name
Other Department/Institution
Academic Year 100
Semester 2
PublicationYear 101
Author's name (in Chinese) 李依潔
Author's name(in English) Yi-Chieh Lee
Student ID 699540091
Degree 碩士
Language Traditional Chinese
Other Language
Date of Oral Defense 2012-06-16
Pagination 54page
Committee Member advisor - Yi-Heng Chen
co-chair - 謝修
co-chair - 池秉聰
Keyword (inChinese) 獨家交易
上下游雙占
固定比例生產
Keyword (in English) Exclusive Dealing Contracts
Downstream Duopoly
UpstreamDuopoly
Fixed Produce Function
Other Keywords
Subject
Abstract (in Chinese)
本論文以探討單一廠商利潤極大為出發點,在市場中上下游廠商皆為雙占的情況之下,選定上游其中一家廠商為目標廠商,在面臨上游對手廠商沒有採行獨家交易契約與採行獨家交易契約的市場情況下,目標廠商該決定何種因應策略?再以數值分析方法探討下游廠商成本又會如何影響上游目標廠商的利潤。
  本論文依據Chang(1992)的市場架構設定與Salinger(1988)的Cournot市場競爭方式,研究結果得出:當對手上游廠商沒有獨家交易的時候,第一家上游廠商必然會選擇限制下游獨家交易做為因應策略。當對手上游廠商做限制上游獨家交易的時候,第一家上游廠商有無獨家交易並沒有差別,當對手上游廠商做限制下游獨家交易的時候,則必須取決於下游兩家廠商成本而訂定不同因應策略。
Abstract (in English)
Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of exclusive dealing contract on the other upstream firm’s choice of exclusion as well as its profit.
    We find that if the upstream rival does not imply any kind of exclusive dealing contract, either upward exclusive dealing or downward exclusive dealing, the other upstream firm will choose downward exclusive dealing contract. If the upstream rival uses upward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm is indifferent from having exclusive dealing contract or not. But if the upstream rival firm has downward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm’s choice will depend on the production cost of two downstream firms.
Other Abstract
Table of Content (with Page Number)
第一章  緒論 1
第一節  研究動機與目的 1
第二節  研究架構 2
第二章  文獻回顧 3
第三章  理論模型 7
第一節  模型基本設定 7
第二節  賽局設定 9
第三節  符號定義說明 13
第四章  對手第二家上游廠商沒有獨家交易契約 14
第一節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為沒有獨家交易契約 14
第二節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為限制上游獨家交易契約 20
第三節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為限制下游獨家交易契約 25
第四節  綜合討論 31
第五章  對手第二家上游廠商限制上游獨家交易契約 33
第一節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為沒有獨家交易契約 33
第二節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為限制上游獨家交易契約 36
第三節  綜合討論 41
第六章  對手第二家上游廠商限制下游獨家交易契約 42
第一節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為沒有獨家交易契約 42
第二節  上游第一家廠商因應對策為限制下游獨家交易契約 45
第三節  綜合討論 48
第七章  結論 51
參考文獻 53
References
[1]Abito, J. M., andWright,J.2008.Exclusive Dealing with Imperfect DownstreamCompetition, International Journal of IndustrialOrganization,26,1,227-246.
[2]Bernheim, B. D.,&Whinston, M. D. 1985. Common marketing agency as adevice for facilitating collusion. RAND Journal of Economics, 16(2), 269-281.
[3]Bork, Robert, 1978.The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself, New York: Basic Books.
[4]Chang,M.H.,1992.Exclusive Dealing Contracts in a Successive Duopoly with Side Payments,SouthernEconomic Journa,l59,2,180-193.
[5]Colangelo,G.,1995.Vertical vs. Horizontal Integration: Pre-emptive Merging, Journal of Industrial Economics,43,3,323-337.
[6]Comanor, W. S., &Frech,H E,,III. 1984. Strategic behavior and antitrust analysis. American Economic Review, 74(2), 372-376.
[7]Director, A., & Levi, E. H. 2007. Law and the future: Trade regulation. Competition Policy International, 3(2), 253-268.
[8]Hamada,K.,2005.Observation of Common Retail Cost under ExclusiveDealing,Seoul Journal of Economics,18,1,1-19.
[9]Posner, Richard A.,1976. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[10]Salinger,M.A.,1988.Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, Quarterly Journal of Economics,103,2,345-356.
[11]Salop, S. C., &Scheffman, D. T. 1983. Raising rivals' costs. American Economic Review, 73(2), 267-271.
[12]楊淑真,2000,獨家交易對銷售努力的影響,淡江大學產業經濟研究所碩士論文,未出版.
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