本文是採用臺灣保險市場市佔率前五大某間財產保險公司之寵物保險連續投保資料探討隱藏問題之實證研究，以兩個角度探討臺灣寵物保險市場中是否存有隱藏訊息，一為寵物保險契約的保額高低、二為以投保寵物保險的種類多寡。
研究結果顯示，臺灣寵物保險市場中訊息不對稱及有利選擇兩項皆存在。以寵物保險契約的保額高低來看，被保險寵物的年齡是造成訊息不對稱的主要原因；改以投保寵物保險的種類多寡來看，飼主之性別、年齡、續約與否和被保險寵物之品種，四項是造成寵物保險市場存在有利選擇的根本，並且本研究支持過往學者所提出之訊息不對稱及有利選擇的理論與觀點。

This study employs continuous insurance data on pet insurance from one of the top five property insurance companies in the Taiwan insurance market to explore hidden Information through empirical research. It investigates whether there are hidden Information in the Taiwan pet insurance market from two perspectives: the level of coverage in pet insurance contracts and the variety of pet insurance policies taken out.
The research results indicate that both asymmetric information and advantageous selection exist in the Taiwan pet insurance market. Regarding the level of coverage in pet insurance contracts, the age of the insured pets is the primary factor causing asymmetric information. When examining the variety of pet insurance policies taken out, the owner's gender, age, renewal status, and the breed of the insured pet are the fundamental factors causing advantageous selection in the pet insurance market. Moreover, this study supports the theories and perspectives of asymmetric information and advantageous selection proposed by previous scholars.

目錄	I
表目錄	II
第一章 緒論	1
第一節	研究背景	1
第二節	研究動機與目的	5
第三節	研究架構	6
第二章 文獻回顧	7
第一節	保險市場中的訊息不對稱與有利選擇	7
第二節	醫療保險中的訊息不對稱	13
第三章 研究方法	16
第一節	資料來源與說明	16
第二節	研究假說	20
第三節	實證模型	23
第四章 實證結果與分析	25
第五章 結論與建議	31
第一節	研究結論	31
第二節	研究限制與建議	32
參考文獻	34
附表	40

表目錄
表1－1 臺灣近七年嬰兒出生數與寵物登記量統計表	2
表1－2 臺灣寵物保險近七年保費收入統計表	4

 

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