本研究探討公司是否利用認列金融資產減損與裁決性應計項目以達到盈餘管理之目的，並探討當公司具有盈餘管理動機時，其資產減損與裁決性應計項目間之關係，是否受到公司治理機制的影響。本文以財務會計準則委員第34號公報「金融商品之會計處理準則」適用第一年（2006年）之上市、櫃公司為研究樣本，研究結果發現金融資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目間呈現負向關係，亦即當資產減損損失越大，裁決性應計項目會越小。進一步研究發現在盈餘平穩化動機下，管理當局會藉由提列金融資產減損損失及裁決性應計項目來達到淨利下修之目的。此外，本研究發現，公司具有盈餘管理（特別是盈餘平穩化）動機且公司治理機制越強時，金融資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目間的關係會由負向轉為正向。此結果顯示當公司治理機制越強時，越可以抑制盈餘管理的行為。

This paper examines whether earnings management motives affect the association between financial asset write-offs (i.e., big bath, incoming smoothing) and discretionary accruals.  This study also aims to explore whether the strength of corporate governance structures affect the assoication between financial asset write-offs and discretionary accruals for firms with earnings management motives. Given that firms are required to adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 34, “Accounting Treatment of Financial Instruments” in 2006, the sample consistes of all public firms listed on stock exchange market and over-the-counter excluding financial and insurance industries in the year of adoption. Empirical analyses reveal that the relationship between write-offs and discretionary accruals are significantly negative for firms with earnings management motives. Specifically, firms with income smoothing incentive tend to manage earnings downards by taking finance assets write-offs concurrently with discretionary accruals. The results document that the governance measure counters the otherwise negative association between financial asset write-offs and discretionary accruals for firms with smoothing incentive, suggesting that strong governance mechanisms could constrain the management’s discretionary behaviors.

目錄
第壹章　緒論	1
第一節　研究背景	1
第二節　研究動機	2
第三節　研究目的	4
第四節　研究貢獻	4
第五節　研究流程	4
第貳章　文獻探討	7
第一節　金融資產減損	7
第二節　盈餘管理	11
第三節　公司治理	15
第四節　資產減損與盈餘管理之相關文獻	24
第五節　盈餘管理與公司治理之相關文獻	27
第六節　資產減損、盈餘管理與公司治理之相關文獻	29
第參章　研究方法	30
第一節　研究假說發展	30
第二節　研究模型與變數定義	32
第三節　研究分析方法	40
第四節　研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源	41
第肆章　實證結果與分析	43
第一節　敘述性統計分析	43
第二節　單變量檢定的實證結果分析	43
第三節　多變量實證結果與分析	46
第伍章　研究結論、限制與建議	53
第一節　研究結論	53
第二節　研究限制與建議	54
參考文獻	55
中文文獻	55
英文文獻	55

表目錄
表1　不適用34號公報之金融商品	10
表2　我國34號公報與IAS NO. 39之金融資產減損損失與迴轉之規定	12
表3　公司治理機制之變數	39
表4　樣本篩選過程	42
表5　裁決性流動應計項目之敘述性統計－以有無盈餘管理動機做為區分	44
表6　PEARSON CORRELATION－盈餘管理動機與裁決性流動應計項目之關聯性	45
表7　盈餘管理動機下，金融資產減損與裁決性流動應計項目之相關迴歸係數	47
表8　公司治理機制強度對盈餘管理動機影響之相關迴歸係數	49

圖目錄
圖1　研究流程圖	6
圖2　世界銀行提供的公司治理架構	20

中文文獻
財團法人中華民國會計研究發展基金會，2005年，財務會計準則公報第34號公報：金融商品之會計處理準則，台北：財務會計準則委員會。
財團法人中華民國會計研究發展基金會，2005年，財務會計準則公報第36號公報：金融商品之表達與揭露，台北：財務會計準則委員會。
黃金澤，2004，談財務會計公報34號下之公平價值衡量（下），會計研究月刊，第221期：78-82。
黃金澤，2006，談三十四號及三十六號公報下之財報分析（上），會計研究月刊，第250期：84-93。
楊朝旭、吳幸蓁，2007，資產減損之動機與資訊後果：論公司治理之角色，2007會計理論與實務研討會，台北大學。
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