本研究旨在探討我國董事努力程度及公司涉險程度對董事薪酬之影響，將董事薪酬結構分為非誘因性薪酬、誘因性薪酬及總薪酬三類，並認為誘因性薪酬是公司給予董事加強監督之動機，故本研究著重於董事誘因性薪酬。董事努力以公司績效及盈餘品質為衡量基礎，以2008年至2012年在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市及上櫃之公司為研究樣本，檢測影響董事薪酬之因素。研究結果發現，董事薪酬多寡會受到代理問題之影響，當公司績效愈好、盈餘管理愈嚴重，董事薪酬會相對提高；盈餘品質愈好，董事薪酬會相對降低；顯示公司代理衝突愈強烈，對董事薪酬水準之需求愈高。另外，當經營複雜度提升時，給予較高的董事誘因性薪酬為監督動機，可避免經理人為私人利益而損害公司價值；且當公司財務風險愈高，股東會議定較高的薪酬比例來激勵董事做出公司價值最大化之監督行為。此外，本研究亦檢測超額董事薪酬與盈餘穩健性之關係，實證結果顯示，盈餘穩健性能有效地抑制超額董事薪酬的發生，同時公司會願意給予董事較多薪酬作為董事監督之誘因；且薪酬盈餘係數愈高的公司，其超額董事薪酬與盈餘穩健性之關係會更強烈。最後，薪酬委員會之獨立性與專業性愈高，愈能有效抑制超額董事薪酬。

The study investigates the effect of director effort and risk-taking on director compensation. The study divided the compensation from its structure into three types: non-incentive compensation, incentive compensation, and total compensation. Moreover, incentive compensation is considered to strengthen the motivation of supervision, so this study focuses on the director incentive compensation. The director effort is measured by firm performance and earnings quality. The study collected the research samples of listed companies and OTC in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2008 until 2012. The results show that the amount of director compensation is influenced by the agency problem. If the company has better firm performance and more sever earnings management, it would higher the levels of incentive compensation. When the earnings of a company have a high quality, the levels of incentive compensation would be relatively low. It means the more strong the agency conflicts, the more need to rely on the level of incentive director compensation. In addition, if the firm complexity is higher, company would pay more incentive compensation to directors to oversee management, that can avoid damaging the value of the company. Moreover, shareholders would give higher compensation to motivate directors to make oversight behavior of managements if the company’s financial risk is higher. In addition, the results show earnings conservatism effectively suppress the excess directors compensation, while the company would be willing to give more compensation to directors as an incentive. Then, the study also finds that this negative relationship is larger for firms with higher compensation earnings coefficients. Finally, the more independent and professional of the compensation committee, the more able to effectively inhibit excess directors' compensation.

第壹章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	4
第三節 研究架構與流程	5
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展	7
第一節 董事薪酬	7
第二節 董事努力與董事薪酬	9
第三節 經營複雜度與董事薪酬	12
第四節 公司涉險程度與董事薪酬	13
第五節 董事薪酬與盈餘穩健性	15
第六節 薪酬委員會與董事薪酬	18
第參章 研究方法	20
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源	20
第二節 變數定義與衡量	21
第三節 控制變數	30
第四節 實證模型	33
第肆章 實證結果與分析	37
第一節 敘述統計分析	37
第二節 相關係數分析	41
第三節 迴歸結果	45
第四節 增額測試	55
第伍章 結論與建議	63
第一節 結論	63
第二節 研究限制與建議	68
參考文獻	69
圖 1-1  研究流程圖	6
表3-1  樣本篩選過程	20
表4-1  敘述性統計	39
表4-2  相關係數表	43
表4-3  董事努力與企業風險對董事薪酬之影響	47
表4-4  董事薪酬與盈餘穩健性之關聯性	50
表4-5  將CEC分兩群分析董事薪酬與盈餘穩健性之關聯性	51
表4-6  薪酬委員會特性對董事薪酬之影響	54
表4-7  將CEC分兩群分析超額董事薪酬與盈餘穩健性之關聯性	59
表4-8  薪酬委員會與超額董事薪酬之估計結果	62

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