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中文論文名稱 第34號財務會計準則公報實施對衍生性金融商品使用程度之影響-以核心代理問題與內部監理機制論析
英文論文名稱 The Influences of SFAS No.34 on the Derivatives Usage-Control Deviation and Corporate Governances
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 98
學期 2
出版年 99
研究生中文姓名 楊雅茗
研究生英文姓名 Ya-Ming Yang
學號 697600434
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2010-06-11
論文頁數 62頁
口試委員 指導教授-張寶光
指導教授-陳慶隆
委員-范宏書
委員-張寶光
委員-陳慶隆
委員-許永聲
委員-王翰屏
中文關鍵字 第34號公報  公司治理  核心代理問題  內部監理機制  衍生性金融商品 
英文關鍵字 SFAS No.34  derivatives  control deviation  corporate governances 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 衍生性金融商品因同時具備資產負債表外交易、槓桿操作等特色,為保護投資者,降低資訊不對稱,充分揭露的制度有其必要性。我國財務會計準則第34號公報「金融商品之會計處理準則」實施後,預期將對我國內企業近年來衍生性金融商品的會計報導與使用程度產生顯著的影響。其次,文獻顯示我國企業多數為股權集中型,普遍存在控制股東與少數股東之間的核心代理問題(central agency problem),透過公司的監理制度,可監督大股東兼管理者的行為,提昇管理效能,保障外部投資者(小股東)的權益,因此,我國公司的內部監理機制是否有效發揮也受到相當關注。本研究以我國上市公司為樣本,並將衍生性金融商品的使用動機區分為避險與交易目的,探討公司的核心代理問題與內部監理機制是否會影響對衍生性金融商品的使用程度,與實施第34號公報後衍生性金融商品的使用程度是否發生結構性的變化。
研究結果發現:內部監理機制較強的公司,對避險目的衍生性金融商品使用程度較大,較會進行避險,從事能增加公司價值的風險管理活動。第34號公報實施後,對避險目的衍生性金融商品之使用程度顯著降低,因為新公報的規範變嚴格,讓使用複雜度與會計報導成本的提高,導致其對使用衍生性金融商品進行避險的意願下降。然而,研究結果亦顯示內部監理機制強弱對交易目的衍生性金融商品使用程度無顯著的影響,核心代理問題對衍生性金融商品使用程度亦無顯著的影響。
英文摘要 The complexity of financial derivatives and the need for transparency in their financial reporting have triggered the Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the Accounting Research and Development Foundation in Taiwan set forth SFAS No.34. The disclosures requirement under SFAS No.34 should help external financial statement users understand better a company’s risk exposure and its corresponding risk management policy. In addition, most firms in Taiwan have concentrated ownership structure, central agency problem exists inevitably between controlling shareholders and minority stock holders. Nevertheless, the presence of corporate governance can mitigate controlling stockholders’ strategically behavior while they’re also acting as management. At the mean time, corporate governance can improve effectiveness of management and protect external investor’s right (minority interests). Thus, this study focuses on corporate governance and examines the influences of corporate governance on derivatives usage. In other words, using data from Taiwan, this study examines the role of central agency problem and corporate governance in firms’ derivative financial instrument strategies. Meanwhile, this study divides the employing derivative financial instrument into hedge purpose and trading purpose and further investigates any alteration occurred after implementation of SFAS No.34.
This study finds that firms with rigorous corporate governance have higher demand on hedging purpose derivative financial instrument in order to exercise risk management, and hence, raise firms’ value. After implementing SFAS 34, employment frequency of hedge purpose derivative financial instrument has significantly lowered than before. The present study contributes this empirical finding to SFAS 34 has stricter norm which complicates the employment and raises cost of reporting, as a consequence, lowers the intent of employing derivative financial instrument. However, it is found that the corporate governance is statistically insignificant with the trading purpose derivatives usage. This study also finds that the agency problem triggers from the control deviation is statistically insignificant with both the hedging/trading purpose derivatives usage.
論文目次 目 錄
目 錄 i
圖 目 錄 ii
表 目 錄 iii
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展 10
第一節 第34號公報之相關規範 10
第二節 核心代理問題與相關文獻 15
第三節 公司內部監理機制與相關文獻 18
第四節 研究假說之發展 21
第参章 研究方法 24
第一節 研究變數之定義 24
第二節 實證模型 28
第三節 資料選取與樣本篩選過程 30
第肆章 實證結果及分析 33
第一節 敘述性統計及相關性分析 33
第二節 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性 37
第伍章 敏感性分析 43
第一節 Logistic迴歸 43
第二節 擬制性資料 46
第三節 一般產業控制變數 50
第陸章 研究結論、限制與建議 54
第一節 研究結論 54
第二節 研究限制與建議 56
參考文獻 57

圖 目 錄
圖1-1:本研究之流程 6
圖1-2:本研究之架構 7
圖1-3:台灣內、外部監理機制之架構 8
圖1-4:代理問題之架構 9

表 目 錄
表2-1 第34號公報實施之會計處理差異比較表 11
表2-2 我國衍生性金融商品會計處理準則公報發佈實施之差異比較 11
表3-1 產業類別表 31
表3-2 樣本篩選過程 32
表3-3 各年度樣本公司之使用情況 32
表3-4 各年度樣本公司之平均使用程度 32
表4-1 衍生性金融商品使用程度與相關變數之敘述性統計量 35
表4-2 衍生性金融商品使用程度與相關變數之相關係數表 36
表4-3 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性 41
表4-4 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與避險目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性 41
表4-5 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與交易目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性 42
表5-1 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:以Logistic迴歸分析 44
表5-2 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與避險目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:以Logistic迴歸分析 44
表5-3 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與交易目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:以Logistic迴歸分析 45
表5-4 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:以擬制性資料分析 48
表5-5 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與避險目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:以擬制性資料分析 48
表5-6 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與交易目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:以擬制性資料分析 49
表5-7 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:控制產業分析 51
表5-8 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與避險目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:控制產業分析 52
表5-9 核心代理問題、內部監理機制與交易目的衍生性金融商品使用程度之關聯性:控制產業分析 53
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