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系統識別號 U0002-2907200908352400
中文論文名稱 法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測對減緩資訊不對稱之探討
英文論文名稱 Conference Calls, Voluntary Earnings Forecasts and Information Asymmetry
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 97
學期 2
出版年 98
研究生中文姓名 陳俊逸
研究生英文姓名 Jiun-Yi Chen
學號 696600625
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2009-06-18
論文頁數 63頁
口試委員 指導教授-洪玉舜
指導教授-顏信輝
委員-李建然
委員-洪玉舜
委員-顏信輝
委員-范宏書
委員-楊炎杰
中文關鍵字 法人說明會  法說會  自願性盈餘預測  資訊不對稱 
英文關鍵字 Conference Call  Voluntary Earnings Forecasts  Information Asymmetry 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 公司管理者乃因減緩與投資人間資訊不對稱可帶來減少資金成本的好處,因此有意圖透過自願性揭露的方式以減緩資訊不對稱。然,自願性揭露方式很多,其中又以法人說明會的召開與自願性盈餘預測的發布為管理者及投資人所重視,因此本研究欲探討法說會與自願性盈餘預測對減緩資訊不對稱的效果及此兩種自願性揭露工具間的關係。
實證結果顯示,法說會與自願性盈餘預測皆能減緩資訊不對稱,且法說會較自願性盈餘預測在減緩資訊不對稱上更具效果。
本研究亦欲探討法說會與自願性盈餘預測間之關係,根據兩階段最小平方法(two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator)的結果顯示此兩種自願性揭露工具的確存在替代關係,亦即管理者並不傾向同時使用法說會與自願性盈餘預測以減緩資訊不對稱。又,資訊複雜度低的公司,法說會與自願性盈餘預測則仍具替代關係;但資訊複雜度高的公司法說會與自願性盈餘預測則不具替代關係。此即表示,資訊複雜度較高的公司管理者可能願意同時使用法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測,但資訊複雜度較低的公司,管理者則不樂於同時使用此兩種工具減緩資訊不對稱。
英文摘要 Since managers can lower cost of capital by reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors, they have motivation to mitigate information asymmetry through voluntary disclosures. However, managers and investors pay more attention on conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts than other voluntary disclosures, so this research would like to compare conference calls with voluntary earnings forecasts toward information asymmetry and examines the relationship between conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts.
This study presents evidence that conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts will mitigate information asymmetry. Further, conference call will have better effect than voluntary earnings forecasts.
Moreover, this study examine the relationship between conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts. Base on two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, This paper observe substitute effect between these two voluntary disclosure instruments. The result supports the argument that conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts can not help mitigate information asymmetry simultaneously. This paper also observe evidence of substitute effect between conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts when companies have less complicated information, but this paper doesn’t observe evidence when companies have more complicated information. It means that managers may use conference calls and voluntary earnings forecasts simultaneously to mitigate information asymmetry when they have more complicated information, but they are not willing to do so when they have less complicated information.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究架構 6
第四節 研究流程 7
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 8
第一節 自願性盈餘預測與資訊不對稱 9
第二節 法人說明會與資訊不對稱 11
第三節 自願性盈餘預測與法人說明會對減緩資訊不對稱之效果 11
第四節 自願性盈餘預測與法人說明會之關聯性 13
第參章 研究方法 15
第一節 樣本選取與資料蒐集 15
第二節 變數定義 15
第三節 實證模型建立 21
第肆章 實證結果與分析 28
第伍章 結論與建議 57
第一節 研究結論 57
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議 58
參考文獻 59


表目錄
表3-1 檢測內生性關係 24
表3-1 檢測內生性關係(續) 25
表4-1 各變數之敘述性統計 28
表4-2 各變數平均數及中位數檢定(法說會) 30
表4-3 各變數平均數及中位數檢定(自願性盈餘預測) 31
表4-4 買賣價差之平均數與中位數檢定 32
表4-5 股票週轉率之平均數與中位數檢定 32
表4-6 法說會召開次數年度暨季別分配表 36
表4-7 自願性盈餘預測發布次數年度曁季別分配表 37
表4-8 法說會召開次數產業分配表 38
表4-9 自願性盈餘預測發布次數產業分配表 39
表4-10 各變數Pearson及Spearman相關係數表 41
表4-11 法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測之比較 43
表4-12 法說會與自願性盈餘預測之關聯性 45
表4-13 過度認定限制式之檢測 47
表4-14 法說會與自願性盈餘預測關聯性(MtB低) 49
表4-15 法說會與自願性盈餘預測關聯性(MtB高) 50
表4-16 法說會與自願性盈餘預測關聯性(INVREC低) 51
表4-17 法說會與自願性盈餘預測關聯性(INVREC高) 52
表4-18 法說會與自願性盈餘預測關聯性(非電子業) 54
表4-19 法說會與自願性盈餘預測關聯性(電子業) 55
表4-20 法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測之比較(1997年~2004年) 56
表4-21 法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測之比較(2005年~2007年) 56



圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖 7


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