美國發布財務會計準則公報第144號” 長期性資產及待處分長期性資產減損之會計處理”(SFAS No. 144)。本研究首先檢驗盈餘管理動機下（例如洗大澡與盈餘平穩化），SFAS No. 144資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目間的關係。研究結果發現公司同時使用SFAS No. 144資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目的行為確實與盈餘管理有關。特別是在盈餘平穩化下，管理當局會藉由提列SFAS No. 144資產減損損失及裁決性應計項目來達到盈餘下修之目的。另外，本研究也針對在加入公司治理變數後對盈餘管理之影響。實證結果顯示，當公司治理機制越強，越可以抑制管理當局使用SFAS No. 144資產減損損失及裁決性應計項目來進行洗大澡及盈餘平穩化的行為。

The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 144, “Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets” in 2002.  This study examines whether earnings management incentives affect the association between the amount of assets impairment loss and discretionary accruals.  This paper also aims to explore whether corporate governance affect the association between asset write-offs and concurrent discretionary accruals.  Empirical results document that this association are subject to earrings management motives.  Specifically, for “big bath” and “income smoothing” firms, managers tend to manage the earnings downward by the magnitude of asset write-offs and discretionary accruals.  Additional analyses reveal that strong governance mechanisms have a higher propensity to constrain managers to engage in earnings management activities, namely “big bath” and income smoothing behaviors

目錄
第壹章　緒論	1
第一節　研究背景	1
第二節　研究動機	2
第三節　研究目的	3
第四節　研究貢獻	3
第五節　研究流程	3
第貳章　文獻探討與假說建立	6
第一節　美國SFAS NO. 144公報	6
第二節　資產減損與盈餘管理動機之相關文獻	8
第三節　公司治理與沙賓法案	12
第四節　公司治理與資產減損、盈餘管理動機之相關文獻	17
第参章　研究方法	20
第一節  研究假說	20
第二節　研究模型與變數定義	21
第三節　研究方法	28
第四節　研究期間、樣本與範圍	28
第肆章　實證結果與分析	31
第一節　敘述性統計	31
第二節　單變量分析結果	31
第三節　多變量分析結果	33
第伍章　研究結論、限制與建議	40
第一節　研究結論	40
第二節　研究限制與建議	40
參考文獻	42
中文文獻	42
英文文獻	42

表目錄
表3-1　樣本選取過程	29
表4-1　裁決性流動應計項目之敘述性統計－以有無盈餘管理動機做為區分	31
表4-2　 PEARSON CORRELATION-盈餘管理動機與裁決性應計項目之關聯性	32
表4-3　在盈餘管理動機下，SFAS NO. 144資產減損損失與裁決性流動應計項目之相關迴歸係數	34
表4-4　盈餘管理動機下且加入公司治理機制後，SFAS NO. 144資產減損損失與裁決性流動應計項目之相關迴歸係數	36

圖目錄
圖1-1　研究流程圖	5

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