本文以產業競爭程度代表不確定性，探討當產業競爭程度愈高時，表徵其外在環境之不確定性亦愈高，出資者為誘發經理人發揮較大的努力，經由提高經理人報償級距與公司績效之連結，有效解決經理人與股東間之代理問題。
本研究期間為民國86年至民國94年，共計9年。樣本為研究期間於台灣證券交易所上市之公司。本研究主要結論彙整如下：
一、薪酬與公司經營績效部分，總經理薪酬與會計績效呈顯著正相關；總經理薪酬與市場績效呈顯著負相關。據此，本研究結果顯示總經理薪酬的給予並非依據公司市場績效之表現，而是採用會計績效作為薪酬訂定的參考依據。
二、當產業競爭程度高時，總經理薪酬會愈高。公司愈能付出更高的薪酬以聘請有能力之高階主管為公司帶來更大的經營績效。
三、產業競爭程度高時，經理人薪酬級距會愈高。但本研究結果顯示第一層與第二層副總經理的薪酬級距與產業競爭程度呈負相關，不顯著。表示台灣上市公司之副總經理間薪酬並未有明顯差距存在。
四、產業競爭程度之差異，對於不同層級之高階主管薪酬級距與公司績效連結性部分，顯示在市場競爭之情況下，總經理薪酬級距與市場績效相對於會計績效更具有連結性。另外，對於第一層與第二層副總經理之薪酬級距，顯示公司副總經理間薪酬級距與會計績效相對於市場績效反而更具有連結性

In this paper, competition is used as a proxy for uncertainty, so that the level of industry competition represents the level of uncertainty in a company's business environment. Investors face a problem of how to motivate the managers who represent their interests. One solution is to increase the level of linkage between firm performance and manager compensation.
This study covers a period of nine years, from 1997-2005. The sample is all companies traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the study period. The main conclusions are as follows: 
1.	Pay and performance: CEO pay is shown to be significantly positively correlated    with firm performance; CEO compensation is significantly negatively correlated with average performance in the sector. We conclude that the contribution of CEOs cannot be explained by sector performance, and that CEO compensation is based on measures of firm performance.
2.	Industry competition and pay: CEO pay rises with the level of industry competition. Companies facing high levels of industry competition are willing to pay high levels of industry compensation to managers with the ability to improve firm performance.
3.	Industry Competition and pay gap: In the companies studied, there was a small, non-significant negative correlation between the level of industry competition and the pay gap between the first and second ranks of vice-presidents. This result suggests that there is no significant differentiation among vice-presidents in Taiwanese public companies.
4.	Competition, pay gap, performance: for a given level of industry competition, CEO pay gap is more strongly correlated with sector performance than with firm performance. However, the pay gap between the first and second ranks of vice presidents is more strongly correlated with firm performance than with sector performance.

目  錄
第壹章 緒論…………………………………………………	1
第一節 研究背景與動機…………………………………………………...	1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………...	2
第三節 研究流程圖………………………………………….......................	3
第貳章 相關文獻探討………………………………………	4
第一節 代理理論、競賽理論與經理人薪酬級距………………………..	4
第二節 經理人薪酬級距與公司經營績效………………………………...	6
第三節 產業競爭程度與經理人薪酬級距………………………………...	7
第四節 經理人薪酬級距、經營績效與產業競爭程度……………………	9
第參章 研究設計……………………………………………	10
第一節 假說建立........................…………………………………………...	10
第二節 實證模型....................……………………………………………...	11
第三節 變數衡量與定義…………………………………………………...	15
第四節 研究期間及樣本選取………………………..………………….....	20
第五節 資料來源…………………………………………………………...	21
第六節 資料分析方法……………………………………………………...	22
第肆章 實證結果與分析...………………………………….	23
第一節 敘述性統計分析…………………………………………………...	23
第二節 實證結果分析…………………………………………………........	29
第伍章 結論與建議…………………………………………	37
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………………...	37
第二節 研究限制…………………………………………………………...	38
第三節 研究建議…………………………………………………………...	39
參考文獻……………………………………………………..	40
中文部份.........................................................................................................	40
英文部份.........................................................................................................	40
	
表目錄

【表1a】各年度樣本產業分佈表....……………………………….………………	24
【表1b】各年度樣本產業之HHI值…………………..........................................	25
【表2】各變數之敘述性統計量….....……………………………………….……	27
【表3】Pearson 相關係數矩陣…….......…………………………........…………	28
【表4】總經理薪酬與公司經營績效關聯性之實證結果……......………………	30
【表5】產業競爭程度與總經理薪酬關聯性之實證結果………......……………	31
【表6】產業競爭程度與總經理薪酬級距關聯性之實證結果………......………	33
【表7】產業競爭程度與公司績效之交乘效果
對總經理薪酬級距之實證結果……………….........................................	36
圖目錄
【圖1】研究流程圖……………………………………………………………….	3

參考文獻
一、中文部分(依姓氏筆畫排序)
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洪玉舜、王泰昌，2005，績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性，證券市場發展季刊，第17卷第2期：35-100。
施棛婷，2006，以競賽理論探討我國上市公司經理人薪酬級距之實証研究，國立東華大學企業管理學系碩士論文。 
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楊朝旭，2004，產品市場競爭可否降低公司內部治理機制不佳所導致的代理成本？，管理學報，第21卷第2期：153-173。
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