由於國內外會計弊案頻傳，公司治理議題漸漸受各方的關注，而近年來企業邁向國際化發展以及投資大眾求償意識抬頭，國內董監事與管理當局所面對的潛在訴訟風險比過去以往而言，相對增加許多，我國證券主管機關為了落實公司治理及保護投資大眾的權益，以創造友善投資環境及提升資本市場國際競爭力，因此制定上市上櫃公司治理實務守則要求企業投保D&O保險及積極宣導公司治理的重要性，以維護董監事、經理人及投資人的權益。然而以往過去對於董監事暨重要職員責任保險(D&O保險)之研究都著重在企業之需求或發展。但D&O保險有可能影響執行公司治理的效果，亦會改變管理當局的法律責任。本文主要針對2013年至2018年台灣上市櫃企業進行分析，除了探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險是否會影響投資效率之外，並進一步討論有投保之企業，投保超額保險金額是否會對投資效率產生影響。實證結果顯示，有投保D&O保險之企業相較於未投保之企業能夠透過公司治理對投資效率產生負向影響，本文結果支持企業投保D&O保險使得管理當局能夠規避其法律責任及相關風險，反而提供機會及誘因，產生道德風險而從事投機行為，以致投資效率較為不佳。其隱含管理當局在決定投資決策時，而會將投保D&O保險納入整體決策之中。

Due to the frequent accounting fraud cases at home and abroad, corporate governance issues have gradually attracted the attention of all parties. In recent years, companies have moved towards international development and the public’s awareness of investment claims has risen. The potential litigation risks faced by domestic directors and supervisors and management authorities are more In terms of relative increase, in order to implement corporate governance and protect the rights and interests of the investment public, in order to create a friendly investment environment and enhance the international competitiveness of the capital market, China’s securities regulatory authority has formulated a code of practice for listed corporate oversight that requires companies to insure D&O insurance and Actively promote the importance of corporate governance to protect the rights of directors, supervisors, managers and investors. However, the past research on directors and supervisors and important staff liability insurance (D&O insurance) has focused on the needs or development of enterprises. However, D&O insurance may affect the effectiveness of the implementation of corporate governance and will also change the legal responsibility of the management authority. This article mainly analyzes Taiwan's listed counter companies from 2013 to 2018. In addition to discussing whether directors and supervisors and important staff liability insurance will affect investment efficiency, and further discusses the insured companies, whether the amount of insurance insured will affect investment efficiency. influences. Empirical results show that companies with insured D&O insurance can have a negative impact on investment efficiency through corporate governance compared to uninsured companies. The results of this paper support that companies with D&O insurance enable management to avoid their legal responsibilities and related risks, but instead provide Opportunities and incentives generate moral hazards and engage in speculative behavior, resulting in poor investment efficiency. Its implied management will include insured D&O insurance in the overall decision when making investment decisions.

目　錄
第壹章	緒　論	1
第一節	研究背景與動機	1
第二節	研究目的	3
第貳章	文獻探討與假說建立	4
第一節	董監事暨重要職員責任保險相關文獻	4
第二節	投資效率	9
第三節	建立假說	11
第參章	研究方法	14
第一節	樣本選取與資料來源	14
第二節	研究變數	16
第肆章	實證結果	23
第一節	敘述性統計	23
第二節	相關係數分析	25
第三節	投保D&O保險對投資效率之迴歸結果分析	27
第四節	超額投保金額對投資效率之迴歸結果分析	30
第五節	穩健性測試	32
第伍章	研究結論與限制	34
第一節	研究結論	34
第二節	研究貢獻	35
第三節	研究限制與未來研究建議	36
參考文獻	37
 
表目錄
表1樣本篩選過程	14
表2樣本之投保分布表	15
表3樣本之產業分布表	15
表4全部樣本敘述性統計	23
表5單變量分析	24
表6 Pearson相關係數表	26
表7投保D&O保險對投資效率之迴歸分析	28
表7投保D&O保險對投資效率之迴歸分析(續)	29
表8超額投保金額對投資效率之兩階段分析	31
表9 D&O保險與投資效率之穩健性分析	32
表10超額投保金額與投資效率之穩健性分析	33

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