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系統識別號 U0002-2906202023362200
中文論文名稱 再保險訊息不對稱問題-被保險公司上市與非上市比較之實證
英文論文名稱 The Asymmetric Information Problem in Reinsurance: An Empirical Comparative Study Between Listed Insured Companies and Unlisted Insured Companies
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 風險管理與保險學系保險經營碩士班
系所名稱(英) Master's Program,Department of Risk Management and Insurance
學年度 108
學期 2
出版年 109
研究生中文姓名 楊仙宇
研究生英文姓名 Hsien-Yu Yang
學號 607560165
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2020-06-04
論文頁數 67頁
口試委員 指導教授-汪琪玲
委員-田峻吉
委員-田維華
中文關鍵字 再保險  訊息不對稱  逆選擇  上市  非上市 
英文關鍵字 Reinsurance  Asymmetric Informaiton  Adverse Selection  Listed  Unlisted 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究採用2014年至2017年國內某產物保險公司之個別保單資料,針對台灣商業火災保險之再保險訊息不對稱問題進行實證研究。而本研究首要目的為探討再保險市場本身訊息不對稱問題是否存在,同時,加以分析再保險公司是否可利用上市原投保企業之公眾訊息以消弭再保險公司與原保險公司之間的訊息不對稱問題,尤其是當中之逆選擇現象。

本研究主要使用近似於Dionne et al. (2001)所使用之兩階段迴歸法,並分別透過觀察分保比例與風險(分別透過出險機率及出險金額衡量)間之條件相關性,以判別當中之訊息不對稱問題以及逆選擇之存在。根據實證結果發現,不論風險是透過出險機率或出險金額衡量,皆與分保比例呈現條件相關,表示再保險市場本身確實存在訊息不對稱問題。此外,本研究亦發現當原投保企業為上市公司時,透過理賠機率衡量之風險與分保比例間呈條件負相關,代表再保險公司所承受逆選擇之程度,於原投保企業為上市公司時較為輕微,而當原投保企業屬於非上市公司時,再保險公司所承受逆選擇之程度則較為嚴重。
英文摘要 This research analyzed the asymmetric information problems by using the individual reinsurance contract data, form a property and casualty insurance company in Taiwan, ceded by the commercial fire insurance contracts between year 2014 and 2017.
The main purpose of this research is to find out whether the asymmetric information problems exist in the reinsurance market, and also to investigate whether the reinsurance company could use the public information of the insureds, which are listed, to mitigate the adverse selection problem. We use the two stage regression, similar to the method used by Dionne et al. (2001), to identify the information problems by observing the conditional correlation between reinsurance ceding portion and risk evaluated by claim probability and the amount of claim.
We find that there is asymmetric information problem in reinsurance market. No matter what the risk is evaluated by, it will be significantly positive conditional correlation between ceding portion. We also find that there is significantly negative conditional correlation between ceding portion on primary contract and risk, evaluated by claim probability, on ceded contract as the insureds are listed, which means the reinsurer could mitigate the adverse selection through public information of the listed insureds, so we could confirm that there is more adverse selection problem when the insureds are unlisted.
論文目次 目錄
第壹章、緒論--1
第一節 、研究背景--1
第二節 、研究動機與目的--6
第三節 、研究架構與流程--9
第貳章、文獻回顧--10
第一節 、訊息不對稱之經典文獻--10
第二節 、各險種訊息不對稱之實證研究--18
第三節 、再保險訊息不對稱之實證研究--27
第參章、再保險特性與研究假設--30
第一節 、再保險特性--30
一、分保形式--31
二、再保險型態--32
第二節 、研究假說--36
第肆章、研究資料與實證模型--39
第一節 、資料來源及敘述--39
第二節 、實證方法--44
第伍章、實證結果--49
第一節 、再保險市場之訊息不對稱--49
第二節 、上市與非上市被保險公司間逆選擇程度比較--52
第陸章、結論與建議--55
第一節 、研究結論--55
第二節 、研究建議--58
參考文獻--59
一、中文文獻--59
二、英文文獻--60
附錄--64


表目錄
表 1-1、國內近五年火災保險賠款率統計總表--1
表 1-2、國內近五年產物保險業自留賠款統計表--2
表 1-3、國內近五年產物保險業再保費支出統計表--3
表 1-4、國內近五年產物保險業自留保費統計表--4

附表 1、研究變數及定義--64
附表 2、基本統計量--65
附表 3、分保比例與風險間之條件相關性~分保契約--66
附表 4、分保比例與風險間之條件相關性~上市與非上市被保險公司間比較--67


圖目錄
圖 1-1、國內近五年火災保險賠款率趨勢圖--2
圖 3-1、再保險關係圖--34
圖 3-2、再保險種類圖--35
參考文獻 一、中文文獻
中再集團、眾安科技、漢諾威再保險上海分公司、德國通用再保險上海分公司,2018,《再保險區塊鏈(RIC)白皮書》。
汪琪玲,2005,「台灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題」,臺大管理論叢,16卷2期,頁161-186。
林靜宜,2005,「再保險市場之道德危險-以本國責任保險之再保險為例」,碩
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黃依潔,2008,再保險市場資訊不對稱之實證研究,碩士論文,國立臺灣大學財務金融學研究所。
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