法國與越盟之間位於中南半島的殖民戰爭自1946年開始，直到1954年日內瓦會議簽訂停戰協定後宣告結束，共歷時了9個年頭。其間，美國為了東南亞地區豐沛的天然資源所帶來的利益，以及該地區戰略地位的重要性，對法國政府提供了大量的物資援助。在艾森豪執政時期，由於「骨牌理論」的影響，其政府決策者相信一旦中南半島淪陷，整個東南亞地區將相繼遭到赤化，因此對法國政府的援助達到了一個高峰。然而，美國的援助無法使法國在戰場上得到勝利。相反的，法國政府因為在中南半島的戰事節節敗退，而有了退出了念頭。1954年的日內瓦會議就是在這樣的氣氛下舉辦。在冷戰的架構下，以和平談判解決中南半島的戰爭並不符合美國之利益。因此，艾森豪總統與國務卿杜勒斯試圖阻止日內瓦會議的舉行。在此企圖失敗後，美國的政策轉而尋求透過該會議，在東南亞地區建立起一個共同的防禦機制，藉此防止共產主義在此地區的擴散。
   據此，本論文運用決策模式中的理性行為者決策模式作為分析的架構，探討下列的假設：
   H：參加日內瓦會議雖不符合美國國會與民意的期望，但艾森豪政府將其視為防止共產主義在東南亞擴散的手段，故仍派遣代表參與會議的進行。
   在章節的分配上，第一章為緒論，闡述研究動機與目的、文獻回顧、研究理論，以及研究範圍。第二章探討理性行為者決策模式以及對本論文進行假設。第三章介紹日內瓦會議召開的背景，並探討艾森豪政府在會議召開之前所作出的評估。本章另對日內瓦協定的內容作摘要式的敘述，並探討其背後所代表的意義。第四章探討日內瓦會議舉辦期間，美國與其他與會國家之間的互動情形。本章的焦點放在美、中、英、法四個國家之上，並對於該四國外長杜勒斯、周恩來、艾登與畢多的交往情況做一詳實的敘述與分析。第五章分別以理性行為者決策模式對於總統艾森豪與國務卿杜勒斯的決策考量進行驗證，檢視其所採取的政策是否符合當時美國最大的國家利益。
   本論文的研究發現，論文中所提出的假設獲得驗證成立。艾森豪政府藉由參加日內瓦會議，欲在東南亞地區成立一個共同的防禦機制，並藉此防止共產主義在該地區的擴散。

The colonial war between France and the Vietminh in Indochina started in 1946 and ended with the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954.  The United States provided the French government considerable logistic assistance during this period of time because of both the strategic position and abundant resources of South East Asia.  During the Eisenhower administration, decision makers were convinced of the validity of the domino theory (i.e., a belief that held once Indochina fell, the rest of South East Asia would also fall into the hand of communist powers), and therefore U.S. assistance to France reached its maximum at this time.  However, U.S. assistance couldn’t guarantee victory for the French on the battlefield.  Indeed, the French government actually sought to withdraw from Indochina because the conflict was worsening.  It was under such circumstances that the Geneva Conference of 1954 was convened.  Amidst the general atmosphere of the Cold War, ending the war in Indochina through peaceful compromise and negotiations did not correspond to U.S. interests.  Therefore, Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John F. Dulles endeavored to block this Conference from being held.  After their failed attempt, U.S. policy toward the Geneva Conference switched to one of building a collective defense organization in South East Asia, in order to contain the spread of communism.  
   In this thesis, the author applies the rational model from decision-making theory as a framework for analysis.  In particular, this thesis focuses on the exploration of the following hypothesis:
   H: Although the holding of the Geneva Conference didn’t correspond to U.S. expectations, President Eisenhower still sent a delegation because he thought that such an action could provide a means of stopping communism from spreading in South East Asia.
   In terms of structure, the first chapter provides the author’s motives, literature review, outlines of research theory, scope, rationale, and expected academic contributions. The second chapter discusses decision-making theory and the hypothesis stated above.  The third chapter explores the background of the first Indochina war, the contents of the Geneva Accords, and U.S. preparation prior to the Geneva Conference.  The fourth chapter focuses on the reactions between the participants at this Conference, especially on the U.S, Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China.  The fifth chapter uses a rational model to examine the decision-making process of the Eisenhower administration.  The last chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis.
   The thesis concludes with two main findings: (1) the evidence fits with the author’s hypothesis that President Eisenhower considered the Geneva Conference a means of blocking communism from spreading in South East Asia, and (2) the Conference spelled deterioration in the relationship between the United States and the Britain.  After World War I, the U.S and Britain remained allies and cooperated with each other in international affairs. However, during negotiations at the Geneva Conference, because of different concerns, the strategies of the two governments led to opposite and confrontational positions, eventually resulting in rising tensions between the two nations.  This underscores the fact that in international relations, national interests reigns supreme above all other considerations.

第一章	 緒論 1
第二章	 理性行為者決策模式與本論文之假設 10
  第一節  理性行為者決策模式之效用 10
  第二節  本論文之假設 16
第三章	日內瓦協定之內容與美國在會前的準備 18
  第一節  召開日內瓦會議之背景 18
  第二節  日內瓦協定的內容 29
第三節	美國在會議召開之前的評估與準備 35
第四章	會議進行期間與會國家的互動情形 46
  第一節  英國扮演的角色以及與美國之間的互動 46
  第二節  中共扮演的角色以及與美國之間的互動 59
第三節	法國扮演的角色以及與美國之間的互動 70
第五章	以「理性行為者決策模式」解析艾森豪政府之決策過程 80
  第一節 艾森豪的決策考量 80
  第二節 杜勒斯的決策考量 90
第六章 結論 101
附錄一 1954日內瓦會議大事紀 105
附錄二 越南停戰協定全文 107
參考書目 132

一、 書籍

季  明，劉  強。《周恩來的外交藝術》。濟南：山東大學出版社，1992年。
封長虹 譯，Keith, Ronald C. 著。The Diplomacy of ZHOU ENLAL 《周恩來的外交生涯》。北京：中共中央黨校出版社，1992年。
柯遠芬。《越戰之真相》。台北：國防研究院出版部，1970年。
袁文靖。《越南戰爭史》。台北：國際現勢週刊社，1981年。
斐堅章 主編。《研究周恩來─外交思想與實踐》。北京：世界知識出版社，1989年。
陳金星 譯，Lane, Thomas A. 著。《越戰考驗美國》America on the Trial: The War For Vietnam。台北：國防部編譯局，1973年。
譚  逸 譯，武文祥 著。《越戰的回顧與檢討》。台北：黎明文化事業公司，1985年。
戴萬欽。《甘迺迪政府對中蘇共分裂之認知與反應》。台北：正中書局，1992年。

二、 官方資料

中華人民共和國外交檔案選編(第一集)，《1954年日內瓦會議》。北京：世界知識出版社，2006年。


三、 期刊

王建勛。「法國與中南半島關係之演變─兼論中南半島之國際情勢」。《問題與研究》。第二十二卷第二期。1982年。頁55-68。
文  庄。「我所經歷的1954年日內瓦會議」。《黨史博覽》。第十二期。2005年。頁20-25。
李家忠。「援越抗法和1954年日內瓦會議」。《東南亞縱橫》。第六期。2006年。頁1-6。
袁小紅。「陷入泥潭─淺析艾森豪威爾政府的越南政策」。《湖湘論壇》。第三期。2007年。頁54-56。
陶文釗。「遏制與反遏制：日內瓦會議上印支問題的和平解決回顧」。《中共黨史研究》。第二期。1998年。頁44-54。
趙慧君。「國內對1954年日內瓦會議恢復印支和平問題的研究」。《東南亞縱橫》。第八期，2003年。頁31-35。
趙學功。「美國與第一次印度支那戰爭」。《美國研究》。第四期。2003年。頁81-97。
曉  音。「談判日內瓦決勝奠邊府」。《黨史文匯》。第二期。2000年。頁14-16。
錢  江。「周恩來在日內瓦會議的關鍵時刻」。《領導科學》。第十三期。2001年。頁35-38。
蘇珠瑅。「1954年日內瓦會議與越南」。《新時代》。第十卷第四期。1970年。頁35-37。

四、	碩士論文
	
賴柏村。《甘迺迪總統越南政策之理想主義與務實主義---以「有限夥伴關係」建立獨立暨非共之南越》。碩士論文。淡江大學美國研究所。2006年。
周順發。《對美國政府越戰政策的檢討》。碩士論文。文化大學中美關係研究所。1980年。
金永培。《中共對越南政策之研究》。碩士論文。政治作戰學校政治學研究所。1982年。


貳、英文部分
1. Books

Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban      Missile Crisis, New York: Longman, 1999.
Albertson, Dean. Eisenhower As President, New York: Hill and Wang, 1963.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: The President, Volume II, New York: Simon &   Schuster, Inc., 1984.
Boyle, Peter G. The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990.
Cable, James. The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.
Chen, King C. Vietnam and China, 1938-1954, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.
Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
Duiker, William J. Vietnam: Revolution in Transition, Boulder: Pennsylvania State University, Westview Press, 1995.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963.
Gaddis, John The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Gelb, Leslie H. & Betts, Richard K. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, .Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1979.
George, Alexander L. Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.
Goold-Adams, Richard. John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962.
Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington D.C.: The Brookins Institution, 1974.
Hammer, Ellen. The Struggle for Indochina, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966.
Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996.
Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Kahin, George McT. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam, New York: Knoph, 1986.
Kattenburg, Paul M. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945~75, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1980.
Kaiser, David. American Tragedy-Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, The Belknap Press, 2002.
Lacouture, Jean. Pierre Mendes France, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984.
May, Ernest R. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993.
McGlothen, Ronald Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia, New York: W W Norton & Co Inc., 1993.
Minton, Harold Communist China in World Politics, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
Morgenthau, Hans J. and Thompson, Kenneth W. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4thed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,1985.
Pach, Chester J., Jr. & Richardson, Elmo The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991.
Shilling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Synder, Glenn J. and Diesing, Paul, Conflict among Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Thakur, Ramesh. Peacekeeping in Vietnam, Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission, Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1984.
Waltz, Kenneth Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

2. Journal Articles

Brands, Henry W. Jr. “The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Thee, and the “other” Geneva Conference of 1954.” The Pacific Historical Review. Vol.56, No.1, February, 1987, pp. 59-85. 
Ehrlich, Thomas. “[Untitled] Review: Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. by Robert F. Randle.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol.65, No.3, July, 1971, pp. 651-655.
Herring, George C. and Immerman, Richard H. “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: “The Day We Didn’t Go to War” Revisited.” The Journal of American History, Vol.71, No.2, September, 1984, pp. 343-363.
Hess, Gary R. “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina”, The Journal of American History, Vol. 59, No. 2., Sep., 1972, pp.353-368.
Holsti, Ole. “The “Operational Code” Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles’ Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/ Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.3, No.1, March, 1970, pp. 123-157.
Immerman, Richard H. “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who made the Decisions?” Political Psychology, Vol.1, No.2, Autumn, 1979, pp. 21-38.
Mark, Katz N. “The Origins of the Vietnam War 1945-1948”, The Review of Politics, Vol.42, No. 2., Apr., 1980, pp. 131-151.
Ruane, Kevin. “Anthony Eden, British Diplomacy and the Origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954.” The Historical Journal, Vol. 37, No.1, March, 1994, pp. 153-172.
Simon, Herbert A. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1., Feb., 1955, pp. 99-118
Thakur, Ramesh C. “Tacit Deception Reexamined: The Geneva Conference of 1954.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.26, No.1, March, 1982, pp. 127-139.
Warner, Geoffery. “The United States and Vietnam 1945-65: Part I: 1945-54.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol.48, No.3, July, 1972, pp. 379-394.
Walli, R. L. “Vietnam: Prelude to Peace or Interlude in War?” Social Scientist. Vol.1, No.10, May, 1973, pp. 3-12.
Zagare, Frank C. “The Geneva Conference of 1954: A Case of Tacit Deception.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol.23, No.3, September, 1979, pp. 390-411.
Zhai, Qiang “Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950-1954”, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 4, Oct., 1993, pp.689-715.
Zhai, Qiang “China and the Geneva Conference of 1954 ”, The China Quarterly, No.129, Mar., 1992, pp. 103-122

3. Official Documents

U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. XVI, The   Geneva Conference, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981.

4. Newspapers

Butterfield, Fox, “Pentagon Papers: Eisenhower Decisions Undercut the Geneva Accords”, New York Times, July 5, 1971, p. 1.
Eden, Anthony, “Topics: The Diplomatic Way Out of Vietnam”, New York Times, Jan. 6, 1968, p. 28.
Finney, John W.,“Both Sides View Geneva Accords as Peace Key; '54 Pact That Ended Indochina War Was Designed to Lead to Unification of Vietnam”, New York Times Jan. 6, 1966, p. 3.
Fall, Bernard B., “That Geneva Agreement -How the French Got Out of Vietnam; That Geneva Agreement”, New York Times, May 2, 1965, p. SM28.
—————, “Text of Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in. Vietnam Signed in' Geneva Wednesday”, New York Times, July 24, 1954, p. 4.
—————, “Texts of ‘Final Declaration at Geneva Conference And U.S Statements Renouncing Use of Force”, New York Times, July 5, 1971, p. 14.
—————, “Texts of Declaration and Statements at Conference in Geneva”, New York Times, July 22, 1954, p. 2.
—————, “Eisenhower's Instructions To U.S. Envoy at Geneva Talks”, New York Times, July 5, 1971, p. 10.
—————, “A Policy for Indochina”, New York Times, May 24, 1964, p. E10.
Schoenbrun, David, “End of A War; Indochina, 1954”, New York Times, Aug. 24, 1969, p. BR1