自2013年台灣實施國際財務報導準則之後，財務報表可比性之重要性大幅提升，有利於財務報表使用者藉由有用的財務資訊作出理性的經濟決策。但近年來核心代理問題不斷地發生，使得大股東與小股東常常因利益不同產生分歧，在追求公司整體利益及個人利益時，大股東會優先考量自利報導目的，進而影響財務資訊的真實性。CEO是公司之職務代理人，在公司之重大決策上具有一定的影響力，對於公司付出多寡會因CEO在任期內的不同階段而產生不同的盈餘管理動機。本文旨在探討核心代理問題與財務報表可比性之關聯性，並進一步考量CEO任期、CEO任期第一年及CEO離任前一年之影響。研究樣本取自 2018年至2019年間台灣上市櫃公司，共計蒐集1,218筆資料，並參考De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011)之研究方法衡量財務報表可比性。本研究採用固定效果檢定模型來驗證假說。實證結果顯示，當企業之核心代理問題越嚴重時，大股東越有可能為了自身利益極大化而調整財務報表上的數字，使得財務報表可比性下降，進而影響財務報表使用者所作之決策。另外，CEO在任期第一年時，對於公司之管理政策較不熟悉且在專業領域知識上較為不足，因此CEO會為了達到別人對他的期望而產生壓力去影響公司真實的財務資訊，進而導致核心代理問題與財務報表可比性之情況變得更為嚴重。

Since the implementation of IFRS in Taiwan in 2013, the importance of the comparability of financial statements has greatly increased, which is conducive to financial statement users to make rational economic decisions with useful financial information. In recent years, core agency issues have continued to occur, causing controlling shareholders and minority shareholders to often diverge due to inconsistent interests. When pursuing the company's overall and personal interests, controlling shareholders will give priority to self-interest reporting purposes, thereby affecting the authenticity of financial information. CEO is the company's job agent and has a certain influence on the company's major decisions. The amount of contribution to the company will have different earnings management motivations due to the different stages of the CEO's tenure. This study further consider the impact of CEO's tenure, the first year of the CEO's tenure, and the year before the CEO's departure. The research sample is selected from Taiwan listed companies from 2018 to 2019, our sample consists of 1,218 observations. The study employs the comparability of financial statements measure developed by De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). This study uses fixed-effect model to verify the hypothesis. The empirical results show that when the core agency problem of a company becomes more serious, the larger shareholders are more likely to adjust the figures on the financial statements to maximize their own interests, which will reduce the comparability of financial statements and affect the decisions made by users of financial statements. In addition, in the first year of CEO's tenure, the CEO was less familiar with the company’s management policies and lacked professional knowledge. The CEO will exert pressure to affect the company’s true financial information in order to meet the expectations of others, which will lead to the core. The agency problem and the comparability of financial statements have become more serious.

第壹章	緒論	1
  第一節 研究背景與動機	1
  第二節 研究目的	4
第貳章	文獻探討與假說發展	5
  第一節 核心代理問題	5
  第二節 財務報表可比性	9
  第三節 CEO任期	13
  第四節 假說建立	15
第參章	研究設計	20
  第一節 研究架構	20
  第二節 變數定義與衡量	21
  第三節 實證模型	28
  第四節 Panel data適用模型	31
  第五節 研究樣本之選取	32
第肆章	實證結果分析	34
  第一節 敘述性統計	34
  第二節 Pearson相關係數分析	37
  第三節 研究假說檢定結果	40
  第四節 敏感性分析	48
第伍章	結論與建議	54
  第一節 研究結論	54
  第二節 研究貢獻	55
  第三節 研究限制與建議	55
參考文獻	56
  中文部分	56
  英文部分	59


圖目錄
圖1 研究架構圖	20


表目錄
表3-1變數定義彙總表	27
表3-2樣本篩選過程	32
表3-3樣本分布表	33
表4-1敘述性統計	35
表4-2 Pearson相關係數表	38
表4-3核心代理問題對財務報表可比性影響	41
表4-4 CEO任期對核心代理問題與財務報表可比性間關係之影響	43
表4-5 CEO任期第一年對核心代理問題與財務報表可比性間關係之影響	45
表4-6 CEO離任前一年對核心代理問題與財務報表可比性間關係之影響	47
表4-7核心代理問題對財務報表可比性影響	50
表4-8 CEO任期對核心代理問題與財務報表可比性間關係之影響	51
表4-9 CEO任期第一年對核心代理問題與財務報表可比性間關係之影響	52
表4-10 CEO離任前一年對核心代理問題與財務報表可比性間關係之影響	53

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