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系統識別號 U0002-2806201314540100
中文論文名稱 董事會與股權結構對資本投資過度樂觀影響之研究
英文論文名稱 The Effects of Board Composition and Ownership Structure on Managerial Optimism of Capital Investment
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生中文姓名 吳麗蘭
研究生英文姓名 Li-Lan Wu
學號 700600132
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2013-06-13
論文頁數 55頁
口試委員 指導教授-黃振豊
指導教授-孔繁華
委員-丁誌魰
委員-賴丞坡
中文關鍵字 董事會結構  股權結構  過度樂觀  行為財務  資本投資決策 
英文關鍵字 Board Structure  Ownership Structure  Overoptimism  Behavioral Finance  Capital Investment Decision 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究旨在透過董事會與股權結構,研究企業在面臨未來不確定狀況時,對於決定重要資本投資決策時是否會是影響過度樂觀傾向的因素,並嘗試以董事會與股權結構及企業資本投資決策的關係,探討是不是影響企業過度樂觀資本投資決策的重要關鍵。研究對象為國內全體上市、上櫃企業,探討資本支出增加的樣本之企業管理者過度樂觀投資決策是否有受到董事會及股權結構的影響,資本投資資料5,004個,涵蓋2003年至2008年;考慮資本投資後之經營績效具有遞延效果,故整體的研究期間為2003年至2011年,期間共計9年。
依實證結果發現,資本投資變動比率與企業資本投資後經營績效間的關聯性,呈現顯著負向的關係,表示企業管理者在增加資本投資後,反而會讓企業經營績效降低。顯示企業在資本投資決策上,可能因高估投資案獲利或低估風險,資本支出後經營績效變差。本研究驗證 Heaton (2002) 提出的過度樂觀理論,即管理者存有過度樂觀之情形而有高估投資獲利的能力或低估其投資案的風險,甚而投資淨現值為負的投資案,使企業資本投資後的經營績效變差。
文中將董事會與股權結構與資本投資變動比率做調節效果進行實證研究,探討是否會對企業過度樂觀投資決策存有顯著影響。實證結果顯示董事長是否兼任總經理、股權偏離度,與資本投資後之經營績效間均呈現負向顯著影響。機構法人持股比率、企業經營者持股比率是否設立獨立董事,均與資本投資後之經營績效間均呈現正向顯著關係。綜上所述,實證結果顯示董事會與股權結構是管理者過度樂觀決策的影響因素,可透過董事會與股權結構加強企業治理機制,有效達到企業經營績效。
英文摘要 This study aims to explore whether board structure and ownership structure are the factors affecting the tendency of overoptimism towards making important capital investment decisions when the enterprise is faced with future uncertainty. Moreover, it attempts to explore whether the correlation between board structure, ownership structure and capital investment decision is the key to affect the enterprise overoptimism towards making important capital investment decisions. With all listed and GTSM-listed companies in Taiwan as research subjects, it discusses whether the enterprise managers of the samples increasing capital expenses are affected by the board structure and ownership structure when they show overoptimism towards the investment decisions. There are 5,004 data on capital investment, from 2003 to 2008. Considering the lag effect of operating performance after capital investmen Thus, the entire study lasts for 9 years from 2003 to 2011.
As shown in the empirical results, the rate of change of capital investment shows significant negative correlation with the operating performance after the enterprise capital investment. It indicates after the enterprise managers increase capital investment, the operating performance of the enterprise will reduce instead. In other words, when making capital investment decisions, the enterprise may overestimate the investment profitability or underestimate the investment risk, leading to poorer operating performance after capital investment. This study verifies the overoptimism theory proposed by Heaton (2002), which states the managers may overestimate the investment profitability or underestimate the investment risk due to the overoptimism, as a result, they will be involved in the investment case with negative net present value, leading to poorer operating performance after capital investment.
In this paper, it conducts empirical study on moderating effect between board structure, ownership structure and rate of change of capital investment, so as to explore whether it has significant influence on the enterprise overoptimism towards the investment decisions. The empirical results show whether the chairman holding the post of general manager and ownership deviation have significant negative influence on of operating performance after capital investment. show significant positive correlation with of operating performance after capital investment, including shareholding ratio of institutional investors, shareholding ratio of enterprise operators and whether independent director is set up. To sum up, the empirical results show the board structure and ownership structure are the factors affecting the managers’ overoptimism towards decision making, and the enterprise governance mechanism can be enhanced to effectively achieve enterprise operating performance through board structure and ownership structure.

論文目次 目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構流程 6
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 過度樂觀 6
第二節 董事會結構與企業過度樂觀決策 10
第三節 股權結構與企業過度樂觀決策 13
第參章 研究方法 18
第一節 研究架構與研究假說 18
第二節 變數衡量與實證模型 23
第三節 樣本及資料來源 30
第四節 統計方法 30
第肆章 實證結果分析 32
第一節 敘述性統計及相關性分析 32
第二節 迴歸分析 37
第伍章 結論、限制與建議 45
第一節 研究結論 45
第二節 研究限制與建議 45
參考文獻 46
中文文獻 47
英文文獻 48


圖目錄
圖1- 1研究流程圖 5
圖3- 1研究架構圖 19


表目錄
表4- 1樣本產業分佈表 32
表4- 2樣本變數統計量 33
表4- 3 樣本之 VIF 共線性檢定 34
表4- 4各變數間 Pearson 相關係數矩陣 36
表4- 5企業營運績效指標為ROA之迴歸模型 40
表4- 6企業營運績效指標為ROE之迴歸模型 43
表4- 7假說檢定彙整表 44
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