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系統識別號 U0002-2806201309145800
中文論文名稱 臺灣股票市場之公司治理與盈餘管理
英文論文名稱 The Corporation Governance and Earning ManagementIn Taiwan Stock Market
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融學系博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Banking and Finance
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生中文姓名 邱志昌
研究生英文姓名 Chih-Chang Chiu
學號 897530043
學位類別 博士
語文別 英文
口試日期 2013-06-23
論文頁數 59頁
口試委員 指導教授-邱建良
指導教授-李命志
委員-俞海琴
委員-邱建良
委員-莊忠柱
委員-蕭榮烈
委員-王凱立
委員-邱哲修
中文關鍵字 盈餘管理  裁決性應計  自由現金流量比率  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 Earnings Management  Discretionary Accruals  Free Cash Flow Rate  Corporation Governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文以公司治理機能(Corporation Governance Mechanisms)為出發,探討公司治理機能對台灣上市櫃公司盈餘管理(Earning Management)是否影響顯著,比較公司治理各種機能對上市公司之盈餘管理差異。本文認為,公司內部人對盈餘管理工具之運用,主要目的皆為穩定或提升公司價值(Corporation Valuation)。「裁決性應計」(Discretionary Accruals)對公司價值影響是短期的,而「自由現金流量比率」(Free Cash Flow Rate)是長期的,其即為市場所稱「資本支出」(Capital Expenditure)。我們以台灣股票市場上市公司財務與公司治理資料,為本文驗證資料來源;再以多元堆疊迴歸分析法(Multiple Panel Regression Method)進行模型驗證。為對此項議題深入研究,本文將應變數分為四類,以此四類應變數分別與公司治理變數進行驗證:第一種以「裁決性應計」為應變數;第二種以「自由現金流量比率」為應變數;第三種以負「裁決性應計」為應變數;第四種以正「裁決性應計」為應變數。我們想進一步檢驗,在多空頭下,公司專業經理人(CEO)對盈餘管理態度是否會受公司治理機制所影響。驗證結果:一、公司專業經理人持股越多,對「裁決性應計」有顯著效應,但對自由現金流量影響並不顯著。二、公司專業經理人含公司董事持股,對「自由現金流量比率」有顯著影響。三、多空市場中,公司專業經理人對盈餘管理效果是不對稱的。
英文摘要 This dissertation applies multiple variable panelregression analysis method to test the corporation governance and
earnings management issue, and used discretionary accruals and free cash flow rate as the dependent variables. All corporate governance factors were found to have significant internal mechanisms in influencing discretionary accruals. The examination result showed that every independent variable constrains or expands discretionary accruals, and that the corporate governance system is successful for Taiwan listed companies. Again, we applied the free cash flow rate as the dependent variable, and finds that CEO shares do not influence the free cash flow rate, which did not have a significant effect in our examination. We also found that the CEO has the ability to manage discretionary accruals in positive discretionary accruals, but that it cannot manipulate discretionary accruals in negative discretionary accruals. This dissertation applies the free cash flow rate as the dependent variable to top 10 shareholders, independent directors, and boards of
directors, independent inspector could influence free cash flow rate. These examinations prove the corporate governance progression in Taiwan stock market.
論文目次 CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I
ABSTRACT IN CHINES II
ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH III
CONTENTS IV
LIST OF TABLES V

CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION....................................1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW...............................5
2.1 Discretionary Accrual.................................6
2.2 Free Cash Flow....................................... .7
2.3 CEO earning management................................8
2.3.1 Corporation governance..............................11
2.3.2 CEO Private profit..................................14
2.3.3 Free cash flow and earning management by the board of director................................................. 15
2.4. Board of director................................... 16
2.4.1 Board of directors scale............................16
2.4.2 The significant effect of the director board to free cash flow.................................................18
2.4.3 Director duality....................................19
2.4.4. Independent directors functions....................20
2.5. Inspectors mechanisms................................21
2.6 .Outside supervisor: institutions investors as outside supervisor................................................22
CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY............................28
3.1. Process of model research............................29
3.2 Variables and equations designs.......................30
3.3 Data processing and econometrics’ method design......32
3.3.1 Data interpretations of Taiwan listed companies.....33
3.3.2 Data processing.....................................35
3.3.3 Econometrics’ method design........................36
3.4 Interpretation of data characteristics................37
3.4.1 Data characteristics of situation 1: full sample....37
3.4.2 Data characteristics of situation 2: when negative discretionary accruals....................................38
3.4.3 Data characteristics of situation 3: when positive discretionary accruals....................................39
CHAPTER 4 Examination Result..............................40
4.1 F-Test, LM-Test, and Huasman-Test of situation 1......41
4.1.1 Intercept Test of situation 1 (all discretionary accruals sample)..........................................41
4.2 F-Test, LM-Test, and Huasman-Test of situation 1......43
4.2.1 Intercept Test of situation 1 (all free cash flow rate sample)..............................................44
4.3 F-Test, LM-Test, and Huasman-Test of situation 2......46
4.3.1 Intercept Test of situation 2 (negative discretionary accruals).................................................47
4.4 F-Test, LM-Test, and Huasman-Test of situation 3......48
4.4.1 Intercept Test of situation 3 (positive discretionary accruals) ............................ ...................48
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTION…....................51
REFERENCES............................................... 55


LIST OF TABLES
3.4.1 Table 1 Data characteristics of situation 1: full sample 37
3.4.2 Table 2 Data characteristics of situation 2: when negative discretionary accruals 38
3.4.3 Table 3 Data characteristics of situation 3: when positive discretionary accruals 39
4.1.1 Table 4 Intercept Test of situation 1 (all discretionary accruals sample) 41
4.1.1 Table 5 Examination Result of situation 1 (all discretionary accruals sample 41
4.2.1 Table 6 Intercept Test of situation 1 (all free cash flow rate samples) 44
4.2.1 Table 7 Examination Result of situation 1 (all free cash flow rate samples) situation 1 44
4.3.1 Table 8 Intercept Test of situation 2 (negative discretionary accruals) 47
4.3.1 Table 9 Examination Result of situation 2 (negative discretionary accruals) 47
4.4.1 Table 10Intercept Test of situation 3 (positive discretionary accruals) 48
4.4.1 Table 11 Examination Result of situation 3 (positive discretionary accruals) 48
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