根據交通部統計處報告，顯示家中僅有一輛車者通常由男性使用；汽車保險自用汽車條款中，被保險人範圍包含甚廣；保發中心統計資料呈現出， 25歲以上之已婚女性，相較未婚女性，有較高的出險次數及賠款金額。在此背景下，不免令人聯想，台灣「保單被保險人為女性，但實際駕駛為男性」的現象，似乎普遍存在。故本文透過實證研究來驗證，保險公司面臨無法觀察車主與駕駛者不一致之隱藏訊息而帶來風險分類不完全問題，所造成的交叉補貼效果。
研究上，以已出險之保單為樣本，觀察保單之損失幅度，將出險金額除以保費後，所得之損失率，以保險公司使用的風險分類變數以及控制個人非齊一性之特性變數，對損失率進行迴歸，分析保險公司是否並未依照風險分類確實訂價。其次，以上述迴歸中之殘差部位（殘差損失率）被解釋變數，以「保單被保險人為女性，但實際駕駛為男性」這項隱藏訊息為解釋變數，分析保險公司在這項隱藏訊息上，所產生的交叉補貼效果，並以險種與通路思維從旁佐證，以降低道德風險對損失率可能產生影響的混淆。實證結果發現：（1）某些特性變數對保單損失率還有很顯著的解釋力，表示保險公司確實沒有完全運用風險分類變數來訂價；（2）對殘差損失率的解釋發現，保險公司無法觀察「保單被保險人為女性，但實際駕駛為男性」的隱藏變數，確實使得這群實際駕駛者，被其他保單所補貼，而體現在「女性投保丙式車體損失險，但男性為實際駕駛者」、「女性透過非車商通路投保，男性為實際駕駛者」，結果亦是如此。

It is the fact that the insureds of automobile insurance are different from real drivers in Taiwan. In intuition, female and the married were less involved in an accident. However, the Taiwan Insurance Institute shows, over the age of 25 married women who have a higher percentage of loss frequency and severity compared with unmarried women. In addition, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Department of Statistics indicates that only a vehicle is used usually by the male in the family. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to show whether the insurers can’t observe the hidden information that the insured is different from the real driver, and focus on the variable of gender to find the empirical evidence of the cross-subsidization from imperfect risk-classification. We employ the OLS regression method and measure the loss ratio in terms of loss severity.  As a result, we find the evidence that many variables have not be sorted out completely. Futhermore, the findings that cross subsidization with the policies of the female insured is different from the real driver, especially in collision automobile insurance and non-dealer of car associated with the sale of automobile insurance.

目錄
第壹章 緒論	1
第一節  研究背景	1
第二節  研究動機與目的	5
第三節  論文架構	11

第貳章 文獻回顧	13
第一節 風險分類相關文獻	14
第二節 逆選擇相關文獻	18
第三節 交叉補貼相關文獻	21

第參章  研究資料與研究方法	24
第一節 資料來源	25
第二節 資料概述	26
第三節 研究方法	30

第肆章 實證結果分析	34
第一節 損失率之迴歸分析	34
第二節 殘差損失率之迴歸分析	43

第伍章 結論與建議	45

參考文獻	48

附錄	52

 
圖表目錄
圖1-1、論文架構圖	12

表1-1、汽車駕駛人出險分析─以女性為例	4
表1-2、產險業務保費收入統計	8
表1-3、產險業務賠款支出統計	9
表1-4、汽車保險賠款率統計	10
附表1、 變數定義表	52
附表2、 變數之敘述性統計	54
附表3、 整體樣本之損失率迴歸分析	55
附表4、 甲、乙式車體險之損失率迴歸分析	56
附表5、 丙式車體險之損失率迴歸分析	57
附表6、 車商通路之損失率迴歸分析	58
附表7、 非車商通路之損失率迴歸分析	59
附表8、 殘差損失率之迴歸分析	60

一、中文部分	
1.方明川、陳強、謝良瑾、吳芬芳，1994，「汽車險費率從人因素之探討」，財政部保險司研究報告。
2.江朝峰，1993，「車損險危險分類制度之探討」，保險專刊，第34輯，頁：197-208。
3.洪介偉、周志諺，2004，「自用車車體損失險出險因素之探討」，保險專刊，第20卷第2期，頁：131-157。
4.孫翼芸，2008，「對台灣商業癌症保險訊息不對稱之研究」，實踐大學財務金融與保險研究所碩士論文。
5.張金裕、李美杏，1995，「汽車保險費率分類模式之較佳估計」，保險專刊，第42輯，頁：99-111。
6.賴曜賢，1995，「我國任意汽車保險市場經營危機」，保險專刊，第42輯，頁：138-156。
 
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