中國上市公司自2005年開始進行股權分置改革，企圖修正股份制發展初期為配合國家政策與經濟體制影響而形成的流通股與非流通股並存之獨特股權結構。本研究旨在探討中國股權分置改革對上市公司股權結構所產生之改變，是否會對其盈餘穩健性產生影響，以期進一步瞭解中國上市公司在其制度環境制約下，股權結構與公司治理效率及會計資訊品質的關係。本研究主要包括下列三個研究子題：(1)股權分置政策造成中國上市公司有同股不同權、同股不同價的問題，且流通股不論持股多少都將只是公司的小股東，對公司的經營決策影響有限，而以股權分置改革流動非流通股作為改善公司治理的重要機制，則非流通股的減少是否能提昇盈餘穩健性；(2)中國上市公司大多為國有股一股獨大，股權分置改革後股權結構變動，在國有股減持下，對於盈餘穩健性是否有影響；(3)中國上市公司股權高度集中於大股東，股權分置改革後形成股權分散，大股東持股比例的變動對於盈餘穩健性是否產生影響。本研究以2003年至2008年中國上市公司樣本，運用Basu(1997)及Ball and Shivakumar (2005)盈餘時效性不對稱模型衡量穩健性的程度。本研究主要發現為：(1)中國政府施行股權分置改革流動非流通股確實有可能改善公司治理，繼而提升盈餘具穩健性；(2)政府持股比例愈高有愈不穩健的盈餘；(3)大股東持股比例較少或股權較為分散時，盈餘穩健性較高。

This thesis investigates the incremental effects of state ownership and non-tradable shares on earnings conservatism, examining data of Chinese listed companies. The split share structure represented a major hurdle to China’s financial market development. In 2005 the Chinese authorities have launched a structural reform program aiming at circulating state and non-tradable shares. The reform is expected to have important effects on the corporate governance and improve the earnings quality. The thesis employs the concept of earnings conservatism to define earnings quality and adopt empirical models developed by Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to measure the degree of earnings conservatism. The empirical results show that earnings conservatism increases since the reform. Consistent with prior studies, the earnings of companies with lower state-ownership and non-tradable shares remain sensitive to bad news, reflecting overall greater conservatism. This point demonstrates that the companies with state and concentrated ownership structures are more likely to depend on private communication to reduce information asymmetry and to resolve agency problems internally, thereby creating a low demand for earnings conservatism. This thesis provides an early evaluation of the reform and contribute to our understanding of how companies’ ownership structures affect the properties of earnings in emerging markets.

目錄
第一章　緒論	1
第一節　研究背景與動機	1
第二節　研究目的	4
第三節　研究架構	5
第四節　研究流程	6
第二章　文獻回顧與假說	7
第一節　股權分置改革	7
第三節　股權結構對盈餘穩健性之影響	15
第三章　研究方法	23
第一節　研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源	23
第二節　實證模型與變數定義	23
第四章　敘述性統計、實證結果與敏感性測試	28
第一節　敘述性統計與實證結果	28
第二節　敏感性測試	38
第五章　研究結論、限制與建議	46
第一節　研究結論	46
第二節　研究限制與建議	49
中文文獻	50
英文文獻	51
圖目錄
圖1　研究流程圖	6
表目錄
表1　樣本選擇	28
表2　盈餘與報酬率基本敘述統計量	29
表3　中國盈餘穩健性分析	31
表4　敘述性統計量	32
表5　相關係數分析	33
表6　盈餘穩健性迴歸分析	36
表7　股權比例	37
表8　盈餘穩健性之敏感性測試	39
表9　以BALL AND SHIVAKUMAR (2005)模型的敏感性分析	41
表10　股改限售解禁與流通情況	42
表11　證券市場概況表	42
表12　股權制衡與盈餘穩健性的敏感性分析	45

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