過去有許多的文獻在代理的架構下，探討有關公司投資決策之適當性。而發現在每一個個體均追求自我利益極大化下，管理者所採取的投資策略常存在過度投資或投資不足現象。因此，有許多研究更進一步的探討企業應採用之因應策略來有效解決投資代理問題。其中，也顯示股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策確實能夠有效解決投資之代理問題。但是早期研究幾乎僅單一探討股票選擇權獎酬計劃或股利政策對投資決策的影響，卻鮮少同時探討。且過去文獻未嘗針對將投資決策、股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策三者間關係，同時建立起一聯立方程式探討彼此可能潛在的內生關係。故本研究旨在以代理問題的角度，利用三階段最小平方法聯立迴歸模型，探討公司的投資決策、股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策彼此之間的內生關係。本文研究結果發現，在減緩投資代理問題之機制上，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策能有效地減緩過度投資與投資不足代理問題。另外，本研究欲探討股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策在減緩投資代理問題的使用工具上，是否具有相互替代或互補的關係。研究結果發現，在過度投資方面，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策兩者之間呈顯著負相關。因此，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策在降低過度投資代理問題的使用工具上具有相互替代的關係。而在投資不足方面，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策兩者之間呈顯著正相關。因此，CEO股票選擇權與股利政策在降低投資不足代理問題的使用工具上具有互補的關係。

Prior studies consider how agency problems influence managerial investment decisions. Agency problems could lead managers either into overinvestment or underinvestment. In addition, some empirical studies have investigated the impact of managerial incentive compensation or dividend policy on agency problems of investment respectively. However, managerial incentive compensation and dividend policy may jointly improve investment agency problems and thus, this study deeply investigates their relationship. Specifically, the main purpose of this study is to explore the governance implications of a firm’s CEO stock options and dividend decision in controlling overinvestment and underinvestment problem. In this study, we address the potentially endogenous relation among investment decision, managerial incentive compensation, and dividend policy by estimating a three-stage least squares regression model. To distinguish between the overinvestment and underinvestment, we subdivide the sample by Tobin’s Q (Koch and Shenoy, 1999; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1994; Broussard, Buchenroth, and Pilotte, 2004). The empirical results suggest that CEO stock options and dividend policy can mitigate a firm’s overinvestment and underinvestment problem. Moreover, we investigate the relationship between CEO stock options and dividend policy in dealing with overinvestment and underinvestment problem. We find that CEO stock options and dividend policy are negatively associated with each other, indicating they act as substitute-monitoring forces for overinvestment problem. We also find that CEO stock options and dividend policy are positively related with each other, indicating they act as complements in alleviating the underinvestment problem.

目錄
第壹章　緒論	1
第一節　研究背景與動機	1
第二節　研究目的	3
第三節　研究貢獻	3
第四節　研究流程	5
第貳章　文獻探討與假說發展	7
第一節　投資決策與代理問題	7
第二節　股票選擇權獎酬計劃與投資決策	14
第三節　股利政策與投資決策	21
第四節　股票選擇權獎酬計劃與股利政策	24
第参章　研究方法	27
第一節　過度投資與投資不足之衡量	27
第二節　研究方法－聯立方程式模型	27
第三節　實證模型與變數衡量	30
第四節　研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源	36
第肆章　實證結果分析與討論	37
第一節　敘述性統計	37
第二節　相關分析結果	39
第三節　實證分析	41
第四節　敏感性分析	44
第伍章　結論與建議	64
第一節　研究結論與建議	64
第二節　研究限制與後續建議	66
參考文獻	67
中文文獻	67
英文文獻	67

 
表目錄
表1　投資代理問題與股票選擇權獎酬計劃關係之文獻整理	20
表2　投資代理問題與股利政策關係之文獻整理	24
表3　階的認定之彙總	30
表4　變數衡量彙總表	36
表5　樣本敘述性統計量表	38
表6　PEARSON積差相關係數矩陣	40
表7　過度投資聯立方程式模型分析結果表	43
表8　投資不足聯立方程式模型分析結果表	44
表9　樣本分類狀況	47
表10　以全體樣本TOBIN’S Q中位數劃分過度投資與投資不足之分析結果表	51
表10　以全體樣本TOBIN’S Q中位數劃分過度投資與投資不足之分析結果表(續)	52
表11　投資以資本支出加研發支出除以銷貨淨額來衡量之分析結果表	53
表11　投資以資本支出加研發支出除以銷貨淨額來衡量之分析結果表(續)	54
表12　投資以資本支出加研發支出除以銷貨淨額來衡量之分析結果表	55
表12　投資以資本支出加研發支出除以銷貨淨額來衡量之分析結果表(續)	56
表13　以所屬產業TOBIN’S Q中位數劃分過度投資與投資不足之分析結果表	57
表13　以所屬產業TOBIN’S Q中位數劃分過度投資與投資不足之分析結果表(續)	58
表14　以現金獎酬當管理誘因之分析結果表	59
表14　以現金獎酬當管理誘因之分析結果表(續)	60
表15　以庫藏股決策當減緩工具之分析結果表	61
表15　以庫藏股決策當減緩工具之分析結果表(續)	62
表16　實證結果彙總表	63

 
圖目錄
圖1　研究架構圖	4
圖2　研究流程圖	6
圖3　股票選擇權獎酬計劃之2×2矩陣	15

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