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系統識別號 U0002-2806200514213400
中文論文名稱 公司治理與投資支出關聯性之研究
英文論文名稱 The Association between Corporate Governance and Investment Expenditures
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生中文姓名 甘世芬
研究生英文姓名 Shin-Fen Ken
學號 692470304
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2005-06-15
論文頁數 81頁
口試委員 指導教授-葉金成
委員-傅澤偉
委員-倪衍森
中文關鍵字 公司治理  資本支出  裁決性支出  結構方程模式 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  capital expenditure  discretionary expenditure  Structural Equation Modeling 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 本研究旨在探討公司治理與投資支出間之關聯性,鑒於投資支出之性質與管理者裁量權之不同,投資支出可區分為資本支出與裁決性支出,透過個別性與整體性治理機制探討公司治理與資本支出和裁決性支出之關聯性,幫助資金提供者及其他利害關係人,從不同角度觀察企業投資行為。然而,有鑒於公司治理評等之相關研究對於公司治理各構面所佔權重之決定過於主觀,因此,本研究應用結構方程模式(Structural Equation Modeling, SEM),估計各構面之結構關係以計算各公司治理構面之權重。
本研究以2000年至2003年台灣上市公司進行實證分析,結果發現公司治理與資本支出和裁決性支出呈現不同之關聯性,顯示公司治理對於不同性質之投資支出會產生不同影響;而從個別治理機制與投資支出之結果,發現個別機制之迴歸結果並不一致,無法從中得到一具體之結論,所以僅觀察局部機制無法有效了解公司投資支出行為;而從整體性公司治理指標之結果,發現台灣上市公司之公司治理機制能有效監控「過度投資」及「短視投資」之代理問題。
英文摘要 This paper examines the association between corporate governance and investment expenditures. Based on the nature of investment expenditures and managerial discretion, investment expenditures may be divided into the capital expenditure and discretionary expenditure. We study the association between individual governance mechanisms, comprehensive corporate governance, and investment expenditures to help stakeholders observe the behavior of the investment from different perspectives. In addition, we use Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to estimate each governance structures’ weight, instead of subjective weight in previous study.
The empirical results, according to the data from year 2000 to 2003 in Taiwan security market, show that it is different associations between corporate governance, capital investment, and discretionary expenditure, corporate governance will produce different impact for each kind of investment expenditure. From the association analysis of individual indicator of corporate governance and investment, we found the results of various indicators are not in unanimity, not get a consistent conclusion; so it is unable to understand effectively that the company’ investment behavior to only observe some indicator. Finally, from the association analysis results of the comprehensive indicator of corporate governance and investment we find that corporate governance can monitor the agency problem of over-investment and myopic investment behavior effectively.
論文目次 目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 投資決策之探討 6
第二節 代理問題與公司治理機制之探討 11
第三節 公司治理機制與投資支出之相關實證文獻 21
第四節 文獻評述 26
第參章 研究方法 28
第一節 研究架構 28
第二節 研究假說 30
第三節 研究變數定義 35
第四節 研究設計 39
第肆章 實證結果與分析 50
第一節 公司治理構面權重計算分析 50
第二節 敘述性統計分析 54
第三節 相關分析 57
第四節 公司治理與投資支出之探討 59
第五節 公司治理構面權重之敏感性測試 70
第伍章 研究結論與建議 71
第一節 結論 71
第二節 建議 73
第三節 限制 74
參考文獻 75


圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖 5
圖2-1 世界銀行公司治理架構 15
圖3-1 研究架構圖 29
圖3-2 SEM模式 42
圖3-3 公司治理綜合性指標構面之結構關係模式 46
圖3-4 公司治理綜合性指標構面之結構方程模式 47


表目錄
表2-1 投資支出效益之相關文獻 10
表2-2 代理問題彙整表 12
表2-3 解決權益代理問題之治理機制 17
表2-4 解決負債代理問題之治理機制 18
表2-5 公司治理五個構面、17個變數與公司績效之關係 20
表3-1 變數衡量彙總表 38
表3-2 樣本分配表 39
表4-1 模式整體配適度評估結果 50
表4-2 結構模式之評估結果 51
表4-3 公司治理構面之權重 52
表4-4 相關公司治理評等系統治理構面權重比較表 52
表4-5 測量模式評估結果 53
表4-6 各變數之敘述統計值(樣本數=1449) 55
表4-7 高科技與傳統產業相關變數之平均數及差異性檢定 56
表4-8 自變數間相關係數 58
表4-9 個別公司治理機制與投資支出之關聯 61
表4-10 整體性公司治理指標與投資支出之影響 62
表4-11 個別公司治理機制對投資支出之影響-以產業個別檢驗 65
表4-12 整體性公司治理指標與投資支出之關聯-以產業個別檢驗 66
表4-13 個別公司治理機制與投資支出之關聯-以受產業影響下檢驗 68
表4-14 整體性公司治理指標與投資支出之關聯-以受產業影響下檢驗 69
表4-15 整體性治理機制與資本支出之實證結果-敏感性分析 70
表4-16 整體性治理機制與裁決性支出之實證結果-敏感性分析 70

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