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系統識別號 U0002-2707201513052000
中文論文名稱 美國產險業高階經理人薪酬與董事會薪酬對準備金操縱之影響-是否存在合謀現象
英文論文名稱 CEO compensation, board compensation and reserve error - Collusion in U. S. property-casualty insurance industry
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 保險學系保險經營碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Insurance
學年度 103
學期 2
出版年 104
研究生中文姓名 洪良慶
研究生英文姓名 Liang-Ching Hung
學號 602560228
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2015-06-26
論文頁數 67頁
口試委員 指導教授-湯惠雯
委員-王朝仕
委員-繆震宇
中文關鍵字 公司治理  董事會  高階經理人  薪酬  準備金操縱  兩階段最小平方法  固定效果模型 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  board  CEO  compensation  reserve error  2SLS  fixed-effect model 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究旨在探討美國產險公司董事會與高階經理人是否合謀操縱賠款準備金。由於董事薪酬與高階經理人薪酬可能存在內生性,本研究同時採用兩階段最小平方法(two-stage least square method, 2SLS)與固定效果模型(fixed-effect model)估計迴歸模型。本研究亦檢視董事與高階經理人誘因薪酬的關係,並探討董事與高階經理人在誘因薪酬下,是否也有合謀操縱賠款準備金之情形。實證結果顯示,董事與高階經理人間的薪酬呈現顯著的正相關;高階經理人薪酬與準備金誤差值亦呈現顯著的正相關。本研究推測,當高階經理人薪酬較低,或者未達激勵薪酬計畫的上限時,會設法提升公司的淨收益,此時高階經理人會低估準備金,以期獲取較高薪酬。此外,本研究發現,受超額董事薪酬影響的高階經理人薪酬與準備金誤差呈現更為顯著的正向關係,此結果再次驗證董事與高階經理人很可能為了薪酬的極大化,而合謀操縱準備金。然而,高階經理人誘因薪酬與準備金誤差則呈現不顯著的正向關係,故誘因薪酬可能減少高階經理人與董事合謀操縱準備金之動機。因此,本研究對於董事會與高階經理人薪酬之相關研究,提出了新的證據。
英文摘要 This thesis aims to investigate whether board members and CEO collude to manipulate loss reserve in U.S. property-casualty insurance industry. Because there may exist an endogeneity problem between CEO compensation and board compensation, this thesis uses both two-stage least square method (2SLS) and fixed-effect model to test regression models.The empirical results show that excess director compensation has a positive relationship with CEO compensation, and CEO compensation also has a significant and positive correlation with reserve error. We speculate that CEOs who receive lower compensation or bonuses that do not reach the cap tend to underestimate current-year loss reserve in order to obtain higher compensation. This thesis also finds that CEO compensation due to director excess compensation has a more significantly positive effect on reserve error than CEO compensation does. This result has proven that directors and CEO are likely to conspire to manipulate loss reserve in order to maximize their compensation. CEO’s incentive compensation is also positively correlated with reserve error but not significant in our result, because incentive compensation may decrease collusion. Therefore, we propose a new evidence for the literature on board and CEO compensation.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 1
第三節 研究架構 2
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 董事會與高階經理人薪酬關聯性 4
第二節 高階經理人與保險公司賠款準備金操縱關聯性 7
第三章 研究方法 11
第一節 研究假說 11
第二節 研究變數與模型設定 12
第三節 資料來源與樣本選取 19
第四章 實證結果分析 24
第一節 敘述性統計 24
第二節 相關分析 28
第三節 平均數差異檢定 31
第四節 實證結果分析 37
第五章 結論與建議 53
第一節 結論 53
第二節 研究限制與建議 54
參考文獻 55
附錄一 60
圖目錄
圖1:研究流程圖 3
圖2:代理理論與忠僕理論的董事及經理人關係 7
表目錄
表3-1:NAIC SCHEDULE P – PART2統計表:2013年度 X公司 13
表3-2:樣本選取過程 21
表3-3:研究期間樣本公司各年度平均ROA、EPS 及資產分布 (依S&P指數占比分類) 22
表3-4:研究變數定義總表 23
表4-1:研究變數之敘述性統計 26
表4-2-1:董事平均薪酬分年度基本統計量 27
表4-2-2:高階經理人薪酬分年度基本統計量 27
表4-3:PEARSON 相關係數 29
表4-4:多元共線性診斷 30
表4-5-1:金融控股與非金融控股產險公司之平均數差異性檢定 33
表4-5-2:S&P大型股與小型股公司之平均數差異性檢定 34
表4-5-3:S&P中型股與非S&P指數公司之平均數差異性檢定 35
表4-5-4:KFS準備金誤差值高估與低估公司之平均數差異性檢定 36
表4-6-1:董事會薪酬之迴歸結果 41
表4-6-2:高階經理人薪酬之迴歸結果 42
表4-6-3:KFS準備金操縱對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸結果 43
表4-6-4:KFS準備金操縱對高階經理人薪酬(受超額董事薪酬影響部分)之迴歸結果 44
表4-7-1:董事會誘因薪酬之迴歸結果 46
表4-7-2:高階經理人誘因薪酬之迴歸結果 47
表4-7-3:KFS準備金操縱對高階經理人誘因薪酬之迴歸結果 48
表4-7-4:KFS準備金操縱對高階經理人誘因薪酬(受超額董事誘因薪酬影響部分)之迴歸結果 49
表4-8-1:公司績效對高階經理人薪酬之迴歸結果 51
表4-8-2:公司績效對高階經理人薪酬(受超額董事薪酬影響部分)之迴歸結果 52
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3.洪榮華、陳香如、王玉珍,2008,「公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係--股權結構與董事會特性的觀點」,輔仁管理評論,12卷3期 ,頁23-40。
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