本研究樣本為Standard & Poor's(S&P)Global Reinsurance Highlights 2017研究報告書中Top 40 Global Reinsurance Groups共40家再保險公司，樣本期間為2007年至2017年，共440筆樣本。探討全球再保險業公司治理對公司經營績效之影響，實證結果顯示公司治理部分，與董事會規模大小呈顯著正相關，其餘公司治理變數在本研究中則皆無顯著之相關性。控制變數部分，再保險業經營績效與其信用評等呈顯著正相關，損失率則為負相關，公司規模、財務槓桿、巨災損失成本、保險滲透度及公司設立地域別等皆無顯著性結果。
    本研究進一步分析公司設立之地域別對公司經營績效是否產生影響，實證結果顯示公司治理部分，董事長兼任總經理僅於美洲再保險市場中呈現顯著負相關，董事會規模大小則於歐洲再保險市場中呈現顯著正相關，董事會平均年齡於亞洲再保險市場呈顯著負相關，獨立董事占董事會席次比例於亞洲再保險市場為顯著負相關及美洲再保險市場呈顯著正相關，此外是否由四大會計師事務所審計於亞洲市場呈顯著正相關。控制變數方面，亞洲再保險市場顯示公司規模及財務槓桿具有顯著性，與公司規模呈顯著正相關，而財務槓桿則為負相關，美洲再保險市場則於損失率呈現負相關。最終考量金融海嘯前後再保險業公司治理機制對公司經營績效之影響，研究結果顯示董事長兼任總經理與董事會規模大小對於公司經營績效呈顯著正相關。本研究可供再保險業實施公司治理機制以提升公司經營績效之參考。

The sample of this study is the Top 40 Global Reinsurance Groups in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) Global Reinsurance Highlights 2017 research report, with a total of 440 samples from 2007 to 2017. The impact of corporate governance on the firm performance is discussed. The empirical results show that the size of the board is significantly and positively related to firm performance, while the other corporate governance variables are insignificant in this study. For the control variables, the rating (loss rate) of reinsurance company is significantly and positively (negatively) related to firm performance, and insignificant results are obtained for firm size, financial leverage, catastrophe loss cost, insurance penetration and firm location. 
   This study further analyzes whether the location has an impact on the firm's performance, the empirical results show that the board size is significantly and positively related to firm performance in Europe markets. The duality (chairman and CEO is same person) is significantly and negatively related to firm performance in the American market, so as the average age of the board in Asian markets. The percentage of independent director on the board is significantly and negatively (positively) related to firm performance in the Asian markets (American market) and the Big four auditor is significantly and positively related to firm performance in the Asian markets. For the control variables, the firm size (financial leverage) of reinsurance company is significantly and positively (negatively) related to firm performance in Asian markets, and the loss ratio is significantly and negatively related to firm performance in American markets. Finally, the researcher further examines the impact of corporate governance on the firm performance before and after financial crisis. Results show that the duality and the board size are significantly and positively related to firm performance after financial crisis.

目錄
第一章  緒論 1
第一節	研究背景 1
第二節	研究動機與目的 8
第三節	研究架構 9
第二章  文獻回顧 11
第一節	再保險市場 11
第二節	公司治理 14
第三章  研究方法 21
第一節  研究樣本與資料來源 21
第二節  研究方法與研究模型 23
第三節  變數定義 26
第四章  實證結果與分析 30
第一節	敘述性統計分析 30
第二節	相關係數分析 33
第三節	Panel Data實證結果 35
第四節	金融海嘯前後之分析 43
第五章  結論與建議 48
第一節	結論 48
第二節	建議 51
參考文獻 52
附錄 58

圖目錄
圖 1-1 2017 年三大再保險市場再保險家數 2
圖 1-2 2000-2017 年各國保險巨災損失 4
圖 1-3 2007-2017 年各地區自然災害與人為災害次數統計圖 5
圖 1-4 2007-2017 年S&P 全球40 大再保險人綜合比率與損失率 5
圖 1-5 2007-2017 年S&P 全球40 大再保險公司評級分佈 7
圖 1-6 研究流程圖 10

表目錄
表 1-1 2007-2017 年S&P 全球40 大再保險公司評級分佈 2
表 1-2 2017 年三大再保險市場再保險費收入占比 3
表 1-3 2007-2017 年S&P 全球40 大再保險人綜合比率與損失率 6
表 2-1 2018 年全球各地區巨災狀況. 13
表 3-1 研究樣本 21
表 3-2 變數定義 29
表 4-1 樣本敘述性統計分析 32
表 4-2 Pearson 相關係數分析. 34
表 4-3 再保險業公司治理對公司經營績效之影響 37
表 4-4 是否設立於亞洲再保險市場之平均數差異檢定 38
表 4-5 是否設立於歐洲再保險市場之平均數差異檢定 39
表 4-6 是否設立於美洲再保險市場之平均數差異檢定 40
表 4-7 再保險業以公司設立地區分之公司治理對公司經營績效之影響 42
表 4-8 金融海嘯前後之平均數差異檢定 44
表 4-9 金融海嘯與再保險業公司治理對公司經營績效之影響 45
表 4-10 考量金融海嘯影響再保險業公司治理對公司經營績效之交乘項迴歸結果 47

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