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中文論文名稱 跨國廠商授權決策
英文論文名稱 Fee versus royalty licensing in two nations model
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 產業經濟學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Industrial Economics
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生中文姓名 孫力
研究生英文姓名 Li Sun
電子信箱 ali_ms08@Hotmail.com
學號 600540669
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2013-06-21
論文頁數 28頁
口試委員 指導教授-陳宜亨
委員-邱俊榮
委員-高國峯
中文關鍵字 創新程度  授權成本  固定權利金授權  單位權利金授權 
英文關鍵字 level of innovation  licensing cost  fixed-fee licensing  royalty licensing 
學科別分類
中文摘要 近年來,國際間貿易的頻繁促進了跨市場間的競爭,廠商間的授權合作已是一個相當普遍的現象。通常技術領先的廠商想要開拓國際市場,都會在不同地主國面對一個或多個技術較為落後的廠商與其競爭。雖然跨國廠商在技術成本上有一定優勢,但也有運費以及關稅等額外負擔。此時跨國廠商所採取的競爭策略便尤其重要,以何種方式授權或是不授權是值得我們討論的問題。
在跨國廠商有創新後成本的優勢,而地主國廠商在接受授權後有授權成本的假設,且兩國廠商皆存在於是地主國做產業內競爭的前提下,本文得到的結論是:無論創新為非劇烈創新或劇烈創新,單位權利金授權都是跨國廠商最適的授權方式。跨國廠商為求利潤最大,一定會將技術以單位權利金的方式授權給技術落後的地主國廠商。
英文摘要 In recent years, the frequent trade among countries has increased the competition of firms in cross-market. Often, these international firms not only compete with each other by quantity, but also have a coorperative relationship through licensing. By licensing, the technology leading firm will gain the licensing fee, but lose some market share for tradeoff. When the question comes to an international leading firm, there is also tariff to be considered. The cost advantage of the leading firm will be decreased because of tariff. And if it should or should not give license to the foreign firm, or if it should use fixed fee licensing or royalty licensing becomes an interest issue particularly.
Assume that the leading firm has the cost advantage and the foreign firm has the fixed licensing cost if it accepts license. Under the condition that both firms do Cournot completion after licensing, we found that royalty is the optimal licensing strategy both in non-drastic innovation as well as in drastic innovation. For an international technology leading firm, royalty licensing is always a profit maximizing strategy.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 文獻回顧 2
第二章 基本模型 6
第三章 地主國市場非授權方式下競爭情況 8
第一節 非劇烈創新(ε
第二節 劇烈創新(ε≥a-c+t) 9
第四章 地主國市場固定權利金授權方式下競爭情況 11
第一節 非劇烈創新(ε第二節 劇烈創新(ε≥a-c+t) 14
第五章 地主國市場單位權利金授權方式下競爭情況 17
第一節 非劇烈創新(ε第二節 劇烈創新(ε≥a-c+t) 20
第六章 最佳授權方式 23
第七章 結論 26
參考文獻 Arrow, K., (1962) “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention,”in:R.R. Nelson, ed., The rate and direction of inventive activity Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Kabiraj, T. and S. Marjit, (2003) “Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer,” European Economic Review, 47, 113 - 124.
Kamien, MI. and Y. Tauman, (1984) “The private value of a patent: A game theoretic analysis,” Journal of Economics, 4, 93 - l18.
Kamien, M.I. and Y. Tauman, (1986) “Fee versus royalties and the private value of a patent,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471 - 491.
Kamien, M., S. Oren and Y. Tauman, (1992) “Optimal licensing of cost reducing innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483 – 508.
Katz, M.L. and C. Shapiro, (1986) “How to license intangible property,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 567 – 590.
Poddar, S. and U. B. Sinha, (2004) “On patent licensing and spatial competition,” Econnomic Record, 80, 208 – 218.
Poddar, S. and U. B. Sinha, (2010) “Patent licensing from a high-cost firm to a low-cost frim,” Economic Record, 86, 384 – 395.
Sen, D. and Y. Tauman, (2007) “General licensing scheme for a cost-reducing innovation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163 – 186.
Wang X. H, (1998) “Fee versus royalty licensing in a cournot duopoly model,” Economics Letters, 60, 55 – 62.
Wang, X. H. and Yang, B. Z, (1999) “On licensing under Bertrand competition,” Australian Economic Papers, 38, 106 – 119.
蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2008),“存在中間財市場下的廠商授權,”經濟論文, 37:4, 557 – 585.
蔡宜臻、邱俊榮 (2009),“跨國廠商的進入模式─直接投資、出口與授權決策”經濟論文, 37:1, 1 – 26
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