Jensen(1986)提出的自由現金流量假說顯示當自由現金流量增加時，公司股東與經理人之間的利益衝突會加劇，因為經理人對自由現金流量的濫用與股東的利益不一致，進而導致代理成本的增加。由於壽險業資金龐大，為了抑制自由現金流量的濫用，公司治理機制扮演重要的角色。本研究以2005年至2011年台灣21家壽險公司為樣本，檢視公司治理變數與自由現金流量間的關係。實證結果顯示，當壽險公司規模越大、整體經營風險愈高時，自由現金流量也越高，然而公司治理變數並未顯著影響自由現金流量。究其可能原因為台灣企業間的交叉持股情形相當嚴重，企業的經營又與家族關係密切，因此大多數企業的董事或監察人多為同一家族者所擔任，造成部分家族與大股東操作公司經營，以致於公司治理制度未能彰顯。然考量金融風暴後，獨立董事占董事會人數的比例與自由現金流量呈顯著正相關，此即顯示在金融風暴後，獨立董事占董事會人數的比率愈高，為考量資產流動率之適足性、確保壽險公司之清償能力，自由現金流量較金融風暴前增加。

This study applies Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis to investigate the impact of corporate governance on free cash flow in the life insurance industry in Taiwan. Jensen (1986) argues that the increasing of free cash flow represent an incremental cost of the owner-manager conflict, because the existence of free cash flow provides managers with an opportunity to waste cash on unprofitable investments. The sample comprises 21 life insurance companies in Taiwan for 2005 through 2011. We find that larger firms and insurers with higher total risk tend to hold more free cash flow. However, we find that the impact of corporate governance on free cash flow is insignificant. The possible reason is the close relationship between corporate management and family controlling. Most of the directors on the board and supervisors are served by the same family, so the corporate governance system can’t work effectively. Finally, we examine the impact of financial crisis on free cash flow and show that a significant positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and free cash flow. This implies that independent directors will tend to hold more free cash flow to maintain the liquidity of assets and avoid default risk after financial crisis.

第一章  緒論	                                           1
第一節  研究背景	                                           1
第二節  研究動機與目的	                                   5
第三節  研究架構	                                           6
第二章  文獻回顧	                                           8
第一節  代理理論與代理成本	                                   8
第二節  公司治理與自由現金流量	                          11
第三章  研究模型與假說	                                  21
第一節  研究樣本	                                          21
第二節  研究方法	                                          22
第三節  實證模型之建立	                                  27
第四節  研究假說	                                          30
第四章  實證結果	                                          35
第一節  樣本敘述性統計	                                  35
第二節  Panel Data實證結果                          	  37
第五章  結論與建議	                                          43
第一節  結論	                                          43
第二節  建議	                                          45
參考文獻	                                                  46
附錄1	                                                  48
附錄2	                                                  50

圖1-1 台灣壽險業現金及銀行存款金額折線圖	                   2
圖1-2 台灣壽險公司現金占總資產之比例折線圖	                   3
圖1-3 壽險業資產占整體金融機構總資產比例折線圖                	   4
圖1-4 研究架構	                                           7
圖2-1 權益代理問題	                                           9
圖2-2 負債代理問題	                                          10
表3-1 變數定義	                                          28
表4-1 樣本敘述性統計	                                  36
表4-2 PEARSON 相關係數分析	                                  38
表4-3 公司治理對自由現金流量影響，被解釋變數: LNUCF	          40
表4-4 金融風暴前與金融風暴後之均數檢定	                  41
表4-5 金融風暴虛擬變數與公司治理變數之交乘項迴歸結果，被解釋變數：LNUCF	                                                  42
附錄表1-1 公司治理對自由現金流量影響，被解釋變數：DUCF	          48
附錄表1-2 金融風暴虛擬變數與公司治理變數之交乘項迴歸結果，被解釋變數：DUCF	                                                  49
附錄表2-1 公司治理對自由現金流量影響，被解釋變數：LNFCF	  50
附錄表2-2 金融風暴虛擬變數與公司治理變數之交乘項迴歸結果，被解釋變數：LNFCF	                                          51

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