淡江大學覺生紀念圖書館 (TKU Library)
進階搜尋


下載電子全文限經由淡江IP使用) 
系統識別號 U0002-2706201214255400
中文論文名稱 公司績效、風險與高階經理人薪酬之關聯性研究
英文論文名稱 The Relationships between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance, and Risk
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融學系碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Department of Banking and Finance
學年度 100
學期 2
出版年 101
研究生中文姓名 黃涵青
研究生英文姓名 Han-Ching Huang
學號 799530273
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2012-06-19
論文頁數 65頁
口試委員 指導教授-顧廣平
委員-林淑玲
委員-楊馥如
委員-林允永
中文關鍵字 高階經理人薪酬  風險因子  公司績效  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 CEO Compensation  risk factor  Corporate Performance  Corporate Governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究探討會計和市場績效、風險因子等變數與高階經理人薪酬間之關係,被解釋變數包括全體總薪酬、董監事總薪酬、總經理/副總薪酬等高階經理人薪酬改變量;解釋變數包含會計績效之資產報酬率改變量和股東權益報酬率改變量、市場績效之股票報酬率、以及四個風險因子:資產報酬率標準差、股東權益報酬率標準差、報酬率標準差、負債比率改變量,並在總資產週轉率改變量、淨值市價比改變量、總資產改變量等三個控制數下,分別針對全部樣本與電子產業樣本進行分析,並比較兩結果之異同。
結果顯示,不同的會計績效衡量指標對高階經理人薪酬之增加幅度有完全不同之影響方向,其中高階經理人薪酬改變量與資產報酬率改變量間呈現顯著之正向關係;反之,高階經理人薪酬改變量與股東權益報酬率改變量間呈現顯著之負向關係。不過,市場績效指標結果一致顯示當股票報酬愈佳時,則高階經理人薪酬改變量愈高。
至於,風險因子之結果顯示除了資產報酬率標準差外,其餘三個風險因子均是呈現高階經理人薪酬變動是隨著企業的風險增加而降低。以及本研究結果顯示三個控制變數均與高階經理人薪酬改變量之間存在正向關係。最後,電子產業樣本所得之結論與全部樣本之結果相同。
英文摘要 This study discusses the relationship between accounting, market performance, risk factors and other variables and the remunerations of senior managers. The explained variables include the variations in remunerations of total staff, total remunerations of directors and supervisors, total remunerations of general manager/deputy general managers and other senior managers; the explaining variables include the variations in ROA and ROE of the accounting performance, variations in return on stock of the market performance, and the variations in four risk factors: standard deviation of ROA, standard deviation of ROE, standard deviation of return rate, and debt ratio. All samples and the samples of the electronics industry will be analyzed through the three control numbers: variation in total asset turnover, variation in net market price and variation in total assets, and the results of the two will be compared to find out the differences and similarities.
The results show that different accounting performance indicators influence the increases in the remunerations of senior managers in completely different ways: it shows a significant positive relationship between the variations in remunerations of senior managers and the variation in ROA; conversely, it shows a significant negative relationship between the variations in remunerations of senior managers and the variation in ROE. However, the results of market performance indicators consistently show that the variations of the remunerations of senior managers are higher when there are better stock returns.
As for the risk factors, except for the standard deviation of the ROA, the results of other three risk factors all show that the variations in remunerations of senior managers decrease along with the increased risk of the enterprises. And the results of this study show a positive relationship between the three control variables and the variations in remunerations of senior managers. Finally, the conclusions from the samples of the electronics industry are the same with the results of all samples.
論文目次 目錄 頁次
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 7
第四節 研究流程 8
第二章 文獻探討 9
第一節 公司治理對高階主管薪酬契約之影響 9
第二節 績效衡量指標對高階主管薪酬契約之影響 14
第三節 風險特性對高階主管薪酬契約之影響 17
第四節 公司特性對高階主管薪酬契約之影響 20
第三章 研究方法 22
第一節 理論架構 22
第二節 研究假說 23
第三節 變數定義與研究模型 28
第四章 實證結果與分析 34
第一節 研究資料 34
第二節 全樣本公司之敘述性統計分析 37
第三節 全部樣本公司之相關性分析 41
第四節 所有樣本迴歸分析結果 43
第五節 電子業樣本敘述性統計與相關性分析 49
第六節 電子產業樣本之迴歸分析結果 53
第五章 結論與建議 57
第一節 研究結論 57
第二節 研究建議 61
參考文獻 62

表目錄 頁次
[表3-1] 被解釋變數統整表 29
[表3-2] 自變數統整表 32
[表3-2] 自變數統整表(續) 33
[表4-1] 全部樣本公司的彙總整理 35
[表4-2] 電子產業樣本公司的彙總整理 36
[表4-3] 全部樣本公司之薪酬水準 38
[表4-4] 全部樣本公司之績效水準變數 39
[表4-5] 全部樣本公司之風險變數 40
[表4-6] 全部樣本公司之控制變數 40
[表4-7] 各研究變數間之相關係數矩陣-全部樣本 42
[表4-8] 全體總薪酬改變量之迴歸分析結果-全部樣本 44
[表4-9] 董監事總薪酬改變量之迴歸分析結果-全體樣本 46
[表4-10] 總經理/副總薪酬改變量之迴歸分析結果-全體樣本 48
[表4-11] 電子產業樣本公司之薪酬水準 49
[表4-12] 電子產業樣本公司之績效水準變數 50
[表4-13] 電子產業別的樣本公司之風險變數 50
[表4-14] 電子業樣本公司之控制變數 51
[表4-15] 各研究變數間之相關係數矩陣-電子產業樣本 52
[表4-16] 全體總薪酬改變量之迴歸分析結果-電子產業樣本 54
[表4-17] 董監事總薪酬改變量之迴歸分析結果-電子產業樣本 55
[表4-18] 總經理/副總薪酬改變量之迴歸分析結果
-電子產業樣本 56
[表5-1] 各產業別假說實證結果彙整 58
[表5-2] 電子產業假說實證結果彙整 59

圖目錄 頁次
[圖1-1] 研究架構 8
[圖3-1] 理論架構 22
參考文獻 Abowd, J. M. (1990), Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporation performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, 52-73.
Aggarwal, R. K. and A. A. Samwick (1999), The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation, Journal of Political Economy 107, 65-105.
Barro, J and R. Barro (1990), Pay, performance, and turnover of bank CEOs, Journal of Labor Economics 8, 448-481。
Bebchuk, L.. A. and J. M.. Fried (2004), Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation, Harvard University Press.
Brick, I. E., O. Palmon, and J. K. Wald. 2008. Too much pay performance sensitivity?
Working Paper.
Bulan, T. L. and Z. Yan (2009), Test of the pecking order theory and the firm life cycle, Working Paper, Brandeis University.
Chen, J (2005), Corporatization of China’s state-owned enterprises and corporate governance, In D. H. Brown and A; I. MacBean ed., Challenges for China`s development: An enterprise perspective, 58-71.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker (1999), Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406.
Cyert, R. M., S.-H. Kang and P. Kumar (2002), Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-management compensation: theory and evidence, Management Science 48, 453-469.
Devers, C. E., A. A. Cannella JR, G. P. Reilly and M. E. Yoder (2007), Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments, Journal of Management 33, 1016-1072.
Evans, J. and R. Evans (2001), An examination of economic value added and executive compensation, Working paper, Curtin University of Technology, Australia.
Fehr, E., O. Hart and C. Zehnder (2008), Contracts as reference points - experimental evidence, Working paper, Harvard University.
Fehr, E., O. Hart and C. Zehnder (2009), Contracts, reference Points, and competition - behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation, Journal of the European Economic Association 7, 561-572.
Gabaix, X. and A. Landier (2008), Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 49-100.
Guy, F. (2000), CEO pay shareholder returns and accounting profit international, Journal of the Economies of Business 17, 263-274.
Hall, B. and J. Liebman (1998), Are CEOs paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 653-691.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (2008), Contracts as reference points, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 1-48.
Harvey, K. D. and R. E. Shrieves (2001), Executive compensation structure and corporate governance choices, Journal of Financial Research 24, 495-512.
Jackson, S., T. Lopez and A. Reitenga (2008), Accounting fundamental and CEO bonus compensation, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 374-393.
Jensen, M and K. J. Murphy (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.
Kato, T. and K. Kubo (2006), CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 20, 1–19.
Kostiuk, P. F. (1990). Firm Size and Executive Compensation. Journal of Human Resources,25 (Winter): 90-105.
Leone, A., J. Wu and J. Zimmerman (2006), Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns, Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 167-192.
Liu, Q. (2006) Corporate governance in China: Current practices, economic effects and institutional determinants, CESifo Economic Studies 52, 415-453.
Mehran, H. (1995), Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
Mishra, C. S. and J. F. Nielsen (2000), Board independence and compensation policies in large bank holding companies, Financial Management 29, 51-69.
Mishra, C. S., D. L. McConaughy and D. H. Gobeli (2000), Effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance, Review of Financial Economics 9, 1-13.
Murphy, K. J. (1985), Corporate performance and management remuneration: An empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 11-42.
Murphy, K. J. and J. A. N. Zabojnik (2007), Managerial capital and the market for CEOs, Working Paper, University of Southern California.
Palia, D. (2001), . The endogeneity of managerial compensation in firm valuation:A solution, Review of Financial Studies 14, 735-764.
Sharma, B. and A. E. Smith (2001), Firm performance and executive compensation in Australia and Canada, Journal of Comparative International Management 4, 1-8.
Shaw, K. W. and M. H. Zhang (2010), Is CEO cash compensation punished for poor firm performance? The Account Review 85, 1065-1093.
Taussins, F. W. and W. S. Baker (1925), American corporations and their executives: a statistical inquiry, Quarterly Journal of Economics 3,1-51.
Tosi, H. L., S. Werner, J. P. Katz and L. R. Gometz-Mejia (2000), How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies, Journal of Management 26, 301-339.
Yermack, D. (2006), Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs, Journal of Accounting and Economics 41, 237-256.
論文使用權限
  • 同意紙本無償授權給館內讀者為學術之目的重製使用,於2012-07-17公開。
  • 同意授權瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2017-07-17起公開。


  • 若您有任何疑問,請與我們聯絡!
    圖書館: 請來電 (02)2621-5656 轉 2281 或 來信