本研究探討2004年至2015年間43家美國產險公司，CEO與Chairman過度自信及雙元性對於公司經營績效之影響。研究發現以股票淨購買(OCNETB)作為過度自信衡量方法時，CEO與Chairman之過度自信對於公司ROA與ROE影響都不具顯著性；以持有選擇權(OC67)作為過度自信衡量方法時，發現僅有CEO之過度自信對於下一期股東權益報酬率為顯著正相關。公司是否採用雙元性對於公司經營績效無顯著影響。董事會成員平均年齡與公司ROA與ROE呈顯著負相關；財務專家佔審計委員會之比例與公司ROE呈顯著正相關。控制變數發現地區集中度與公司經營績效呈現顯著負相關，而長尾險種保費佔率和公司規模與公司經營績效呈顯著正相關。
本文亦考量金融風暴前後對於公司經營績效之影響，研究結果發現以持有選擇權(OC67)作為過度自信之衡量方法時，金融風暴發生後相較於金融風暴發生前CEO過度自信對於公司ROA與ROE皆為顯著正相關；Chairman過度自信對於公司ROE為顯著正相關。雙元性之部分發現以股票淨購買(OCNETB)作為過度自信之衡量方法時，雙元性在金融風暴後相較於金融風暴前對於公司經營績效為顯著負相關。董事會規模與大股東持股比例在金融風暴後相較於金融風暴前對於公司經營績效為顯著正相關，但財務專家占審計委員會之比例在金融風暴後相較於金融風暴前對於公司經營績效為顯著負相關。地區集中度對於公司經營績效為顯著負相關，而長尾險種保費佔率和公司規模對於公司經營績效為顯著正相關。

This study investigates the impact of CEO and Chairman overconfidence on firm performance in the 43 U.S. publicly traded property-liability insurance companies over the period 2004-2015. This study finds the CEO and Chairman overconfidence have no significant relationship between CEO and Chairman overconfidence and the firm performance when CEO and Chairman overconfidence is measured using net stock purchase-based measure. This study also finds the CEO overconfidence has a positive impact on the return on equity (ROE) when CEO overconfidence is measured by using option holdings-based measure. This paper also investigates the relationship between the duality and firm performance, and discusses the situation of that company don’t adopt the duality, the results are no significant. The average age of directors have a significant negative impact on firm performance and the percentage of financial experts in audit committee have a significant positive impact on ROE. Also, the study finds geographic herfindahl index is negatively associated with firm performance and the percentage of long tail and firm size is positive associated with firm performance.
This study also considers the impact on firm performance before and after the financial crisis. While CEO and Chairman overconfidence is measured by using option holdings-based measure, the evidence shows CEO overconfidence has a significant positive impact on ROA and ROE and Chairman overconfidence has a significant positive impact on ROE. While using net stock purchase-based measure, the results of duality is more significant negative impact on firm performance after financial crisis. Board size and the percentage of block holder is significant positive impact on firm performance after financial crisis, but the percentage of financial experts in audit committee is significant negative impact. Also, the study finds geographic herfindahl index is significant negatively associated with firm performance and the percentage of long tail and company size is significant positive associated with firm performance.

目錄
第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	3
第三節 研究架構	4
第二章 文獻回顧	6
第一節 過度自信與公司經營績效	6
第二節 雙元性與公司經營績效	8
第三節 董事會組成與公司經營績效	10
第四節 大股東持股比例與公司經營績效	15
第三章 研究資料及方法	17
第一節 資料來源	17
第二節 研究方法與研究模型	18
第三節 變數定義	23
第四章 實證分析與結果	29
第一節 敘述性統計分析	29
第二節 相關係數分析	31
第三節 平均數差異性檢定	34
第四節 實證結果	36
第五章 結論與建議	58
第一節 結論	58
第二節 建議	62
第三節 後續研究建議	63
參考文獻	64
中文文獻	64
英文文獻	64
附錄	72

 
圖目錄
圖 1 1 研究流程圖	5
圖 3 1 模型流程圖	23

 
表目錄
表 3 1 變數定義	28
表 4 1 樣本敘述性統計分析	30
表 4 2 相關係數分析	33
表 4 3 金融風暴前後之均數檢定	35
表 4 4 經理人過度自信(OCNETB)對於公司經營績效之實證結果	43
表 4 5 經理人過度自信(OC67)對於公司經營績效之實證結果	49
表 4 6 金融風暴對經理人過度自信(OCNETB)與董事會組成變數之交乘項迴歸結果	52
表 4 7 金融風暴對經理人過度自信(OC67)與董事會組成變數之交乘項迴歸結果	54
表 4 8 考量無雙元性，經理人過度自信對於公司經營績效之實證結果	57
表 5 1 各迴歸式與假說之檢定	60

附錄表
附錄表 1八個迴歸式之VIF檢定	72
附錄表 2無雙元性變數之VIF檢定	73

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