本研究探討企業績效和經理人薪酬之間的關係，並研究企業風險是否干擾企業績效和經理人薪酬之間的關係。本研究將企業績效分為資產報酬率與股票報酬；企業風險分為營運風險、信用風險、市場風險和道德風險。
本研究實證結果如下：
首先，實證結果顯示台灣企業的企業績效與經理人薪酬之間呈現顯著正相關，與先前文獻一致。此外，實證結果亦顯示台灣企業只設有薪酬下限，並未設立薪酬上限，此結果和Shaw and Zhang (2010)之實證結果相異。再者，本研究發現信用風險越高，績效對薪酬的敏感度越低，顯示企業藉由薪酬敏感度適應企業整體的信用風險。然而，當企業的市場風險越高，則績效對薪酬的敏感度越高，顯示企業將補償經理人所承擔的風險溢酬。最後，本研究將道德風險分為股權偏離度、席次偏離度和經理人持股率。就偏離度的部份，研究結果顯示以盈餘為基礎時，企業的偏離度越大，則績效對薪酬敏感度就越高。然而，以市場為基礎時，顯示企業偏離度越大，則績效對薪酬敏感度就越低。在經理人持股率的部份，僅顯示持股率越高和總薪酬之關係呈正相關，並未顯示經理人持股會干擾薪酬敏感度。整體而言，企業的各項風險將會影響經理人薪酬合約的制定內容。

This paper investigates the relationship between firm’s performance and its top managers’ compensation, and research whether firm’s risks affect the relationship between firm’s performance and its top managers’ compensation or not, and we divide firm’s performance ROA and stock returns; separate firm’s risks operating risk, credit risk, market risk, and moral risk.
The empirical results of this paper are listed as follow:
First of all, the empirical result shows that top managers’ compensation is significantly positively correlated with firm’s performance. Moreover, it also reveals that Taiwanese firms have no cap (upper bound) to their top managers’ compensation, but they have bogey (lower bound), and this result is inconsistent with Shaw and Zhang (2010) study. Additionally, we find that firms with higher credit risk have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity, indicating firms use pay-for-performance sensitivity to adapt firm credit risk. Nevertheless, when market risk gets higher, pay-for-compensation sensitivity becomes higher, revealing firm would compensate top managers’ risk premium. Finally, we separate moral risk stock divergence, board divergence, and top managers’ share-holding rate. On earnings-based measure, the higher divergence is, the higher pay-for-performance sensitivity is; however, on market-based measure, the higher divergence is, the lower pay-for-performance sensitivity is. Furthermore, we find that pay-for- performance sensitivity is not affected by top managers’ share-holding rate, but the relation between top managers’ share-holding rate and total compensation is positive.

目錄
目錄	IV
表目錄	VI
圖目錄	VII
第一章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	3
第三節 研究架構	4
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說	6
第一節 代理理論	6
第二節 績效與薪酬之關係	8
第三節 績效、薪酬與各項風險之關係	11
第四節 觀念性架構	14
第三章 研究設計	15
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取	15
第二節 變數之操作性定義	17
第三節 實證模型	22
第四章 實證結果	25
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數	25
第二節 迴歸結果	28
第三節 穩健性測試	46
第五章 結論與管理意涵	57
第一節 結論	57
第二節 管理意涵	59
第三節 研究限制	61
參考文獻	62
附錄	66
 
表目錄
表3-1　樣本篩選彙總表	15
表3-2　樣本年度分布彙總表	16
表3-3　樣本產業分布彙總表	16
表3-4　變數之操作性定義	20
表4-1　敘述性統計表	26
表4-2　相關係數矩陣表	27
表4-3　薪酬與績效（以股票報酬為基礎）之迴歸結果	30
表4-4　薪酬與績效（以資產報酬率與股票報酬為基礎）之迴歸結果	31
表4-5　薪酬、績效與信用風險之迴歸結果	33
表4-6　薪酬、績效與市場風險之迴歸結果	36
表4-7　薪酬、績效與股權偏離度之迴歸結果	40
表4-8　薪酬、績效與席次偏離度之迴歸結果	42
表4-9　薪酬、績效與經理人持股率之迴歸結果	44
表4-10　薪酬與績效（以股票報酬為基礎）之迴歸結果	48
表4-11　薪酬與績效（以資產報酬率與股票報酬為基礎）之迴歸結果	49
表4-12　薪酬、績效與信用風險之迴歸結果	50
表4-13　薪酬、績效與市場風險之迴歸結果	51
表4-14　薪酬、績效與股權偏離度之迴歸結果	52
表4-15　薪酬、績效與席次偏離度之迴歸結果	53
表4-16　薪酬、績效與經理人持股率之迴歸結果	54
表4-17　薪酬、績效與經理人持股率之迴歸結果	56

圖目錄
圖1-1　研究流程圖	5
圖2-1　以資產報酬率為基礎之薪酬曲線圖	9
圖2-2　觀念性架構圖	14
圖4-1　信用風險與股票報酬對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	34
圖4-2　信用風險與資產報酬率對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	34
圖4-3　市場風險與股票報酬對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	37
圖4-4　市場風險與資產報酬率對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	37
圖4-5　股權偏離度與股票報酬對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	41
圖4-6　股權偏離度與資產報酬率對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	41
圖4-7　席次偏離度與股票報酬對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	43
圖4-8　席次偏離度與資產報酬率對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	43
圖4-9　經理人持股率與股票報酬對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	45
圖4-10　經理人持股率與資產報酬率對薪酬變動數之交互作用圖	45
圖4-11　經理人持股率與薪酬變動數之關係圖	55
圖5-1　以資產報酬率為基礎之薪酬曲線圖	60
圖A-1　ROA與經理人平均薪酬之散布圖（全體樣本）	66
圖A-2　ROA與經理人平均薪酬之散布圖（刪除ROA最高、低10%）	66
圖A-3　ROA與經理人平均現金紅利之散布圖（全體樣本）	67
圖A-4　ROA與經理人平均現金紅利之散布圖（刪除ROA最高、低10%）	67

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