本文利用成本差異、Cournot競爭的架構，分別從權利金收益及社會福利的角度，探討降幅型研發與非降幅型研發下，產業外研發單位的最適授權機制。可能的授權方式有三：次高價格密價拍賣、固定權利金與單位權利金。
　　本文發現，如果產業外研發單位以權利金收益為考量，最適授權方式難以從一而論；基本上要依成本的降幅、授權前成本差異的程度而定。非降幅型研發若能改善所有廠商的成本，則最適授權方式為次高價格密價拍賣，但若只能改善技術劣勢廠商的位成本，則最適授權方式為固定權利金。
　　如果以社會福利為考量，不論是降幅型或非降幅型研發，只要能改善所有廠商的成本，最適授權方式都是固定權利金；但若非降幅型研發只能改善技術劣勢廠商的成本，則最適授權方式為單位權利金。

This article studies the optimal licensing mechanism of an outside patent-holder from a point of view of the patent-holder’s profit or social welfare, in a cost differentiated、Cournot duopoly model. We consider two types of cost reducing innovation: “cost-cut” and “non cost-cut”; and three types of patent licensing: second-price sealed-bid auction, fixed-fee franchising or royalty.
     With the view of maximizing the patent-holder’s profit, it is found that the optimal licensing policy of cost-cut innovation varies with the degree of cost differentiation and the extent of cost-cut. The optimal licensing policy of non cost-cut innovation improving all firms’ cost is second-price sealed-bid auction, but the optimal licensing policy is fixed-fee if the non cost-cut innovation can only improve the cost of the less efficient firm.
     To maximize social welfare, the optimal licensing policy is fixed-fee if the innovation can improve all firms’ cost no matter whether it is cost-cut or non cost-cut innovation. However the optimal licensing policy is royalty if the non cost-cut innovation improves only the cost of the less efficient firm.

目錄

第一章　導論	1
　　第一節　研究動機與目的	1
　　第二節　文獻回顧	4
第三節　基本模型設定	8
第四節　技術授權前的均衡	11
第二章　降幅型研發	13
　　第一節　權利金收益	13
　　第二節　社會福利之探討	24
　　第三節　比較分析	30
第三章　非降幅研發一	31
　　第一節　權利金收益	31
　　第二節　社會福利之探討	40
　　第三節　比較分析	47
第四章　非降幅研發二	48
　　第一節　權利金收益	48
　　第二節　社會福利之探討	54
　　第三節　比較分析	60
第五章　綜合分析	61
第六章　結論	64
　　第一節　主要結論	64
　　第二節　未來研究方向建議	65
附錄	66
參考文獻	70
圖目錄

【圖1-1】技術授權賽局之階段圖	8
【圖2-1】不同成本降幅x以收益極大的最適授權方式判別圖一	21
【圖2-2】不同成本降幅x以收益極大的最適授權方式判別圖二	22
【圖2-3】不同成本降幅x以收益極大的最適授權方式判別圖三	22
【圖2-4】不同成本降幅x以收益極大的最適授權方式判別圖四	23

表目錄

【表2-1】降幅型研發以固定權利金授權之報酬矩陣	15
【表2-2】降幅型研發以單位權利金授權之報酬矩陣	17
【表2-3】降幅型研發的最適授權方式	30
【表3-1】非降幅研發一以固定權利金授權之報酬矩陣	33
【表3-2】非降幅研發一的最適授權方式	47
【表4-1】非降幅研發二的最適授權方式	60
【表5-1】不同研發的最適授權方式	61

參考文獻

Gallini, N.T., 1984. Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing. American Economic Review, 74(5), 931-941.
Kamien, M.I., and Tauman, Y., 1986. Fee versus Royalty and the Private Value of a Patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 101(3), 471-491.
Kamien, M.I., Oren, S.S., and Tauman, Y., 1992. Optimal Licensing of Cost-reducting Innovation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483-508.
Muto, S., 1993. On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition. Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 257-267.
Rockett, K.E., 1990. Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing. Rand Journal of Economics, 21(1), 161-171.
Sen, D., 2005. Fee versus Royalty Reconsider. Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 141-147.
Vickrey, W., 1961. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
Wang, X.H., 1998. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model. Economics Letters, 60, 55-62.
Wang, X.H., 2002. Fee Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly. Journal of Economics and Business, 54, 253-266.
Wang, X.H., and Yang, B.Z., 1999. On Licensing under Bertrand Competition. Australian Economic Papers, 38(2), 106-119.
Wang, X.H., and Yang, B.Z., 2004. On Technology Licensing in a Stackelberg Duopoly. Australian Economic Papers, 43, 448-458.
Wang, X.H., and Yang, B.Z., 2004. On Technology Transfer to an Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly. Economics Bulletin, 4(14), 1-6.