過去研究大都在探討公司治理與盈餘管理或企業績效之關連性，卻較少有研究依公司治理之強度來做觀察。然近年有研究指出管理者會因企業公司治理較弱而進行對其較有利之操弄行為。故本研究為探討不同公司治理強度與盈餘管理及企業績效之關係，將我國上市高科技公司，依其各年度公司治理之強度分成強、中與弱三組進行分析，以了解在不同公司治理強度下，其與盈餘管理及企業績效間之關係是否有所不同？並間接證明我國公司治理的強度是否同時具有除弊和興利功能。實證結果顯示無論有無區分企業之公司治理強弱，皆無法有效抑制企業之盈餘管理行為；而各公司治理強弱分群皆對企業績效之權益報酬率 (ROE) 呈顯著正相關，顯示對於股東的保障是公司治理的基本要求；對於保障債權人之利息保障倍數 (IS)，只有在「弱度公司治理」時呈顯著正相關，在中度和強度公司治理下皆不顯著，顯示當公司治理較弱時，企業較能顧及債權人的保障；對於企業之長期績效而言我國之「弱度公司治理」無法將其影響全部反映於當期之權益報酬率，而會有遞延ㄧ期和二期的效果存在。綜言之，即使最強之公司治理仍無法對於盈餘管理有效抑制，顯示我國公司治理之除弊功能並不彰顯，僅對於企業之績效有提升之作用。

A number of extant studies have examined the association among corporate governance, earnings management, and business performance over the past decades.  However, little academic research has been devoted to testing the levels of corporate governance.  Prior studies indicated that weak corporate governance appeared to have a greater impact on the magnitude of earnings management.  Accordingly, this paper is intended to explore the relationship among the differing levels of corporate governance, earnings management as well as business performance.  The sample of this study consists of public limited companies (PLC) of hi-tech industry in Taiwan from 2001-2004.  Based on the magnitude of corporate governance, the sample firms are classified as firms with a high level of corporate governance, firms with a medium level of corporate governance, and firms with a low level of corporate governance, respectively.  Evidence of the effects of varying levels of corporate governance on earnings management and/or on corporate performance can provide insights into whether governance mechanisms are served as profit-generating and/or fraud-preventing instruments.  Empirical results indicate that (1) the association of the magnitude of corporate governance and earnings management is insignificant; (2) all levels of corporate governance are significantly, positively related to the return on equity (ROE), indicating that enhancing the wealth of stockholders is perceived as an indispensable part of corporate governance; (3) the relationship between the low level of corporate governance and the interest coverage ratio (IS) is significantly positive, implying that the lower the level of corporate governance, the less likely managers will engage in some activities that transfer wealth from bondholders; (4) weak corporate governance in the current year appears to have a significant impact on ROE in the subsequent one to two years. Overall, the findings suggest that the implementation of corporate governance does not effectively lessen the magnitude of earnings management.  Specifically, the implication is that the hi-tech companies in Taiwan utilize corporate governance to enhance business performance rather than prevent the incidence of financial fraud.

目錄
第壹章  緒論	1
    第一節  研究背景與動機	1
    第二節  研究目的	4
    第三節  研究流程	5
    第四節  論文架構	6
第貳章  文獻探討	7
    第一節  公司治理	7
    第二節  盈餘管理	14
    第三節  企業績效	15
    第四節  公司治理和盈餘管理之相關文獻	15
    第五節  公司治理和企業績效之相關文獻	16
    第六節  盈餘管理和企業績效之相關文獻	17
第參章  研究設計	19
    第一節  觀念性架構	19
    第二節  研究假說	20
    第三節  研究設計	24
第肆章  實證結果與分析	36
第伍章  結論與建議	53
    第一節  結論	53
    第二節  研究限制	56
    第三節  建議	57
參考文獻	58

表目錄
表2-1  公司治理的外部機制	12
表3-1  公司治理各構面之衡量變數及定義	29
表3-2  產業公司分佈表	35
表4-1  2001年至2004年研究樣本觀察值之各變數敘述統計分析36
表4-2  公司治理得分之基本統計量	39
表4-3  研究樣本之皮爾森相關係數矩陣（N=1,049）	42
表4-4  公司治理為弱、中程度企業樣本觀察值之敘述統計及差異檢定	43
表4-5  公司治理為中、強程度企業樣本觀察值之敘述統計及差異檢定	43
表4-6  公司治理為弱、強程度企業樣本觀察值之敘述統計及差異檢定	44
表4-7-1  權益報酬率與盈餘管理之裁決性應計項目(DAM)之迴歸分析	44
表4-7-2  權益報酬率與盈餘管理之裁決性應計項目(DAK)之迴歸分析	45
表4-8  公司治理與盈餘管理之裁決性應計項目(DAM)之迴歸分析	47
表4-9  公司治理與盈餘管理之裁決性應計項目(DAK)之迴歸分析	47
表4-10  公司治理與權益報酬率(ROE)之迴歸分析	48
表4-11  公司治理與利息保障倍數(IS)之迴歸分析	48
表4-12  公司治理與股價報酬率(RETURN)之迴歸分析	49
表4-13  公司治理與平均權益報酬率(AVEROE)之迴歸分析	49
表4-14  公司治理與權益報酬率遞延ㄧ期(LAG1ROE)之迴歸分析	50
表4-15  公司治理與權益報酬率遞延二期(LAG2ROE)之迴歸分析	50
表4-16-1「公司治理前20%」與盈餘管理之裁決性應計項目(DAM)之迴歸	51
表4-16-2「公司治理前20%」與盈餘管理之裁決性應計項目(DAK)之迴歸	51

圖目錄
圖2-1 世界銀行提出之公司治理架構圖	10
圖4-1  2001年公司治理總分折線圖	38
圖4-2  2002年公司治理總分折線圖	38
圖4-3  2003年公司治理總分折線圖	38
圖4-4  2004年公司治理總分折線圖	39

參考文獻
牛延苓，2001，股權結構、董事會組成與企業績效關係之研究—以高科技產業與傳統產業為例，國立中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
王大維，2003，公司治理相關要素與企業績效關連性之研究—以台灣上市公司為例，私立淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。
王鼎立，2002，董事會結構與公司盈餘的傳遞效果，私立東吳大學會計學系碩士論文。
吳娟娟，2002，財務績效指標之重要性分析研究—以台灣化學工業上市公司為例，中原大學會計研究所碩士論文。
吳睿怡，2003，上市 ( 櫃 ) 與閉鎖期盈餘管理之關連性，私立淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。
柯承恩，2000，我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（上），會計研究月刊，第173 期：頁次75-81。
柯承恩，2000，我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（下），會計研究月刊，第174 期：頁次79-83。
洪小芬，2005，盈餘及盈餘管理特性對分析師預測之影響，私立淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。
洪世馨，2003，設立外部董事與企業經營績效之關係，國立成功大學會計學系碩博士班論文。
張家智，2001，相對績效評量與總經理離職、薪酬之實證研究－考慮產業競爭程度，國立中正大學會計學系碩士論文。
許淑鈴，2003，所有權集中程度、董監事會組成與企業績效關係之研究，國立嘉義大學管理研究所碩士論文。
陳家慧，2000，我國上市公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之實證研究，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
陳靜怡，2000，財務危機公司資本結構決定因素－資本結構與自發性重整行為聯立結構，義守大學管理科學研究所碩士論文。
湯麗芬，2003，盈餘管理之探討，致理學報第十八期，頁237-252。
楊善富，2000，台灣上市公司高階主管持股比例、績效與離職關係之實證研究，國立中正大學會計學系碩士論文。
葉雅薰，1999，公司改組、監督機制與盈餘管理之研究，私立東吳大學會計研究所碩士論文。
葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，台北市，商智文化。
廖秀梅，2002 ，董事會結構特性與企業績效關係之研究－探討台灣家族控制企業因素的影響，國立臺北大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
劉玉珍，1999，金融控股公司經營績效評估指標之建構，世新大學經濟學系碩士研究所碩士論文。
鄭美麗，2002，臺灣上市公司高階管理者替換之研究－以會計績效為例，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
盧愛治，2004，公司治理的內外部機制與財務績效關連性之研究，私立淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。
證券暨期貨市場發展基金會2004年4月公佈之台灣公司治理。
Antonio and Fernando. 2004. Corporate governance and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation. Working Paper.
Austin, J., A, Lee. and D, Warren, 1999. The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management. Working paper.
Beasley, M.S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board the board of directors composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review (October): 443-465.
Berle,A. and G. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property, MacMillan, New York: Micllan.
Beth, Y. 2003. Corporate governance and firm performance: is there a relationship? Ivey Business Journal 68(1). 
Black, B. S., H. Jang, W. Kim and J. Mark, 2002. Does corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence from Korea. Working Paper. 
Brickley, J.A., R.C., Lease, and C.W., Smith. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on anti-takeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-291.
Chaney, P. K. and C. M. Lewis, 1998. Income Smoothing and Underperformance in Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Corporate Finance 4: 1-29.
Chtourou, S.M., J. Bedard, and L. Courteau. 2001. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management. Working Paper.
Core, J. E., and Guay, W. R. 1999. The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32: 237-334.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, pp.371-406.
DeAngelo, L. E. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Markets Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61 (July): 400-420.
Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1995. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 70 (April): 193-226.
Dechow, P. M., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeny. 1996. Cause and Consequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actionsbe the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13: 1-36.
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., and Zeckhauser, R. 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business, 72 (1), 1-33.
Denis, D. J.,  and Denis, D. K. 1995. Performance changes following top management dismissal. Journal of Finance, 50(4), 1029-1058
Fama, E F, 1980, Angency problem and the theory of the firm., Journal of polotocal Economy, vol.88, pp.288-308.
Fudenberg, D and Tirole, J. 1995. A theory of income and dividend smoothing based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 75-93.
Gillies, J. and R. Leblanc. 2003. The coming revolution in corporate governance. Ivey Business Journal 68(1).
Gompers, P., J. Ishii and A. Metrick.2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics118: 107-156.
Goyal, V. K. and C. W. Park, 2002, ”Board leadership structure and CEO turnover” The Journal of Corporate Finance, 8,49-66 
Healy, P. M. and K.G. Palepu, 1993. The Effect of Firms’ Financial Disclosure Policies on Stock Prices. Accounting Horizons 7: 1-11
Healy, P. M.. 1985. The Impact of Bonus Schemes on the Selection of Accounting Principles. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 107-115.
Hermalin, B. E., and M. Weisbach. 1991. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 20: 101-112.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling M., 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jones, J., 1991. Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations, The Accounting Review, 61 (Autumn): 193-228.
Klapper, L. F. and I. Love. 2002. Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2818.
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting & Economics 39(1): 163.
Lambert, R. and Larcker, D. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1): 129-149. 
Leuz, C., D. Nanda, P.D. Wysocki, 2003. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: an International Comparison, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, p.505-527
Lipton, M and J. Lorsch, 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer 48: 59-77.
Loughran, T. and A. M. Vijh, 1997,” Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate acquisitions” The Journal of Finance, Vol.LII, No.5. December, 1765-1789. 
McConnell , John J. and Henri Servaes , 1990 , Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value , Journal of Financial Economics 27 ,595-612.
Murphy, Kevin J,  Zimmerman, Jerold L. 1993. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting & Economics. Amsterdam: Vol.16, Iss. 1-3;  pg. 273, 43 pgs
Patton A. and Baker J.C. 1987. Why won’t director rock the boat? Harvard Business Review. pp.10-18.
Paul M Healy, James M Wahlen. 1999. A review of earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons Vol. 13, Iss. 4; p. 365.
Peasnell, KV, Pope, PF & Young, S. 2000. Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32 (7-8), 1311-1346.
Pound , John , 1988 , Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight , Journal of Financial Economics 20 , 237-265 .
Rajgopal, S. and M, Venkatachalam, 1998. The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An Empirical Investigation. Working Paper.
Schipper, K., 1989. Commentary on Earnings Management. Accounting Horizons (3)： pp. 91-102.
Sloan, R. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Econimics, 16: 55-100. 
Stock, H. 2003. Poor governance impacts returns: communicating accountability is more important than ever, IROs Say. Investor Relations Business 1.
Subramanyam, K. R., 1996. The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 249-281.
Venkatraman, N. and V. Ramanujam, 1986, Measurement of business performance in strategy research: A comparison of approaches. Academy of Management Review, 11(4), 801-814. 
Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman, 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review Vol. 53, Iss. 1; p. 112.
Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman, 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Williamson, O.E, 1983, Organization from Residual Claimants and Corporate Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp.351-366.
World Bank, 1999. Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation-Overview. The World Bank, Washington D.