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系統識別號 U0002-2605200613221000
中文論文名稱 銀行對私人企業信用放款之決定因子—分量迴歸的應用
英文論文名稱 The Determinants of Private Credit—Application of Quantile Regression
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Banking and Finance
學年度 94
學期 2
出版年 95
研究生中文姓名 林莉真
研究生英文姓名 Li-Chen Lin
學號 693490475
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2006-05-13
論文頁數 54頁
口試委員 指導教授-黃河泉
委員-黃台心
委員-林淑琴
委員-楊浩彥
中文關鍵字 私人企業信用放款  債權人權利  法律制度  資訊不對稱  分量迴歸 
英文關鍵字 Private Credit  Creditor Right  Legal Institution  Information Asymmetry  Quantile Regression 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 傳統上,資本結構(capital structure)主要可分成負債資金及權益資金兩大類。過去有關資本結構理論之探討,包括有:融資順位理論(pecking order theory)及抵換理論(trade-off theory)。而以上理論,皆可看出融資貸款不管對於一家公司或個人而言,皆扮演著一相當重要之角色。因此,本研究即主要在探討銀行業其私人企業信用放款比率,主要受到哪些因子影響。透過129個國家之資料,發現債權人權利可藉由法律制度的改善及資訊不對稱的降低,來提升對私人企業的借貸意願。而本研究運用Koenker and Bassett (1978)所提出的分量迴歸 (quantile regression)方法,進一步的發現,上述情況在信用放款程度中高以下的國家,影響力隨放款程度之增加而遞增,對於信用放款程度中高以上的國家,其影響力則會逐漸遞減。另外,在法律制度方面,信用放款程度較低的國家,以北歐為其法源,對於提升私人企業借貸是有幫助;而信用放款程度中高的國家,以社會主義為其法源,會降低對私人企業借貸的意願。至於,信用機構之設立,除了信用放款程度較低的國家,大致上皆會提升私人企業信用放款。而此機構以私人或政府設立來區分,可發現前者除了信用放款程度較低之國家沒有影響外,其餘情形皆可擴大對私人企業借貸意願;而後者僅對信用放款程度中及較高的國家有幫助。
英文摘要 Normally, capital structure can be classified as two types of categories—debt and equity. In the past, the theories related to capital structure include the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. From the above-mentioned theories, it’s quite obvious for us to realize that credit plays a rather important role for both a company and an individual person. Therefore, this research is primarily about the factors which have direct effects on private credit ratio of bank. According to the data from 129 countries, we found the creditor rights can promote the desire for extending credit of the enterprise by the improvement of legal institution and decrease of information asymmetry. By means of the Quantile Regression method proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), we also found that in the countries of private credit degree below medium-high, the more the private credit increment of the degree is, the more the creditor rights’ influence could increase; on the other hand, in the countries of private credit degree above medium-high, the more the private credit increment of the degree is, the less the creditor rights’ influence could increase. Besides, speaking of the aspect of legal institution, the counties having lower standard in private credit degree follow Nordic legal origin, which helps to promote the private credit. As for the countries of private credit degree in medium-high, they take socialism as their legal source, which would reduce the desire for private credit. Moreover, the establishment of credit organizations can approximately promote the private credit in most of the countries except the counties having lower standard in private credit degree. And the organizations of this kind are classified as private bureau and public registry. The former can extend credit to the enterprise in most of the countries except the counties having lower standard in private credit degree, and the latter is helpful only to the countries having average or higher standard in private credit degree.
論文目次 第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第四節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 銀行與企業往來關係之重要性 6
第二節 銀行對企業信用放款額度之決定 8
第三章 研究方法
第一節 OLS模型 14
第二節 QR模型 16
第三節 QR的漸近(asymptotic)行為 19
第四節 Kernel之估計法 20
第四章 實證結果分析
第一節 實證資料 22
第二節 債權人權利之分析 32
第三節 加入法源後之分析 35
第四節 加入資訊共享、政府信用資訊機構及私人信用資訊機構後之分析 38
第五章 結論 46
參考文獻 50

圖 表 頁碼

圖1 本研究之研究流程 5
圖2 債權人權利之估計係數(平均1999-2003年) 33
圖3 加入法源後債權人權利指標之估計係數(平均1999-2003年) 37
圖4 加入資訊共享後債權人權利指標之估計係數(平均1999-2003年) 40
圖5 加入政府信用資訊機構及私人信用資訊機構後,債權人權利指標之估計係數(平均1999-2003年) 44

表1 敘述統計量 30
表2 相關係數表 31
表3 私人企業信用放款之迴歸結果(平均1999-2003年) 32
表4 私人企業信用放款之各分位間係數檢定 34
表5 私人企業信用放款在加入法源後之迴歸結果(平均1999-2003年) 36
表6 私人企業信用放款加入法源後之各分位間係數檢定 38
表7 私人企業信用放款在加入資訊共享後之迴歸結果(平均1999-2003年) 39
表8 私人企業信用放款加入資訊共享後之各分位間係數檢定 41
表9 私人企業信用放款在加入政府信用資訊機構及私人信用資訊機構後之迴歸結果(平均1999-2003年) 42
表10 私人企業信用放款加入政府信用資訊機構及私人信用資訊機構後之各分位間係數檢定 45
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