本研究係以國內上市公司為例，探討董監事結構對公司經營績效間的關聯性，並分析資產規模、負債比率、大股東持股比率及經理人持股比率等控制變數對公司績效是否存在著非線性的關係。在研究方法上採用Gonzalez,Terasvirta and Dijk(2004, 2005)所發展的縱橫平滑移轉迴歸模型（Panel Smooth Transition Regression Model），以董監事持股比率為模型中的轉換變數，觀察台灣上市公司之董監事結構對ROE與Tobin’s Q，是否存在平滑移轉效果，即為董監事持股比率是否為經營績效產生變化轉折的重要因素；又以獨立董事持股比率為轉換變數，探討公司獨立性是否能提升公司績效。
根據實證結果顯示，得知在績效代理變數為ROE下，董監事結構呈現縱橫門檻效果而非平滑移轉效果，存在兩個轉換門檻值10.22%、10.24%；獨立性則出現平滑移轉效果，轉換門檻值為43.02%。在績效代理變數為Tobin’s Q下，董監事結構呈現平滑移轉效果，轉換門檻值為2.77%；獨立性則出現縱橫門檻效果，轉換門檻值為18.18%。顯示在股東關心會計項目之ROE與對公司未來前景判斷指標之ㄧ的Tobin’s Q間，皆有非線性之轉折。

Corporate governance is one of the important things to manage a company. Good corporate governance can reduce the agency problem and make an enterprise achieving sustainable development. In order to achieve the objective, the board of directors is the major roles in a firm. Therefore, this research aims to investigate the relationship between the board of director and firm performance, and to find out whether independent directors are really effective on solving the agency problems.
With the listing companies as an example, this research investigate nonlinear effect of each of the control variables considered (e.g., asset size, debt-ratio, share ratio of directors) on firm’s operation performance (ROE and Tobin’s Q) by hypothesizing that there exist threshold values when board structure, shares ratio of directors and the ratio of independent directors, are used as the threshold variables. In order to catch the nonlinear phenomenon, this research adopts panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) derived by Gonzalez, Terasvirta and Dijk (2004, 2005).
The evidence show that ROE and shares ratio of directors jumps abruptly at 10.22% and 10.24%. On the other hand, Tobin’s Q and shares ratio of directors produces a smooth transition at 2.77%. This research also finds that ROE and ratio of independent directors produces a smooth transition at 43.02%, however, Tobin’s Q and ratio of independent directors jumps abruptly at 18.18%. The nonlinear relationships between board structure and firm’s operation performance found in this research provide helpful reference for corporate governance.

謝辭．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．	I
中文摘要．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．	II
英文摘要．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．	III
目錄．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．	V
表目錄．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．	VII
圖目錄．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．	VIII
	
第一章、緒論…………………………………………………………..	1
第一節  前言 ……………………………………………………………	1
第二節  研究動機 ………………………………………………………	4
第三節  研究目的………………………………………………………..	6
	
第二章、文獻探討…………………………………………………	8
第一節  代理理論……………………………………………………….	8
     1.1  代理理論……………………………………………………….	8
     1.2  公司代理問題與代理成本 …………………………………...	10
第二節  董監事會………………………………………………………..	11
     2.1  董事會與其功能 ……………………………………………...	11
     2.2  監察人與其功能………………………………………….…….	12
第三節  董監事結構規模與經營績效之關係. …………………………	12
     3.1  董事會之獨立性 …………………………………..…………...	12
     3.2  董監事會結構、規模與經營績效 ………………….…………	13
	
第三章、研究方法………………………………………………	16
第一節  研究資料………………………………………………………..	16
第二節  縱橫平滑移轉迴歸模型………………………………………..	18
第三節  縱橫平滑移轉迴歸模型之設定………………………………..	22
	
第四章、實證結果與分析 ………………………………………	28
第一節  各變數之基本敘述統計量 ……………………………………	28
第二節  縱橫平滑移轉模型之實證結果………………………………..	33
    4.2.1  董監事持股比率對公司經營績效之平滑移轉效果…………..	33
      ㄧ、董監事持股比率對ROE之影響………………………………..	36
      二、董監事持股比率對Tobin's Q之影響……………………………	40
    4.2.2  獨立董事比率對公司經營績效之平滑移轉效果……………..	42
      ㄧ、獨立董事比率對ROE之影響…………………………………	45
      二、獨立董事比率對Tobin's Q之影響………………………………	48
	
第五章、結論……………………………………………………	51
	
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………	55

表目錄
表　2-1：代理理論之歸納………………………………..………………	9
表　3-1：本研究選取之產業(上市公司)樣本家數………………………	16
表　4-1-1：公司績效代理變數與移轉變數橫斷面基本統計量		30
表　4-1-2：控制變數橫斷面基本統計量		31
表　4-1-3：各變數之縱斷面基本統計量		32
表　4-2-1：董監事持股比率對公司經營績效之同質性檢定		35
表　4-2-2：董監事持股比率對公司經營績效之轉換區間個數檢定		35
表　4-2-3：董監事持股比率對ROE之模型估計結果		36
表　4-2-4：董監事持股比率對ROE模型中解釋變數之影響		39
表　4-2-5：董監事持股比率對Tobin’s Q之模型估計結果		40
表　4-2-6：董監事持股比率對Tobin’s Q模型中解釋變數之影響		42
表　4-2-7：獨立董事比率對公司經營績效之同質性檢定		43
表　4-2-8：獨立董事比率對公司經營績效之轉換區間個數檢定		44
表　4-2-9：獨立董事比率對ROE之模型估計結果		45
表　4-2-10：獨立董事比率對ROE模型中解釋變數之影響		47
表　4-2-11：獨立董事比率對Tobin’s Q之模型估計結果		48
表　4-2-12：獨立董事比率對Tobin’s Q模型中解釋變數之影響		50
圖目錄
圖　3-2-1：m=1之轉換模型		21
圖　3-2-2：m=2之轉換模型		22
圖　4-2-1：董監事持股比率對ROE之轉換函數		38
圖　4-2-2：董監事持股比率對Tobin’s Q之轉換函數		41
圖　4-2-3：獨立董事比率對ROE之轉換函數		46
圖　4-2-4：獨立董事比率對Tobin’s Q之轉換函數		49

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