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系統識別號 U0002-2507200716100800
中文論文名稱 經理人薪資誘因與公司績效
英文論文名稱 Executive Compensation Incentive and Firm Performance
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 產業經濟學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Industrial Economics
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生中文姓名 簡妏玲
研究生英文姓名 Wen-Ling Chien
學號 694510040
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2007-06-13
論文頁數 57頁
口試委員 指導教授-陳明園
委員-陳業寧
委員-林佩蒨
中文關鍵字 經理人薪酬  薪資誘因  公司績效 
英文關鍵字 Executive compensation incentive  Firm Performance 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學經濟學
中文摘要 本研究以西元1996年至2004年台灣證券交易所上市之非金融業公司為取樣對象,並以該公司經理人薪資最高者為研究對象,探討經理人薪資與績效之關係。實證分析包含兩階段的研究設計,第一階段為經理人薪資決定與調整迴歸式,強調外部經理人勞動市場對決策經理人「市場均衡薪資」的決定;第二階段為公司之財務績效迴歸式,以薪資誘因變數做為績效迴歸式的主要解釋變數,並考慮經理人在其職位上之工作年資與薪資誘因間的交叉效果,探討經理人之薪資誘因與公司績效之間的關係。
研究發現,我國公司在訂定與調整經理人薪酬時,會將外部經理人勞動市場基於公司特質與經理人個人特質變數以及公司經營績效變數所決定之酬勞行情納入考量。此外,薪資誘因對於會計績效之資產報酬率大多具正面的影響;然而,對於市場績效之普通股報酬率大多呈負面影響。若將經理人在其職位上之工作年資對薪資誘因之交叉效果加入衡量普通股報酬率之迴歸式,則薪資誘因對普通股報酬率除少數為不顯著之負面效果外,其餘皆為正面之影響;而年資變數和薪資誘因之交叉效果對普通股報酬率大多存在負面之影響。因而薪資誘因對於市場績效之影響方向,須取決於正負面效果之力量。
英文摘要 This paper takes the non-financial listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 1996 to 2004 as samples. We take the top executives' wages as the research objective, investigating the relationship between the top executives' wages and the companies’ performance. The empirical analysis includes two-stage research design. The first stage is the regression of the determination and adjustment of the top executives' wages. The second stage is the regression of these companies’ financial performance considering several wages incentive variables and the cross effect among the top executives' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables, we research into the relationship between the executives' wages incentive and the company's performance.
Our main findings are as follows: The companies in Taiwan will take account the equilibrium wages of the external managerial labor market based on the companies’ characteristics and the executives’ personal characteristics to determine and adjust the executives’ wages,. The wages incentive variables mostly have positive influence on the rate of returns of assets (ROA) which proxies the accounting performance. However, the wages incentive variables mostly have negative influences on the rate of returns of common stock (RTN) which proxies the companies’ market performance. If the cross effect among the top executives' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables are added to the RTN regressions, mostly wages incentive variables have positive influence on RTN, while mostly cross effects among the top executives' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables have negative influences on RTN. Therefore the direction of the influence of the market performance to the wages incentive depends on the positive or negative strength which one is greater.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究貢獻 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 國外實證文獻 4
第二節 國內實證文獻 6
第三章 實證模型與研究假說 9
第四章 變數設定、樣本選取與資料來源 19
第一節 變數定義及說明 19
第二節 樣本選取 29
第三節 資料來源 32
第五章 實證結果 33
第一節 基本敘述統計量分析 33
第二節 實證結果分析 37
第六章 研究結論與研究建議 53
第一節 研究結論 53
第二節 研究限制及建議 54
參考文獻 55


表目錄
《表4-1》外部勞動市場迴歸式之變數定義 25
《表4-2》薪資調整迴歸式之變數定義 26
《表4-3》財務績效迴歸式之變數定義 28
《表4-4》樣本選取範例 31
《表5-1》外部勞動市場迴歸式各變數之基本統計量 35
《表5-2》薪資調整迴歸式各變數之基本統計量 36
《表5-3》外部勞動市場迴歸式之實證結果 41
《表5-4》薪資調整迴歸式之實證結果 44
《表5-5》會計資產報酬率績效迴歸式之固定效果模型 46
《表5-6》普通股報酬率績效迴歸式之固定效果模型 48
《表5-7》普通股報酬率績效迴歸式之固定效果模型 -考量經理人之年資變數 50
參考文獻 國內文獻
林淑惠與胡星陽(2003),「上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構」,《經濟論文》,31,pp.171-206。

林穎芬與劉維琪(2003),「從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度」,《管理學報》,20,pp.365-395。

陳明園與石雅慧(2004),「高階經理人薪酬—代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究」,《台大管理論叢》,15,pp.131-166

陳明園與張家萍(2006),「高階經理人薪酬變動之決定因素」,《經濟論文叢刊》,34,pp.285-316

陳隆麒、郭敏華與吳政穎(1998),「我國上市公司高階主管薪酬決定因素之探討」,《中國財務學會年會暨學術研討會論文集》,pp.925-943。

辜秋屏(1997),「高階主管酬勞與公司經營績效之實證研究」,台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文。


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