由於近年來爆發許多重大金融弊案與風暴，使得公司治理的議題顯得相當重要。本研究以MSCI台灣指數成分股為研究對象，探討股權結構、董事會組成與超額報酬的關聯性，研究期間自2005年至2011年第二季為止。另以金融風暴事件為背景，觀察金融風暴前後公司治理與超額報酬間變動之關係。本文同時也將產業別列入考量，分析金融業與電子業的差異變化。
	實證研究顯示：在股權結構方面，總樣本和電子相關產業的董監持股、大股東持股與股權偏離度對超額報酬呈正相關；經理人持股、法人持股對超額報酬呈負相關。而在金融產業部分，董監持股、經理人持股對超額報酬呈正相關。在董事會特性方面，在探究總樣本與金融業時，董事會規模、董事長兼任總經理、外部董監事比例、董監事質押比例對超額報酬均無顯著影響，在電子相關產業方面，外部董監事比例對超額報酬呈正相關，而董事會規模、董事長兼任總經理、董監事質押比例對超額報酬均無顯著影響。由此可知，股權結構是相較董事會組織更影響公司股價的超額報酬，因此投資人可先以股權結構的特性，為投資選擇的依據。
	經金融風暴，電子相關產業與金融業之董監事持股比例由不顯著相關轉為顯著正相關，金融業之經理人持股由顯著正相關轉為不顯著。在董事會特性方面，電子相關產業與金融產業之外部董監事比例經金融風暴後皆由顯著正相關轉為不顯著相關。

The frequent occurrence of serious financial crisis has made the issue of corporate governance quite important in recent years. This study investigated the impact of the ownership structure, board composition on the excess return. The empirical samples are collected from stocks of MSCI Taiwan Index between 2005 and second season in 2011.Investigating the impact of the corporate governance on the excess return undergo the financial crisis.
Empirical results in total samples and electronic companies how that the higher ratio of shares hold by board of directors and the major shareholders will increase the excess return, thehigher ratio of shares hold by managers and corporations will decrease the excess return. In financial companies, empirical results show that the higher ratio of shares hold by board of directors and the managers will increase the excess return. Otherwise, board composition didn’t impact the excess return in total sample and financial companies. Finally, ownership structure is more influence than board composition.
After global financial crisis, shareholding of board in electronic companies and financial companies presentednot significant turned to significant positive effect on excess return.Shares hold by managers in financial companies presented significant positive effect turned to not significant on excess return. Outside directors presented significant positive effect in financial companies before global financial crisis, but it didn’t impact the excess return after global financial crisis.

目錄
第一章緒論	1
第一節研究背景及動機	1
第二節研究目的	4
第三節研究流程及架構	5
第二章文獻探討	7
第一節股權結構	7
第二節董事會組成	13
第三章研究方法	20
第一節研究假說	20
第二節研究樣本及資料來源	23
第三節研究變數	24
第四節研究方法	26
第四章實證結果與分析	29
第一節敘述統計	29
第二節相關分析	32
第三節實證結果迴歸分析	34
第五章結論與建議	44
第一節研究結論	44
第二節後續建議	45
參考文獻	47
表目錄
表1、應變數(超額報酬)之描述	24
表2、自變數(股權結構、董事會組成)之描述	25
表3、控制變數之描述(在迴歸式中，以Control代替所有控制變數)	26
表4、樣本公司之敘述統計	31
表5、Pearson之相關性分析	33
表6、股權結構變數與超額報酬之迴歸模型	35
表7、董事會組成變數與超額報酬之迴歸模型	36
表8、股權結構變數與超額報酬之迴歸模型─金融產業	37
表9、董事會組成變數與超額報酬之迴歸模型─金融產業	38
表10、股權結構變數與超額報酬之迴歸模型─電子相關產業	40
表11、董事會組成變數與超額報酬之迴歸模型─電子相關產業	41
表12、股權結構變數與超額報酬之整合比較	42
表13、董事會組成變數與超額報酬之整合比較	43
圖目錄
圖1、研究流程圖	6

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