由於資訊不對稱的存在，經理人與外部股東對公司的價值認知產生了落差，而公司治理機制之有效性與管理當局盈餘預測皆可藉由提高資訊透明度，以減輕此代理問題，進而提升公司價值。因此，本研究欲探討我國上市櫃公司之公司治理機制有效性、盈餘預測正確性與公司績效三者間的關聯性。鑑於過去研究未完整探討盈餘預測正確性與公司治理機制間之內生關係，本研究乃以聯立方程式呈現盈餘預測正確性與公司治理機制間的因果關係；另一方面，以聯立方程式及兩階段最小平方法探討盈餘預測正確性與公司績效間之內生關係；最後，本研究探討盈餘預測正確性與公司治理機制之交乘項對公司後續績效之影響，以期說明三者間之關聯。首先，本研究探討公司治理機制之有效性與盈餘預測正確性間的因果關係，從聯立方程式(simultaneous equation)的實證結果顯示，董事會規模、獨立董事比率、職位雙重性、機構投資人持股比率、盈餘分配權、席次盈餘偏離差均與盈餘預測的正確性間存在顯著互補性的因果關係。
再者，本研究探討盈餘預測之正確性與公司績效間之關係，從聯立方程式之實證結果顯示，盈餘預測正確性與公司財務績效間存在顯著的因果關係；從兩階段最小平方法(2SLS)之實證結果顯示，當公司之財務績效愈佳，管理當局所發佈之盈餘預測正確性愈高，進而提升市場績效，顯示當公司所發佈之盈餘預測正確性較高時，其資訊透明度亦隨之提高，投資人因此給予較高之評價，因而使得公司股價報酬率較高；另外，本研究以公司治理作為工具變數，實證結果同上，當公司治理愈有效，其所發佈之盈餘預測正確性愈高，進而提升市場績效。
最後，本研究探討公司治理機制之有效性與盈餘預測正確性之交乘項對公司後續績效之影響。實證結果顯示，當董事會規模愈小且盈餘預測正確性愈高時，公司後續財務績效愈佳，顯示董事會規模與盈餘預測之正確性對於公司後續財務績效間存在互補關係；機構投資人持股比率愈高且盈餘預測之正確性較高，公司後續市場績效愈佳，顯示機構投資人持股比率與盈餘預測之正確性對於公司後續市場績效間存在互補關係；控制股東之席次控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度與盈餘預測之正確性對於公司後續市場績效間存在替代關係，即當控制股東之席次控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度愈低且盈餘預測之正確性愈低，公司後續市場績效愈佳。
本研究以聯立方程式較完整地呈現盈餘預測正確性與公司治理間的因果關係，並以兩階段最小平方法解決變數之內生性關係，導正係數估計偏誤之問題。

Since information asymmetry causes the gap of the recognition of corporate value between internal managers and outside stockholders, corporate governance mechanisms and managerial earnings forecasts can improve information transparency to mitigate the agency problem, so as to enhance corporate value. This study examines the relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, the accuracy of earnings forecasts and corporate performance. Specifically, this paper studies the relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and the accuracy of earnings forecasts. From Simultaneous Equation modeling, the result shows that there exists causal relationship between the accuracy of earnings forecasts and corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size, the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEO serving as the chairman, institutional ownership, the controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, the deviation of shareholders’ controlling right from cash flow right. In addition, this paper investigates the association between the accuracy of earnings forecasts and corporate performance. From Simultaneous Equation modeling, the result shows that there exists causal relationship between the accuracy of earnings forecasts and financial performance (ROA). From 2-Stage Least Square modeling, the result displays that financial performance, the effectiveness of corporate governance is positively associated with the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Then, the accuracy of earnings forecasts is positively associated with subsequent stock performance. Finally, this study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and earnings forecasts on corporate performance. The result shows that the deviation of shareholders’ controlling right from cash flow right will substitute for the inadequacy of earnings forecasts to raise corporate market performance. As the board size is smaller and earnings forecasts are accurate, corporate performance is better. Moreover, when the institutional ownership is lower and earnings forecasts are inaccurate, corporate performance is poor.

目錄
第壹章	緒論	1
第一節	研究背景與動機	1
第二節	研究目的	3
第三節	研究架構	4
第四節	研究流程	5
第貳章	文獻探討與假說建立	6
第一節	公司治理機制的有效性與盈餘預測	7
第二節	盈餘預測與績效	11
第三節	公司治理、盈餘預測正確性與公司績效	13
第参章	研究方法	15
第一節	研究期間、選本選取與資料蒐集	15
第二節	變數定義	15
第三節	實證模型建立	20
第四章	實證結果與分析	26
第五章	結論、限制與後續研究建議	36
第一節	研究結論	36
第二節	研究限制與後續研究之建議	39
參考文獻	40
表目錄
表一	各變數之敘述性統計量	47
表二	PEARSON相關係數矩陣	48
表三	公司治理對於盈餘預測正確性之影響	49
表四	盈餘預測正確性與董事會規模之內生性關係	50
表五	盈餘預測正確性與獨立董事比率之內生性關係	51
表六	盈餘預測正確性與職位雙重性之內生性關係	52
表七	盈餘預測正確性與機構投資人持股比率之內生性關係	53
表八	盈餘預測正確性與盈餘分配權之內生性關係	54
表九	盈餘預測正確性與席次盈餘偏離差之內生性關係	55
表十	盈餘預測正確性與公司財務績效之內生性關係	56
表十一	盈餘預測正確性對公司市場績效之影響(以ROA為工具變數)	57
表十二	盈餘預測正確性對公司市場績效之影響(以公司治理為工具變數)	58
表十三	公司治理與盈餘預測正確性之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	59
表十四	公司治理與盈餘預測正確性之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	61
表十五	公司治理對於盈餘預測偏誤之影響	63
表十六	盈餘預測頻率與董事會規模之內生性關係	64
表十七	盈餘預測頻率與獨立董事比率之內生性關係	65
表十八	盈餘預測頻率與職位雙重性之內生性關係	66
表十九	盈餘預測頻率與機構投資人持股比率之內生性關係	67
表二十	盈餘預測頻率與盈餘分配權之內生性關係	68
表二十一	盈餘預測頻率與席次盈餘偏離差之內生性關係	69
表二十二	盈餘預測頻率對公司市場績效之影響	70
表二十三	盈餘預測可能性對公司市場績效之影響	71
表二十四	盈餘預測偏誤對公司市場績效之影響	72
表二十五	盈餘預測正確性對公司市場績效之影響	73
表二十六	公司治理與盈餘預測頻率之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	74
表二十七	公司治理與盈餘預測頻率之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	76
表二十八	公司治理與盈餘預測信譽之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	78
表二十九	公司治理與盈餘預測信譽之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	80
表三十	公司治理對於盈餘預測正確性之影響	82
表三十一	盈餘預測正確性與董事會規模之內生性關係	83
表三十二	盈餘預測正確性與獨立董事比率之內生性關係	84
表三十三	盈餘預測正確性與職位雙重性之內生性關係	85
表三十四	盈餘預測正確性與機構投資人持股比率之內生性關係	86
表三十五	盈餘預測正確性與盈餘分配權之內生性關係	87
表三十六	盈餘預測正確性與席次盈餘偏離差之內生性關係	88
表三十七	盈餘預測正確性與公司財務績效之內生性關係	89
表三十八	盈餘預測正確性對公司市場績效之影響(以ROA為工具變數)	90
表三十九	盈餘預測正確性對公司市場績效之影響(以公司治理為工具變數)	91
表四十	公司治理與盈餘預測正確性之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	92
表四十一	公司治理與盈餘預測正確性之交乘效果對公司後續績效之影響	94

圖目錄
圖一	研究流程圖	1

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