本文旨在探討政府部門貪腐對於企業現金持有之影響。藉由中國在2012年第十八次人民代表大會宣布實施反貪腐改革的自然實驗，本研究以公司總部位於第一波實施改革省份的公司為實驗組、公司總部位於第二波實施改革省份的公司為對照組，並且採用差異中的差異法來比較實驗組公司與對照組公司在反貪腐改革實施前後現金持有的變化。本研究的實證結果發現，在反貪腐改革實施之後，實驗組公司的現金持有相較於對照組公司有顯著的提升。換言之，當政府部門的貪腐程度受到反貪腐改革的影響而下降時，公司遭受政府部門政治敲詐的風險以及其隱藏流動性資產的遮蔽性動機都隨之下降，因此公司將會提高現金持有。同時，為彌補無法藉由賄賂政府部門獲取有利資源的損失，公司持有現金的預防性動機在政府貪腐程度下降後亦將提高。綜合以上所述，本文的研究結果證實，在控制內生性問題的情況下，政府部門的貪腐程度與企業現金持有呈現負相關。

This study examines whether government corruption affects corporate cash holdings. To mitigate the endogeneity problem, I rely on a natural experiment that the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China announced national anti-corruption reform in 2012. Using firms located in the provinces affected by the first-round anti-corruption policy in 2013 as a treatment group and firms located in the provinces affected by the second-round anti-corruption policy in 2014 as a control group, I employee difference-in-differences approach to examine the causality between government corruption and corporate cash holdings. I find that treated firms have higher cash holdings than control firms after the implementation of anti-corruption policy. The result implies that the incentive of hiding liquidity assets (i.e., sheltering motive) decreases after the implementation of anti-corruption reform. On the other hand, as firms cannot obtain extra resources from bribing government officers after the anti-corruption reform, they tend to increase the level of cash holdings due to precautionary motives. In short, this study provides supporting evidence that there is a negative causality between government corruption and corporate cash holdings after controlling for the endogeneity problem.

目錄:
中文摘要		I
英文摘要		II
目錄		III
表目錄		IV
第一章：緒論	1
第一節：研究動機	1
第二節：研究目的	3
第二章：文獻回顧	5
第一節：政府部門貪腐對經濟造成的影響	5
第二節：企業現金持有的決定性因素	8
第三節：研究假說	11
第三章：研究樣本與研究方法	13
第一節：研究樣本	13
第二節：研究方法	13
第四章：實證結果	18
第一節：樣本資料敘述統計量	18
第二節：差異中的差異法分析結果	22
第五章：結論與建議	38
參考文獻		40
表目錄:
【表一】	研究變數說明	17
【表二】	敘述統計量表	19
【表三】	反貪腐改革實施前後實驗組與對照組公司現金持有之比較分析	20
【表四】	各變數之相關係數表	21
【表五】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—基礎模型	23
【表六】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—加入控制變數	24
【表七】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—加入公司治理變數	26
【表八】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—不同定義下的現金持有	29
【表九】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—產業調整後現金持有	30
【表十】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—控制公司固定效果	32
【表十一】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—排除受中央政府控制的國營企業	35
【表十二】	政府貪腐程度對企業現金持有影響之迴歸分析—公司規模大小分析	36

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