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系統識別號 U0002-2407200809582500
中文論文名稱 投資人對董事會效能知覺與投資人交易行為之關聯性研究
英文論文名稱 A study on the relationship between investors' perceptions of board effectiveness and their investment behaviors
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accounting
學年度 96
學期 2
出版年 97
研究生中文姓名 蕭聖蘭
研究生英文姓名 Sheng-Lan Hsiao
學號 794470160
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2008-06-12
論文頁數 95頁
口試委員 指導教授-洪雪卿
委員-孫瑞霙
委員-曹嘉玲
中文關鍵字 公司治理  董事會效能  投資人知覺  投資行為 
英文關鍵字 Corporate governance  Board effectiveness  Investor's perceptions  Investment behaviors 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學商學
中文摘要 美國學術界自一九三O年代開始探討有關公司治理之課題,亞洲國家在一九九七年金融風暴以後亦逐漸呼籲企業體能夠重視公司治理制度,因此無論在管理學界或是學術界,公司治理皆為普遍受到重視之課題。董事會的設立為公司治理機制中不可或缺的一部份,其目的在於代替全體股東監督管理者,促使管理者為全體股東創造最大的財富。而董事會功能之強弱,亦與董事會之組成有著密不可分的關係。

追溯以往有關董事會的研究中,較常以企業為主體來探討董事會的運作情形,至於以投資人角度為出發點,來探討董事會效能對投資人交易行為的影響,在目前來說鮮少有相關之討論。為了補強這方面的理論缺口,本研究主要的研究問題有兩項:一、投資人之投資行為是否會受到董事會效能強弱之影響。二、投資人對董事會效能之知覺,與其投資行為間之關聯性,是否因為投資人型態之不同,而有不同程度之影響。

本研究採實驗設計並搭配問卷調查方式,以專業投資人及非專業投資人為主要研究對象,其中專業投資人以共同基金經理人為代表,非專業投資人以EMBA學生為代表。問卷之內容以分別具強公司治理與弱公司治理之兩家虛擬公司為主,藉以探討投資人對虛擬公司董事會效能之知覺,與投資風險、投資金額及投資持有期間之關連性。實證結果發現:

1.投資人對董事會效能之知覺,會顯著影響他們對投資風險、投資金額及投資持有期間之評價。當投資人察覺董事會較有效能時,則認為該虛擬公司之投資風險較低,且願意投資較高的金額,並投資持有該公司較長之期間。
2.投資人對董事會效能之知覺,與所願意投資之金額,會因為投資人型態之不同而有所不同,專業投資人所願意投資之金額,較非專業投資人為高。
3.投資人對董事會效能之知覺,與投資風險及投資持有期間之判斷,並不因為投資人型態之不同而有顯著之不同。
英文摘要 The American academia has started to investigate the corporate governance issue since 1930s. After Asian financial crisis, Asian governments have also been asking enterprises to put more weight on the issue of corporate governance. Thus, corporate governance has become a popular topic and has drawn public’s attention in both business administration and academia. The board of directors is an indispensable mechanism for corporate governance. The board supervises the corporate management and its operation on behalf of all shareholders and asks the management to maximize the firm’s profit. Furthermore, the capability of the board of directors in control of the management has the inseparable connection with the constitution of board of directors.

Among previous studies regarding the issue of board of directors, the majority of researchers focused their studies on the board’s operations from firm’s perspective. However, the relationship between board effectiveness and investor’s behavior is relatively unexplored. In order to fill this gap, this study is trying to examine (i) whether the investment behavior of the investors will be influenced by the effectiveness of the board of directors, and (ii) whether the relationship between effectiveness of the board and investment behavior will be moderated by the type of investors.

This study employs experimental design along with survey questionnaires. Our study samples consist of professional and non-professional investors. Mutual fund managers are chosen to represent the professional investors and EMBA students are proxies of non-professional investors.

The content of the questionnaire includes two fictitious companies. One has strong-form of corporate governance and the other does not. It explores the relationship between investors’ perceptions of board effectiveness and their judgments on these two companies’ investment risk, investment holding period, and investment amount. Our empirical results are summarized below:

1.Apparently, investors' perceptions of board effectiveness significantly influence their evaluation of investment risk, investment amount, and holding period. When investors perceive strong-form of the effectiveness of the board, the investors tend to believe that the investment risk of the company is lower; they would like to invest larger amount of money and to hold the investment longer.

2.Investors’perceptions of board effectiveness and the amount of assets they are willing to invest changes according to different types of the investor. The amount of money that professional investors are willing to invest is larger than non-professional investors.

3.However, the relationship between the investors’ perceptions of board effectiveness and their judgments of investment risk and investment holding period would not be changed as to different investor types.
論文目次 目  錄
誌   謝 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iv
目  錄 vi
圖 目 錄 viii
表 目 錄 ix
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的與問題 5
第三節 研究流程 7
第四節 論文架構 8
第二章 文獻回顧 9
第一節 公司治理與董事會之關係 9
一、公司治理之理論背景 9
二、公司治理與董事會 14
第二節 心理學與投資人行為之關係 22
第三節 專業投資人及非專業投資人與董事會之關係 25
一、專業投資人及非專業投資人之定義與相關研究 25
二、投資人對公司治理及董事會知覺之相關研究 28
第三章 研究設計 32
第一節 問卷設計 32
第二節 研究假說 35
一、專業投資人及非專業投資人對董事會效能之知覺 35
二、專業投資人及非專業投資人之投資判斷 37
第三節 實證模式與變數衡量 39
一、實證模式 39
二、變數定義與衡量 41
第四章 實證結果與分析 45
第一節 基本資料分析 45
一、樣本特性之敘述性統計分析 45
二、研究變數之敍述性統計分析 48
第二節 假說驗證 56
一、相關性分析 56
二、迴歸分析 57
第三節 實證結果之討論 69
第五章 結論與建議 71
第一節 結論 71
一、投資人對董事會效能之知覺,與其交易行為之關聯性 72
二、董事會效能之知覺及交易行為,與投資人型態之關聯性 72
第二節 管理意涵 74
第三節 研究限制 75
第四節 建議後續研究方向 76
參考文獻 77
中文部份 77
英文部份 79
附錄一 專業投資人對董事會知覺之問卷表 86
附錄二 非專業投資人對董事會知覺之問卷表 91

圖 目 錄
圖1 研究流程圖 7

表 目 錄
表 1 樣本特性敍述性統計表 47
表 2 敍述性統計分析表-依個案公司比較 54
表 3 敍述性統計分析表-依投資人型態比較 55
表 4 Pearson相關係數表 57
表 5 模式一之迴歸變異數分析表 58
表 6 模式一之迴歸分析表 59
表 7 模式二之迴歸變異數分析表 59
表 8 模式二之迴歸分析表 60
表 9 模式三之迴歸變異數分析表 61
表 10 模式三之迴歸分析表 62
表 11 模式四之迴歸變異數分析表 63
表 12 模式四之迴歸分析表 64
表 13 模式五之迴歸變異數分析表 65
表 14 模式五之迴歸分析表 66
表 15 模式六之迴歸變異數分析表 67
表 16 模式六之迴歸分析表 68
表 17 假說驗證彙總表 70
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網站資料

台灣證券交易。http://www.tse.com.tw/ch/index.php

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證券暨期貨法令判解查詢系統。http://www.selaw.com.tw/new.asp


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