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系統識別號 U0002-2402201512545700
中文論文名稱 銀行所有權類型、往來關係與授信績效之研究
英文論文名稱 Bank Ownership, Relationship with Clients and Lending Performance
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 管理科學學系博士班
系所名稱(英) Doctoral Program, Department of Management Sciences
學年度 103
學期 1
出版年 104
研究生中文姓名 郭碧雲
研究生英文姓名 Bih-Yun Kuo
學號 895620416
學位類別 博士
語文別 英文
口試日期 2015-01-30
論文頁數 168頁
口試委員 指導教授-黃振豊
委員-沈中華
委員-王維康
委員-張婉瑜
委員-倪衍森
委員-張寶光
委員-孔繁華
中文關鍵字 所有權類型  往來關係  客戶信用  資訊不對稱  放款利差 
英文關鍵字 ownership type  relationship  credit rating  information asymmetry  loan spread 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文主要以財團法人聯合徵信中心所收集的資料,探討以下三個主題:(一)銀行的所有權類型對借款企業多重往來關係之影響-以台灣的微小型企業與中大型企業為例,(二)資訊不對稱與客戶信用對授信績效的影響-以台灣為例,(三)客戶的信用狀態與往來密切程度對銀行放款利差的影響-以台灣為例。
第一個主題本研究得出的結論是(1)銀行偏好資訊透明度高的微小型企業。負責人的信用評分愈高,微小型企業愈不迫切多重往來關係的建立;信用紀錄不良的微小型企業,愈困難建立多重往來關係。外資銀行充分供應微小型企業資金,使得這些企業不積極開拓多重往來關係。(2)中大型企業向外資銀行愈多舉債,往來家數愈少;惟若是向民營銀行愈多舉債,則愈積極建立多重的往來關係。(3)銀行面對大量投注研發支出的中大型企業,願意全力支持,使其免於開拓新的往來銀行。(4) 民營金控融資給予中大型企業愈多額度時,會使這些企業顯著減少往來銀行的家數。
第二個主題的結論是(1)經營規模大、資訊透明度佳的企業,傾向與鉅額呆帳和卡損嚴重銀行建立往來關係;卡損嚴重的銀行與成立期間短的企業密切往來,此種情況在新銀行開放以後更加明顯,也承擔了偏高的信用風險。(2)微小型的外資企業,以及獲利率、現金比率和研發支出率均高的中大型企業,偏好與授信績效佳、信用風險低的銀行往來。 (3) 信用紀錄不良的微小型和中大型企業,偏好與授信績效佳、信用風險低的銀行往來。當企業負責人的信用評分提高時,其轉向授信績效佳、信用風險低的銀行舉債之傾向提高。
第三個主題的結論是(1)民營金控及民營非金控的放款利差顯著低於公營銀行。而外國銀行的放款利差則顯著高於公營銀行。(2)銀行僅會在高信用風險之借款客戶的信用評等有明顯改善時降低其放款利差,但這並不適用於一般性的借款客戶,雖然其信用評等也有改善。(3)實證發現最大債權銀行及主力銀行,給予借款客戶顯著較低之放款利差,也願意給予高信用風險的借款客戶較低的放款利差,該現象之意涵為台灣的銀行應該是重視往來關係的。(4)穩健性測試指出,當借款客戶之風險提高時,銀行會提高其放款利差,而當借款客戶之風險降低時,銀行會調降其放款利差。
英文摘要 This dissertation uses the data collected by the Taiwan’s Joint Credit Information Centre (JCIC) to explore the following topics: bank ownership types and multiple relationships with corporate clients, the impact of information asymmetry and client credit on lending performance, and the impacts of credit rating, ownership, and relationships on loan spread.
With regard to topic Ⅰ, we find that banks prefer to have relationships with micro and small businesses (MSBs) that have a high level of information transparency. The more micro-enterprises borrow from private financial holding companies or non-financial holding companies, the more the enterprises develop multiple relationships. The more medium and large businesses (MLBs) borrow from foreign banks, the fewer bank relationships they have. And the more they borrow from private banks, the greater their tendency to build multiple relationships.
In topic Ⅱ, MLBs with good information transparency tend to establish relationships with banks that have huge losses from bad debts and credit card lending. However, small foreign firms, and MLBs that have high profitability, cash, and R&D expenditure ratios, prefer to have relationships with banks that have good lending performances and low credit risks. In addition, MLBs and MSBs with poor credit records prefer to have relationships with banks that have good lending performances and low credit risks.
In topicⅢ, our results show that private financial holding companies and private non-financial holding companies grant loan spreads significantly lower than those of state-owned banks. Foreign banks grant loan spreads significantly higher than those of state-owned banks. Banks reduce their loan spreads only for high credit risk borrowers with obvious improvements in credit ratings; they do not reduce loan spreads for general borrowers even when the borrowers’ credit ratings improve.

論文目次 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
1.1 Research Motivation and Purpose 1
1.2 Contribution of the Dissertation 3
1.3 Framework of the Dissertation 9
References 12
Chapter 2: Topic I: Bank Ownership Types and Multiple Relationships with Corporate Clients 16
2. 1 Introduction 17
2. 2 Literature Review 24
2.3 Sampling Design, Variable Definition and Research Method 31
2.4 Research Hypotheses 40
2.5 The Scale of Borrower and Banking Relationship with Various Types of Bank Ownership 46
2.6 The Impact of Bank Ownership Types on Borrowers’ Multiple Relationships 59
2.7 Conclusions 68
References 73
Chapter 3: Topic II: The Impacts of Information Asymmetry and Client Credit on Lending Performance 79
3.1 Introduction 79
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 84
3.3 Research Design 91
3.4 Empirical Results 97
3.5 Conclusions 107
References 109

Chapter 4: Topic III: The Impacts of Credit Rating, Ownership and Relationships on Loan Spreads 111
4.1. Introduction 111
4.2 Literature and Hypotheses 116
4.3 Data and methodology 125
4.4 Empirical Analysis and Results 129
4.5 Conclusions 147
References 148
Chapter 5: Conclusion 155
5.1 Major Research Conclusions 155
5.2 Contributions of the Dissertation 159
5.3 Suggestions and limitations 162
References 164

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
ILLUSTRATION 1-1 ................................................................................................... 9
ILLUSTRATION 1-2 ................................................................................................. 10
ILLUSTRATION 1-3 ................................................................................................. 11

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1 Summary of Dimensions and Variables ............................................... 37
Table 2-2 Mean and Median for Small Firms with Relationships with Four
Types of Banks ........................................................................................ 48
Table 2-3 Mean and Median for Large Firms with Relationship with Four
Bank Ownership Types .......................................................................... 57
Table 2-4 Factors that Impact Relationships between Small Firms and Banks 58
Table 2-5 Factors that Impact Relationships between Large Firms and Banks58
Table 2-6 Multiple Relationships for Small Firms ............................................... 62
Table 2-7 Multiple Relationships of Large Firms ................................................ 71
Table 2-8 Comparison of Diversification of Bank Ownership Types and
Financing Amount to borrower ............................................................. 72
Table 3-1 Summary of Dimensions and Variables ............................................... 96
Table 3-2 Comparison of MSBs and MLBs from Different Perspectives ........ 102
Table 3-3 Using Logit Model to Distinguish Credit Risk by “WOBD” Event . 104
Table 3-4 Using Logit Model to Distinguish Credit Risk by “HCCL” Events 107
Table 4-1 Summary of Variables .......................................................................... 128
Table 4-2 Description Statistics - by lending performance ................................ 134
Table 4-3 Descriptive Statistics - by ownership of banks .................................. 134
Table 4-4 Descriptive Statistics - by credit risk of borrowing companies ........ 135
Table 4-5 The impact of the customer’s credit state and relationships on loan
spreads - sampling with or without “WOBD” ................................... 136
Table 4-6 The impact of the customer’s credit state and relationships on loan
spreads - sampling with and without “HCCL” ................................. 140
Table 4-7 The impact of the customer’s credit status and relationships on loan
spreads- measuring relationships by the financing ratio of different
ownership types .................................................................................... 144
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