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系統識別號 U0002-2307200715082000
中文論文名稱 再生能源政策探討:封閉與開放經濟體系
英文論文名稱 The Optimal Renewable Energy Policy: Close and Open Economy
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 產業經濟學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Industrial Economics
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生中文姓名 吳伊婷
研究生英文姓名 Yi-Ting Wu
學號 694510016
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2007-06-14
論文頁數 52頁
口試委員 指導教授-洪鳴丰
委員-蕭代基
委員-陳宜亨
中文關鍵字 淨再生能源  政策  污染排放稅  補貼  市場結構  開放經濟 
英文關鍵字 net renewable energy  policy  emission tax  subsidy  market structure  open economy 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學經濟學
中文摘要 近年來由於經濟、環境與化石能源耗竭等問題的浮現,以及再生能源對環境的正外部效益,使各國紛紛推廣再生能源的使用與發展來替代化石能源。但再生能源雖具環境友善性,其生產過程也可能對環境造成污染,故政府在制定再生能源發展政策時,除了利用各種經濟工具促進其發展外,也要針對其污染損害給予限制及懲罰,以導正負外部性造成之市場失靈。
本文主要探討在封閉與開放經濟體系下,政府最適再生能源政策的制定。在封閉經濟體系下,我們分析不同市場結構下最適再生能源政策為何。在開放經濟體系下,我們以一個兩國兩廠商雙占出口貿易模型,分析本國與外國政府在合作與不合作下之最適再生能源政策。
首先,在封閉經濟體系下,我們發現若市場結構為完全競爭,最適的污染排放稅率為皮古稅而最適淨再生能源補貼率大於再生能源的邊際效益,且廠商市場力量越強大則補貼率越高於皮古補貼。
其次,在開放經濟體系下,本國(再生能源出口國)與外國(再生能源進口國)不合作時,本國政府應對本國廠商污染排放課徵皮古稅,外國政府雖對外國廠商污染排放課稅,但其最適稅率低於邊際污染損害,且外國政府對外國廠商之淨再生能源補貼率亦會高於市場總再生能源產量的邊際效益。若兩國政府合作,制定聯合再生能源政策時,兩國最適之污染排放稅率會等於兩國廠商污染排放的邊際損害,但較不合作者為高。而兩國政府聯合最適之淨再生能源補貼率會高於兩國再生能源產出的邊際效益,但聯合補貼率會低於不合作下外國政府對外國廠商最適之淨再生能源補貼率。
英文摘要 Because of economic and environmental problems, exhaustion of fossil fuels, and the positive externality of renewable energy, all countries pay attention to renewable energy as a fossil fuel substitute. However, even though renewable energy is friendly to environment, the life cycle of renewable energy may pollute the environment. Therefore, governments have not only to develop the renewable energy but also to internalize the negative externalities from renewable energy.
This thesis studies the optimal policies of renewable energy in closed and open economies. In the case of closed economy, the optimal emission tax and energy subsidy are Pigouvian ones if the market structure is perfectly competitive. When the market structure is monopoly or oligopoly, the optimal emission tax is also a Pigouvian one. The optimal subsidy, however, is higher than the Pigouvian one. Moreover, the higher the market power, the higher the subsidy rate.
In the case of open economy, a two-country duopoly model is used to analyze. When two governments act noncooperatively, we find that the government who exports renewable energy would levy a Pigouvian tax on its domestic firm. The importer government would levy an emission tax which is lower than the Pigouvian tax and give a subsidy which is higher than the Pigouvian subsidy to its firm. When two governments act cooperatively, the cooperative tax is equal to the marginal damage and the cooperative subsidy is higher than the marginal benefit of total renewable energy. In addition, the cooperative tax and subsidy are higher and lower than the noncooperative tax and subsidy, respectively.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 本文架構及研究方法 3
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 再生能源政策與發展現況 5
第二節 環境與貿易政策模型 7
一、封閉體系之環境政策 7
二、貿易與環境政策 8
第三章 理論模型 11
第一節 封閉體系下之最適再生能源政策 12
一、完全競爭市場 16
(一)無污染防治技術 16
(二)有污染防治技術 18
二、獨占市場 20
(一)無污染防治技術 20
(二)有污染防治技術 22
三、寡占市場 25
(一)無污染防治技術 25
(二)有污染防治技術 28
四、小結 31
第二節 開放經濟體系下之最適再生能源政策 34
一、無污染防治技術 35
(一)兩國政府不合作下之最適再生能源政策 37
(二)兩國政府合作下之最適再生能源政策 39
二、有污染防治技術 40
(一)兩國政府不合作之最適再生能源政策 42
(二)兩國政府合作下之最適再生能源政策 44
三、小結 45
第四章 結論 48
參考文獻 50
圖表目錄
頁次
圖一:理論模型分析架構 3
表一:各國再生能源政策工具 10
表二:各市場結構下最適再生能源政策比較: 33
表三:合作與不合作下最適再生能源政策之比較: 47

參考文獻 一、中文部分
林益豪,2007。「再生能源補貼基礎之研究」。碩士論文,政治大學經濟研究所。

郭博堯,2002,「政府再生能源發展政策必須要有可行性」,財團法人國家政策研究基金會,國政分析,民國九十一年七月三十一日。

黃宗煌、陳佩芬、黃瀕儀,2006。「推廣能源作物與生質柴油之政策效果與整合分析」。東莞理工學院學報,13(4):39-50。

邱俊榮、林佳蕙,2002。「開放經濟體系下最適環境及貿易政策」。人文及社會學集刊。24卷,2期,211-232。

張鼎煥、呂威賢,2005,「我國再生能源法規制度探討」,經濟部「永續產業發展雙月刊」,22卷,32-43。

嚴萬璋,2003,「我國再生能源設備產業發展建議」,「電機產業資訊報導」。

二、英文部分
Buchanan, J.M. and W.C. Stubblebine (1962), “Externality,” Economica. 29, 371-384.
Buchanan, J.M. (1969), “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and
Market Structure,” American Economic Review. 59, 174-177.

Barnett, A.H. (1980), “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,” American
Economic Review. 70, 1037 - 1041.

Hahn, R. (1984), “Market Power and Transferable Property Rights,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics. 99, 753-765.

Conrad, K. (1993a), “Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 25, 121-135.

Conrad, K. (1993b), “Optimal Environmental Policy for Oligopolistic Industries in an Open Economy,” Department of Economics Discussion Paper 476-493, University of Mannheim.

Conrad, K. (2001), “Voluntary environmental agreements vs. emission taxes in strategic trade models,” Environmental and Resource Economics. 19(4): 361-381.

Copeland, B. R. (1994), “International Trade and the Environment: Policy Reform in a Polluted Small Open Economy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 26, 44-65.

Henke, J. M. , G. Klepper, and N. Schmitz (2005), “Tax Exemption for Biofuels in Germany: Is Bio-Ethanol Really an Option for Climate Policy?” Energy. 30: 2617-2635.

Jacobsen, H.K. (2000), “Taxing CO2 and subsidising biomass: analysed in a macroeconomic and sectoral model,” Biomass & Bioenergy. 18(2): 113-124.

Krutilla, K. (1991), “Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 20, 127-142.

Pigou A. (1932), “The Economics of Welfare”, 4th edition, Mac Millan, London.

Panagriya, A., K. Palmer, W. Oates and A. Krupnick (1993), “Toward an Integrated Theory of Open Economy Environmental and Trade Policy,” Working Paper No. 93-98, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.

Patzek, T. W., S-M. Anti, R. Campos, K. W. Ha, J. Lee, B. Li, J. Padnick, S,-A. Yee (2005), “Ethanol from corn: Clean renewable fuel for the future, or drain on our resources and pockets?,” Environment, Development and Sustainability. 7(3): 319-336.
Requate, T. (2005), “Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition-A Survey,” Economics Working Paper No 2005-12.

Ulph, A. (1996), “Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 30(3), 265-281.

Ulph, A. (1997), “International trade and the environment: a survey of recent economic analysis, ” The international yearbook of environmental and resource economics 1997/1998 : a survey of current issues. 205-243.

Vollebergh, H. (1997), “Environmental externalities and social optimality in biomass markets: Waste-to-energy in the Netherlands and biofuels in France,” Energy Policy. 25(6): 605-621.
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