在金融海嘯後，公司因經濟衰退瀕臨破產危機，但其中虧損公司的高階管理者卻仍坐領高薪之情況屢屢發生，導致各國政府對董監薪酬揭露法規制定更加嚴謹，然而我國現行法規仍無法如國外全面性個別揭露薪酬，使董監事及管理階層為能領取高額薪酬，存在操縱盈餘管理誘因，因此本研究利用金管會所制定法規，將董監薪酬揭露方式分為自願性個別揭露、強制性個別揭露及彙總配合級距揭露，探討不同揭露透明度是否會影響管理階層操縱盈餘管理，並進一步分析自願性個別揭露與強制性個別揭露對盈餘管理程度之影響，及被列為強制性個別揭露原因。由實證結果發現，薪酬揭露資訊透明度愈高，愈能抑制盈餘管理發生，此外，強制性揭露相較於自願性揭露，其盈餘管理程度較高，最後，在強制性揭露下對盈餘管理之影響，公司績效表現比董事會股權結構影響來得大。冀望研究結果能提供給制訂相關法規當局作參考，以規劃完善的薪酬法規制度保障投資人權利。

After the financial tsunami, the company was on the brink of bankruptcy due to economic recession, but the excessive compensation of top managers have happened in loss companies. This has led governments around the world to formulate stricter rules on the disclosure of directors and supervisors’ compensation. However, current laws and regulations in Taiwan are still unable to disclosure the comprehensive of individual compensation such as foreign countries. In order to receive high compensation, directors and supervisors have incentives to manipulate earnings management with the management. Therefore, this study uses the regulations that formulated by the Financial Supervisory Commission to divide the disclosure types of directors and supervisors' compensation into the voluntary disclosure of individual compensation, the mandatory disclosure of individual compensation, and the disclosure of aggregate compensation. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether different disclosure transparency will affect management's motivation to manipulate earnings management. This thesis further explores the impact of voluntary disclosure of individual compensation and mandatory disclosure of individual compensation on earnings management and the reasons for listed as mandatory disclosure of individual compensation. The empirical results show that the higher the transparency of salary disclosure information, the more the earnings management is restrained. In addition, the mandatory disclosure has higher level of earnings management than the voluntary disclosure. Finally, the firm performance has greater impact than the board structure on earnings management under the mandatory disclosure. The result is projected to provide reference to the relevant regulatory authorities for implementation of laws.

目錄
第壹章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與研究動機1
第二節 研究目的3
第三節 研究流程4
第貳章 文獻探討5
第一節 董監事薪酬揭露方式6
第二節 董監事薪酬揭露方式與盈餘管理之關聯性14
第三節 盈餘管理22
第四節 假說建立25
第參章 研究方法29
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源29
第二節 研究模型32
第三節 變數定義與衡量37
第肆章 實證結果與分析43
第一節 敘述性統計43
第二節 相關係數分析47
第三節 迴歸結果分析53
第伍章 結論與建議62
第一節 研究結論62
第二節 研究貢獻63
第三節 研究限制與建議64
參考文獻65

圖目錄
圖1-1  研究流程圖5
圖2-1  各揭露方式透明度比較圖19
圖2-2  研究架構圖25

表目錄
表2-1 董事酬金彙總揭露表7
表2-2 董事酬金級距揭露表8
表2-3 董事酬金個別揭露表9
表2-4 董監薪酬揭露法規彙總表（依年度區分）12
表2-5 董監薪酬揭露法規彙總表（依當年度盈虧區分）13
表3-1 樣本篩選表30
表3-2 產業分配表31
表3-3 追蹤資料檢定表34
表3-4 變數定義表42
表4-1 敘述性統計量44
表4-2 單變量分析46
表4-3 相關係數表（H1）49
表4-4 相關係數表（H2）50
表4-5 相關係數表（H3a）51
表4-6 相關係數表（H3b）52
表4-7 追蹤資料模型選用檢定53
表4-8 彙總配合級距揭露與個別揭露對盈餘管理程度之迴歸結果56
表4-9 自願性個別揭露與強制性個別揭露對盈餘管理程度之迴歸結果58
表4-10在強制性個別揭露下，營運績效對盈餘管理程度之迴歸結果60
表4-11在強制性個別揭露下，董事會結構對盈餘管理程度之迴歸結果61

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