本研究旨在探討台灣上市櫃公司董監事責任險與風險承擔的關聯性，並以公司治理的角色進行研究及分析。由於過去文獻指出公司對董監事責任險的需求會受到許多因素影響，例如，公司治理特性。為解決此內生性問題，本文採用兩階段最小平方法(two-stage least square method, 2SLS)估計迴歸模型，第一階段模型驗證董監事責任保險需求與公司治理關聯性，第二階段探討風險承擔與董監事責任險之關聯性。實證結果顯示，董監事責任險的投保需求會受到公司治理因素影響；董事長兼任總經理、董事會獨立性及經理人持股均對董監事責任險投保需求有正向顯著影響，而董事會規模及大股東持股對董監事責任險投保需求有負向顯著影響，且董監事責任險對公司風險承擔呈現顯著的正向影響，表示投保董監事責任險會使企業擴大風險承擔。此外，本研究以董監事責任險投保金額進行驗證，實證結果亦支持董監事責任險投保金額與風險承擔呈現顯著的正向影響。

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and risk taking in Taiwan listed companies from the role of corporate governance. Prior literatures suggest that the demand of D&O insurance is likely affected by many factors, such as corporate governance characteristics. To solve this endogenous problem, we adopted two-stage least square method (2SLS) to estimate our empirical models. The first stage model is to examine the relationship between the demand of D&O insurance and corporate governance. The second stage model is to examine the relationship between risk taking and the demand of D&O insurance. The empirical results show that the demand of D&O insurance will be influenced by corporate governance factors. CEO duality, board independence and manager shares have significant positive impact on the demand of D&O insurance; whereas board size and block shares have significant negative impact on the demand of D&O Insurance. D&O insurance has a significant positive impact on corporate risk taking indicating that the purchase of D&O insurance will lead to greater risk taking. In addition, we testified our models by the amount of D&O insurance. The results also support the significant positive impact on corporate risk taking.

目錄
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 4
第三節　研究架構 5
第二章　文獻探討 7
第一節　董監事責任險需求與公司治理 7
第二節　風險承擔與公司治理 11
第三章　研究方法 13
第一節　研究假說 13
第二節　研究樣本與資料來源 18
第三節　研究變數與模型設定 19
第四章 實證結果分析 24
第一節 敘述性統計分析 24
第二節 相關性分析 30
第三節 平均數差異檢定 35
第四節 實證結果分析 37
第五章 結論與建議 51
第一節 結論 51
第二節 研究限制及建議 53
參考文獻 54

圖目錄
圖1-1:研究流程圖 6

表目錄
表4-1:研究樣本產業分布狀況 25
表4-2:研究樣本年度分布狀況 27
表4-3:研究變數敘述性統計 29
表4-4:PEARSON相關係數－董監事責任險投保與否 31
表4-5:PEARSON相關係數－董監事責任險投保金額 33
表4-6:董監事責任險投保與否兩母體平均數差異性檢定 36
表4-7-1:多元共線性診斷－DO 38
表4-7-2:多元共線性診斷－Amt 39
表4-8-1:第一階段迴歸結果－DO 44
表4-8-2:第二階段迴歸結果－DO 45
表4-9-1:第一階段迴歸結果－Amt 49
表4-9-2:第二階段迴歸結果－Amt 50

中文部分
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2. 李書行、韓建婷、劉俐萱、李柏霖，2007，「訴訟風險，董監事責任險，與公司經營績效」，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告。
3. 陳彩稚、龐嘉惠，2008，董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析，「臺大管理論叢」，第18卷，第2期，頁171-196。
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