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系統識別號 U0002-2206201114000100
中文論文名稱 交叉授權與社會福利
英文論文名稱 Cross Licensing and Social Welfare
校院名稱 淡江大學
系所名稱(中) 產業經濟學系碩士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Industrial Economics
學年度 99
學期 2
出版年 100
研究生中文姓名 顏以理
研究生英文姓名 Yi-Li Yan
學號 697540168
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
口試日期 2011-06-15
論文頁數 31頁
口試委員 指導教授-梁文榮
委員-麥朝成
委員-黃鴻
委員-王光正
中文關鍵字 交叉授權  單位權利金授權  混合授權  獨占產量 
英文關鍵字 Cross Licensing  Royalty Licensing  Mix Licensing  Monopoly Output 
學科別分類 學科別社會科學經濟學
中文摘要 本文假設二家廠商均生產一個同質產品,各自擁有一個對方需要的創新技術,且在市場上從事 Cournot 數量競爭,探討廠商的均衡授權策略組合、最適授權策略以及社會福利之比較。本文得到下列結論:(1) 二廠商有一個優勢策略組合,即雙方均採授權策略,因此二廠商會從事交叉授權。(2) 若廠商選擇交叉授權且對固定權利金不限制不得為負值,則會透過單位權利金來調整市場總產量至生產聯合獨占產量。但若限制固定權利金不得為負值,則當製程創新程度夠小時,廠商無法生產聯合獨占產量。(3) 二授權廠商的最適授權策略為混合授權,且當製程創新程度夠小時,二授權廠商的最適單位權利金會超過製程創新程度。但若限制固定權利金不得為負值,當製程創新程度夠小時,授權策略為等於製程創新程度的單位權利金授權。(4) 若不限制固定權利金不得為負值,當製程創新程度夠大時,交叉授權下的社會福利比授權前的高;反之,當製程創新程度夠小時,交叉授權後的社會福利比授權前的低。但若限制固定權利金不得為負值,則交叉授權後的社會福利一定會提高。此結論提供政府採取反托拉斯法,限制固定權利金不得為負值的理論基礎。在上述本文的四個結論中,尤以第二個結論最為重要。
英文摘要 This paper develops a duopoly model, in which both firms have a process innovation, respectively, that can reduce the rival’s marginal production cost and engage in Cournot competition in the commodity market, to explore the equilibrium licensing contract combination and the impact of licensing contract to the social welfare. We show that (1) the dominant strategy combination is that both firms will definitely choose licensing strategy, i.e., cross-licensing is the equilibrium licensing contract combination. (2) If both firms choose cross-licensing and there is no restriction that the fixed-fee must be non-negative, firms will charge a royalty rate so as to produce the monopoly output. However, if the fixed-fee is required be non-negative, both firms are unable to produce the monopoly output as the innovation size is small. (3) The optimal licensing contract is mixed licensing. Moreover, the optimal royalty rate would be greater than (be equal to) the innovation size, if the innovation size is small with no restriction (with restriction) on the non-negative value of fixed fee. (4) If the fixed-fee is required be non-negative, social welfare would improve by choosing cross-licensing as the innovation size is large while worsen, otherwise. However, social welfare would definitely improve by choosing cross-licensing if the fixed-fee is required be non-negative. This provides the rational for the government to enact an anti-trust law for confining to a non-negative value of fixed fee. It is worth noting that the second conclusion mentioned above is the most crucial in this thesis.
論文目次 目 錄-----------------------------------------------------Ⅰ
第一章 緒論------------------------------------------------1
第二章 文獻回顧--------------------------------------------4
第三章 基本模型--------------------------------------------7
第四章 最適授權策略----------------------------------------8
4.1 給定對手採取授權策略下的最適授權策略----------------10
4.2 給定對手採取不授權策略下的最適授權策略--------------16
4.3 均衡策略組合----------------------------------------19
4.3.1 給定廠商2選擇授權-----------------------------19
4.3.2 給定廠商2不選擇授權---------------------------20
4.3.3 均衡策略組合----------------------------------21
第五章 社會福利分析---------------------------------------23
第六章 結論-----------------------------------------------27
參考文獻--------------------------------------------------29
參考文獻 Anand, B., and Khanna, T., 2000, “The Structure of Licensing Contracts,” The Journal of Industrial Economics 48: 1, 103-135.
Eswaran, M., 1994, “Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device,” Canadian Journal of Economics 27, 689-708.
Fershtman, C., and Kamien, M., 1992, “Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, 329-348.
Filippini, L., 2006, “Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing,” International Journal of Business and Economics 5: 3, 201-210.
Forfuri, A and E. Roca, 2004, “Optimal Licensing Strategy: Royalty or Fixed Fee?” International Journal of Business and Economics 3: 1, 13-19.
Galasso, A., 2007, “Broad Cross-License Agreements and Persuasive Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry,” Working Paper.
Liao, C. H., and D. Sen, 2005, “Subsidy in Licensing: Optimality and Welfare Implications,” The Manchester School 73, 281-299.
Kamien, M., and Y. Tauman, 1986, “Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 471-491.
Kamien, M., S. S. Oren, and Y. Tauman, 1992, “Optimal Licensing of Cost-reducing Innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 21, 483-508.
Kamien, M., and Y. Tauman, 2002, “Patent Lisensing: The Inside Story,” The Manchester School 70: 1, 7-15.
Meniere, Y., and Parlane, S., 2004, “A Dynamic Model of Cross Licensing,” Working Paper.
Poddar, S., and U. B. Sinha, 2010, “Patent Licensing from a High-Cost Firm to a Low-Cost Firm,” Economic Record 86, 384-395.
Rostoker, M., 1984, “A Survey of Corporate Licensing,” Journal of Law and Technology 24, 59-92.
Shapiro, C., 1985, “Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry,” American Economic Review 75: 2, 25-30.
Sen , D., 2005, “Fee versus Royalty Reconsidered,” Games and Economic Behavior 53, 141-147.
Sen, D., and Y. Tauman, 2007, “General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-reduceing Innovation,” Games and Economic Behavior 59, 163-186.
Taylor, C.T., and Z.A. Silberston, 1973, “The Economic Impact of the Patent System” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Wang, X. H., 1998, “Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model,” Economics Letters 60, 55-62.
Wang, X. H., 2002, “Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly,” Journal of Economics and Business 54, 253-266.
Wang, X. H., and B. Yang, 1999, “On Licensing under Bertrand Competition,” Australian Economic Papers 38, 106-119.
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