隨著近年來越來越多公司利用法人說明會作為與投資人溝通的管道，是否法人說明會的召開確實可以降低外部資訊使用者資訊不對稱的情形，是本研究欲探討的首要議題。然而在不同公司治理特性下，過去研究探討公司治理多由經營績效與企業價值方面分析，本研究改由分析師盈餘預測之角度，以瞭解相關公司治理變數在降低外部使用者資訊不對稱上，所扮演之角色是否與對公司經營績效與企業價值有別。本研究以台灣上市（櫃）公司2000至2004之分析師盈餘預測為樣本，主要發現如下： 
    首先，不論是否考慮公司本身治理特性的情況下，公司在第一季季報發布後伴隨法人說明會的召開，相較於無召開的，的確更有助於分析師降低預測誤差。 
    其次，在公司治理內部與外部機制的考量下，在第一季季報發布
時，包括董監事持股比例、管理當局盈餘預測特性與公司資訊透明度三項變數，均影響到分析師預測準確性。其中當公司有召開法人說明會時董監事持股比例與分析師預測準確度之提升具負向關係。若公司沒有召開法人說明會時，管理當局上年度盈餘預測修正次數和公司資訊透明度與分析師預測準確度之提升具正向關係，但管理當局上年度盈餘預測誤差率平均則與分析師預測準確度之提升具負向關係。 
    最後，在考慮法人說明會與公司治理變數之交互作用對分析師盈餘預測之影響上，在第一季季報發布時，有召開法人說明會之公司相較於無召開法人說明會之公司，其董監事持股比例與分析師預測準確度之提升具負向關係。而管理當局前一年度盈餘預測誤差率平均則與分析師預測準確度之提升具正向關係。當第三季季報發布時，分析師預測人數與分析師預測準確度之提升具正向關係。且法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測之影響均在期初較明顯。

More and more enterprises use the conference calls to communicate with investors in recent years. We investigate whether conference calls can help external information users to reduce information asymmetry. Most of the previous corporate governance researches concerned about the effects on operating performance and firm value. But we concerned whether corporate governance could reduce information asymmetry. This study also examined the relationship between conference calls, corporate governance variables 
and analysts’ judgment. According to the analysts’ forecasted data from year 2000 to 2004 in Taiwan security market, the main results of this study are as follows: 
First, no matter considering the corporate governance variables, the use of earnings related conference calls could reduces analysts’ forecast error.Secondly, when we consider the internal and external governance, As company use of earnings related conference calls, the shares of directors have negative effect on analysts’ forecast. As company do not use of earnings related conference calls, the number of administrative authority predict revise in prior year, and the quality of the transparency of company's information have positive effect on analysts’ forecast. But the average revising error rate in the prior year of the administrative authority have negative effect on analysts’ forecast.Finally, when we exam the relationship between conference calls, corporate governance variables and analysts’ judgment. As company use of earnings related conference calls, the shares of directors have negative effect on analysts’ forecast than the company don’t use of earnings related conference calls. As company use of earnings related conference calls, the average revise error rate in the of prior year of the
administrative authority and the analyst predicted number have positive effect on analysts’ forecast than the company don’t use of earnings related conference calls. The effect of conference call and corporate governance on analysts’ earnings forecast is more obviously in the beginning of the period.

目錄
第壹章  導論	1
第一節  研究背景與動機	1
第二節  研究目的	4
第三節  論文結構	4
第貳章  文獻探討與假說建立	5
第一節  國內召開法說明會之現況	5
第二節  法人說明會對分析師盈餘預測之影響	6
第三節  公司治理機制對分析師盈餘預測之影響	7
第參章  研究方法	21
第一節  變數之操作型定義	22
第二節  迴歸模式之建立	27
第三節  樣本選取與資料來源	31
第肆章  研究結果	33
第一節  法人說明會對分析師盈餘預測影響之研究結果	33
第二節  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測 影響之研究結果	38
第三節  其他分析	60
第四節  討論與啟示	64
第伍章  研究結論、限制與後續研究建議	68
第一節  研究結論	68
第二節  研究限制與後續研究建議	69
參考文獻	70
圖目錄
圖2-1  公司治理架構圖	8
圖3-1  分析師預測取樣時點	21
表目錄
表2-1  2000~2004國內法人說明會召開次數分配表	5
表3-1  以迴歸係數之方向表達本研究欲探討之研究假說與研究問題	31
表3-2  分析師預測各年度樣本大小	32
表4-1  模式一各變數之平均數與標準差	34
表4-2  模式一中第一季迴歸模式變數之相關係數矩陣	35
表4-3  模式一中第三季迴歸模式變數之相關係數矩陣	36
表4-4  法人說明會對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數（模式一:Q1）	37
表4-5  法人說明會對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數（模式一:Q3）	38
表4-6  模式二各變數之平均數與標準差	41
表4-7  模式二中第一季迴歸模式變數之相關係數矩陣	42
表4-8  模式二中第三季迴歸模式變數之相關係數矩陣	43
表4-9  模式三各變數之平均數與標準差	44
表4-10  模式三中第一季迴歸模式變數之相關係數矩陣	45
表4-11  模式三中第三季迴歸模式變數之相關係數矩陣	46
表4-12  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數及合併係數－未考慮管理當局盈餘預測特性(模式二：Q1)	49
表4-13  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數及合併係數－未考慮管理當局盈餘預測特性(模式二：Q3)	51
表4-14  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數及合併係數－考慮管理當局盈餘預測特性(模式三：Q1)	55
表4-15  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數及合併係數－考慮管理當局盈餘預測特性(模式三：Q3)	57
表4-16  本研究相關研究假說與研究問題結果之匯總表	59
表4-17  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數及合併係數－未考慮管理當局盈餘預測特性(模式二：樣本同模式三Q1)	61
表4-18  法人說明會與公司治理變數對分析師盈餘預測影響之相關迴歸係數及合併係數－未考慮管理當局盈餘預測特性(模式二：樣本同模式三Q3)	63

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