1958年台海危機的著作雖眾，但是有學理依據，並以官方解密檔案驗證假設之純學術研究仍為少數。因此，本文研究目的乃從決策理論中抽理出假設，並藉案例進行驗證。鑒於美國對台灣安全扮演關鍵角色，是故，瞭解美方因應台海危機時之利益考量、組織立場及官僚之間的競奪關係實屬必要。至於探討焦點在於：(一) 艾森豪之危機處理目標、選項評估及政策抉擇。(二) 國務院與國防部因應危機之立場及爭辯。(三) 位居行動管道者如何運用議價技巧，及與總統互動關係，以爭取提案獲得接受。
首先，以理性行為者模式分析，艾森豪處理台海危機之考量，雖從爭取國家利益為出發點，意在選出符合利益高、代價低之選項。然由「口頭承諾防禦外島」的案例得知，艾森豪因考量發表此承諾代價過高，而不願做出表述。但後來《新港聲明》表示，美軍是否介入金門防衛將由總統定調，且在核心幕僚簇擁下，總統最終改變心意。顯示艾森豪評估選項並非一成不變，而是受到當時國內外情勢相對調整。
其次，從組織行為模式切入，以國務院與國防部在處理台海危機之提案較勁觀之，可看出國務院較獲總統器重，因此，國防部必須調整立場。例如：國防部原先所提近距離護航及使用有限核武建議，均未獲艾森豪接受，此乃因身為政策之最終定案者，在權衡選項所付風險過高而予以否決。國防部亦調整原先計畫，以符合總統心意。顯示組織期望提案獲得接受，將會配合主政者喜好，期使方案在修正後獲得採納。
再者，就政府政治模式層面探討，國務卿杜勒斯因擅長營造與總統關係及縮限決策範圍，使他者難以插手。國防部長麥艾樂與國家安全事務特別助理葛雷因新官上任，幾無提出別出心裁建議。中情局局長艾倫‧杜勒斯則將該局定位為僅提供情報而不制定政策，故在決策圈之影響力有限。參謀首長聯席會議主席崔寧雖在危機初期態度強硬，但得知總統希以較低代價回歸現狀，態度逐漸向總統靠攏。顯示杜勒斯精於與總統保持頻繁互動關係，故在決策過程中掌握優勢；而其餘決策者因部分對台海事務生疏，或立場違背總統偏好，因此退居二線。
最後，本文研究結果與發現為：(一) 艾森豪偏好代價較低之選項；(二) 組織之專責單位多能在議題主導位居上風；(三) 位居「行動管道」參與者若能結合總統意志，在決策過程中將掌握優勢；(四) 美軍防衛外島將依總統判斷台海情勢而定；(五) 艾森豪不會因外島問題而動用核武；(六) 艾森豪透過核心幕僚完成其個人意志；(七) 美中台處理外島危機之原則均在尋求國家利益。
綜合上述觀點，艾森豪政府處理台海危機之考量，主要從選項代價、組織立場及參與者競奪等面向切入。多數學者雖認為美國已竭盡心力協防外島，但研究發現則有別於此。事實上，艾森豪自始至終皆無意願防衛外島，故當軍方提出強硬立場均遭駁回，並委由核心幕僚消弭危機。因此本文主旨為：艾森豪總統利用細緻政治手腕，引導國務院及國防部提出總統偏好的政策選項，同時藉國務卿杜勒斯遂行其個人意志，以避免台海危機持續升溫，並確保美國國家利益。

Although there is a large number of publications of 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, only very few theoretical studies adopted theory-confirming case studies in order to verify hypotheses about official declassified archives. This dissertation attempts to do so. Taking into consideration that the US security commitments to Taiwan played a crucial role in the survival of Taiwan, the aim of this study is to explore President Eisenhower’s interests and the organizational stances of his administration, as well as the participants’ competition regarding the decision-making processes during the aforementioned crisis, being the main objective the finding of the patterns and essence of the actual concerns of US leaders in such processes. This dissertation attempts to verify three main hypotheses derived from decision-making theory, and focuses on the decision-making process of the Eisenhower administration. In order to do so, this study tries to answer the following questions: (1) what were the objectives, alternatives, and choices that Eisenhower –in his leading role as US head of state– had during the crisis? (2) what were the stances and debates between the US State Department and the Department of Defense in dealing with the crisis? (3) How did participants of the action channels utilize their bargaining skills and interacted with Eisenhower to compete their proposals?
First, adopting the point of view of the Rational Actor Model, this study tried to demonstrate that Eisenhower –based on the US national interests– chose those proposals that, made by the leading bureaucrats of his administration, represented with higher interests and lower costs. In the beginning, Eisenhower considered that publicly stating the US intention of defending Quemoy was too costly and was, therefore, unwilling to make the Newport Statement. But the US military intervention was to eventually be decided by President Eisenhower alone, which he finally agreed to do. It shows that Eisenhower’s evaluation of proposals was flexible and influenced by both the domestic and international environment. 
Second, from the Organizational Behavior Model, Eisenhower apparently preferred the State Department’s proposals. Thus, the Department of Defense started to adjust its previously strong-arm methods. For instance, the Department of Defense proposed “close-in escort for Taiwan’s vessels” and “the use of nuclear weapons” proposals, which were both rejected by Eisenhower. He assessed that these proposals were too risky and costly. Soon after that, the Department of Defense altered its plans to meet Eisenhower’s expectations. It indicates that an organization may alter its proposals based on the President’s acceptance in order to meet his mindset. 
Third, from the Government Politics Model, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was master-minded in nurturing relations with the President. He also narrowed the number of participants involved in the decision-making processes. Thus, others were unable to affect the outcome. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray were newly appointed. It was difficult for them to offer creative and feasible suggestions. The Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles emphasized that his organization could only provide intelligence, but not get involved in policy making. Consequently, his influence in the action channel was limited. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining’s attitude toward the crisis was tough in the beginning. After Twining learned that Eisenhower had determined to use the least cost in maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, his attitude started to lean toward the President’s side. It showed that John Dulles was good at highlighting his importance within the action channel. He then gained an upper hand in the decision-making process. In comparing with other participants, some of them were not familiar with the cross-strait issues and still others’ opinions diverged from the President’s stance. Therefore, their role in the decision-making process became less effective. 
Finally, the findings of the research are as follows: (1) Eisenhower preferred low-cost proposals; (2) If the crisis fell into the responsibility of a particular organization, proposals from this organization would be more favourably considered  by the President; (3) If participants’ proposals wanted to be accepted, they needed to include the President’s ideas; (4) The decision of defending the offshore islands would be made by the President; (5) Eisenhower was not going to use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy;(6) Eisenhower achieved his objectives through the leading bureaucrats; and (7) US/China/Taiwan were seeking their national interests in dealing with the offshore islands crisis.
To conclude, this study proves that the Eisenhower administration handled the crisis mainly through its assessment of the cost of proposals, the capability of organizations, and competitions among participants. Despite most scholars believe that Eisenhower had willingly made efforts to defend Quemoy, this study has found that, actually, it was just the opposite case. In fact, Eisenhower had no desire to defend Quemoy. When the Department of Defense suggested military counter-measures in the defense of offshore islands, such measures were turned down by Eisenhower. He also assigned his leading bureaucrats to diminish the crisis at the US expense, but Eisenhower remained the key person behind the scene. Thus, the main theme of this dissertation is that as Eisenhower used his influence on agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Defense on the one hand and the Secretary of State Dulles on the other to maximize the national interests of the United States, he successfully prevented further escalation of the Quemoy crisis.

第一章 緒論                                              1 
      第一節 研究目的與預期貢獻                          4
      第二節 研究方法、範圍與限制                        6
      第三節 文獻探討                                   14
      第四節 章節安排                                   31
      第五節 小結                                       33
第二章 理論架構與命題假設                               35
      第一節 理性行為模式                               36
      第二節 組織行為模式                               42
      第三節 政府政治模式                               48
      第四節 小結                                       58
第三章 理性行為模式下艾森豪在台海危機之決策過程         59
      第一節 中共發動金門砲擊之目的與策略               61
      第二節 艾森豪因應危機之目標設定                   74
      第三節 艾森豪之選項評估與理性抉擇                 77
      第四節 小結                                       91
第四章 組織行為模式下國務院與國防部之決策爭辯           94
      第一節 國務院之立場與政策建議                     96
      第二節 國防部之立場與執行                        115
      第三節 國務院與國防部在核武使用上之爭議          130
      第四節 小結                                      137
第五章 政府政治模式下艾森豪國安團隊之議價與妥協        139
      第一節 杜勒斯縱橫決策之關鍵                      140
      第二節 主要決策參與者於議價過程中的妥協          155
      第三節 艾森豪之幕後操控                          166
      第四節 小結                                      176
第六章 結論                                            179

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