本文旨在探討當企業發生董事長兼任總經理之行為時，其董總同一人之兼任行為對於代理成本與監督職能之影響，並探討是否會導致財務報導品質降低。根據相關文獻指出，當企業處於不同之商業環境下對於代理成本與監督職能要求皆不相同。因此，本文透過修正後Jones Model觀察當董事長兼任總經理時，代理成本與監督職能是否會影響企業之財務報導品質，並以Dickinson(2011)之企業生命週期衡量不同之商業環境。結果顯示，當企業處於不同企業生命週期時，若有董事長兼任總經理之行為，對於代理成本與監督職能會有不同之影響。其中，以股利發放率衡量代理成本時，結果發現成長期時會以裁決性應計數操弄盈餘向上；成熟期時會利用過度生產存貨與異常裁決性費用進行實質盈餘管理。以營業費用率衡量時，發現動盪期之企業會操弄裁決性應計數向上；成長期與動盪期之企業，會有利用過度生產存貨之方式操弄會計數字。於資產週轉率方面，初始期之企業會以過度生產進行實質盈餘管理；最後，本研究發現當董事長兼任總經理且企業生命週期為衰退期時，會利用放方寬信用條件之方式進行盈餘管理。希冀透過本文之實證結果，提供主管機關、企業及其利害關係人，有關企業治理政策之設置及參考依據。

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the influence of CEO duality on agency costs and the function of supervision reduces financial reporting quality. A review of relevant literature revealed that the requirements that businesses have for agency costs and the function of supervision vary with the commercial environment. Modified Jones model were employed to measure how CEO duality influence agency costs and the function of supervision, and Dickinson’s (2011) firm life cycle was used to define different commercial environments. The results indicate that CEO duality will influence agency costs and the function of supervision in different life cycle. When the agency cost is measured by the dividend payout ratio, growth stages will increase earnings by discretionary accruals; Mature stages will increase earnings by overproduction and abnormal discretionary expenses. When measured by the operating expense ratio, it is found that decline stages will manipulate earnings through discretionary accruals; Growth stages will influence the accounting figures by overproduction. In terms of asset turnover ratio, it is discovery that Intro stages will manipulate earnings by overproduction; Finally, this study found out that decline stages will influence their earnings through extend the limitation of credit policy. It is hoped that the empirical results of this study can serve as reference for authorities, businesses, and stakeholders regarding corporate governance policies.

謝辭	i
中文摘要	ii
英文摘要	iii
目錄	iv
圖目錄	v
表目錄	vi
第壹章 緒論	1
第一節 研究背景與動機	1
第二節 研究目的	5
第三節 研究流程與架構	6
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立	8
第一節 代理理論與代理成本	8
第二節 董事長與總經理之兼任行為	10
第三節 企業生命週期	12
第四節 應計項目盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理	14
第參章 研究方法	18
第一節 變數定義與模型之建立	18
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取	26
第肆章 實證結果與分析	28
第一節 敘述性統計分析	28
第二節 相關係數分析	30
第三節 迴歸分析	32
第四節 敏感性分析哪張表	51
第五節 其他分析	58
第伍章 結論與建議	63
第一節 研究結論	63
第二節 研究建議與限制	65
參考文獻	66

圖目錄
圖1 研究流程圖	7

表目錄
表1 Dickinson(2011)生命週期之衡量方式	22
表2 產業分布表（N=9,000）	27
表3 敘述性統計（N=9,000）	29
表4 相關係數表（N=9,000）	31
表5 董事長兼任總經理與股利發放率對裁決性應計數之迴歸結果	34
表6 董事長兼任總經理與股利發放率對實質盈餘管理之迴歸結果	36
表7 董事長兼任總經理與營業費用率對裁決性應計數之迴歸結果	40
表8 董事長兼任總經理與營業費用率對實質盈餘管理之迴歸結果	42
表9 董事長兼任總經理與資產週轉率對裁決性應計數之迴歸結果	47
表10 董事長兼任總經理與資產週轉率對實質盈餘管理之迴歸結果	49
表11 董事長兼任總經理與企業生命週期對代理成本之敏感性分析	53
表12 董事長兼任總經理與企業生命週期對監督職能之敏感性分析-裁決性應計數衡量	54
表13 董事長兼任總經理與企業生命週期對監督職能之敏感性分析-實質盈餘管理衡量	56
表14 董事長是否兼任總經理與企業生命週期階段之標準化係數（敏感性分析）	57
表15 董事長兼任總經理與企業生命週期對代理成本之其他分析	59
表16 董事長兼任總經理與企業生命週期對監督職能之敏感性分析-裁決性應計數衡量	60
表17 董事長兼任總經理與企業生命週期對監督職能之敏感性分析-實質盈餘管理衡量	62

中文部分：
尹賢瑜、葉立仁與游雅璇，2015，建構企業財務危機預警模型—考慮財務與公司治理因素，德明學報，第39卷第2期：39-58。
吳芝嫻，2005，以公司治理角度探討企業財務危機相關因素之研究，大葉大學事業經營研究所未出版碩士論文。
李馨蘋、程心瑤、戚靜玟與林欣如，2020，董事會組成要素與代理成本的非線性關係：成長機會的調節效果，台灣管理學刊，第20卷第2期：25-44。
陳建宏與謝佩綺，2016，企業資訊揭露、公司治理與財務危機預警之實證研究-以台灣上市上櫃電子業為例，財金論文叢刊，第25期：93-104。
黃旭輝與王育偉，2007，績效不佳的經理人會被撤換嗎？，證券市場發展季刊，第19卷第3期：49-86。
鄭睿翔，2011，董事會之領導型態與公司績效之研究，屏東科技大學企業管理研究所未出版之碩士論文。
賴丞坡與李昇倫，2012，公司治理對產險公司經營績效影響之研究，保險專刊，第28卷第2期：169-185。
 
英文部分：
Ang, J. S., R. A. Cole, and J. W. Lin. 2000. Agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Finance 55(1): 81-106.
Anothony, J. H., and K. Ramesh. 1992. Association between accounting performance measures and stock prices: A test of the life cycle hypothesis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(June): 203-227.
Boyd, B. K. 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management Journal 16(January): 301-312.
Bulan, L. T., and Z. Yan. 2010. Firm maturity and the pecking order theory. Draft article, International Business School, Brandeis University.
Bushman, R. M., A. J. Smith, and F. Zhang. 2012. Investment cash flow sensitivities really reflect related investment decisions. Working paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Chicago, and Yale University.
Carter, C., and J. Lorsch. 2004. Back to the drawing board: Designing corporate boards for a complex world. Academy of Management Review 30(2): 438-440.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in east Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 58(1-2): 81-112.
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Z. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post- sarbanes-oxley periods. The Accounting Review. 83(3): 757-787.
Cohen, D. A., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 50(1): 2-19.
Daily, C. M., and D. R. Dalton. 1993. Board of directors leadership and structure: Control and performance implications. Sage Journals 17(3): 65-81.
Dalton, D. R., M. A. Hitt., S. T. Certo., and C. M. Dalton. 2007. The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation. Academy of Management Annals 1(1): 1-64.
Deangelo, H., L. DeAngelo., and D. J. Skinner. 1996. Reversal of fortune dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth. Journal of financial economics 40(3):  341-371.
Dechow, P. M., and W. Ge. 2006 The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly. Review of Accounting Studies 11(2006): 253–296.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Cause and consequence of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13(1): 1-36.
Dickinson, V. 2011. Cash flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle. The Accounting Review 86(6): 1969-1994.
Doukakis L. C. 2014. The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on real and accrual-based earnings management activities. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 33(6): 551-572.
Du, X. Q., and Z. J. Zhou. 2009. An empirical study on the relationship between disclosure and agency Costs: Evidence from disclosure Evaluation of shenzhen stock exchange. Journal of Business Economics 218(12): 76-82.
Ducharme, L. L., P. H. Malatesta, and S. E. Sefcik. 2001. Earnings management: IPO valuation and subsequent performance. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 16(4): 369–396. 
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88(2): 288-307.
Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325.
Filatotchev, I., and C. Nakajima. 2014. Corporate governance, responsible managerial behavior, and corporate social responsibility: Organizational efficiency versus organizational legitimacy? Academy of Management Perspectives 28(3): 289-306.
Finkelstein, S., and R. A. D'aveni. 1994. CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal 37(5): 1079-1108.
Friedlan, J. M. 1994. Accounting choices of issuers of initial public offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(1): 1–31. 
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(1-3): 3-73.
Gunny, K. 2005. What are the consequences of real earnings management? Working paper, University of Colorado.
Hastuti, T.D., I. Ghozali, and E.N.A. Yuyetta. 2017. The effect of company life cycles on the accruals earnings management with internal control system as moderating variable. Polish Journal of Management Studies 15(1): 66-75.
Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decision. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3): 85-107.
Healy, P. M. and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4): 365-383.
Hendry, J. 2005. Beyond self-interest: Agency theory and the board in a satisfying world. British Journal of Management 16(1): 55-63.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76(2): 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.
Jones, J. J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29(2):193-228.
Katherine, S. 1989. Earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3(4): 91-102.
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matcher discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1): 163-197.
Leblanc, R. and J. Gillies. 2005. Inside the boardroom: How boards really work and the coming revolution in corporate governance. Hoboken: Wiley
Lin, J. Y., and Z. Li. 1997. The connotation of the modern enterprise system and the direction of state-owned enterprises reform. Economics Research Journal 3(1997): 3-10.
Liu, M. 2007. Accruals and managerial operating decisions over the firm life cycle. Working paper, Pennsylvania State University.
Luo, W., and C. Zhu. 2010. Agency costs and corporate voluntary disclosure. Economic Research Journal 10(2010): 143-155.
Mace, M. L. 1971. Directors: Myth and reality. Boston: Graduate School of Business, Harvard University.
Mueller, G. C., and V. L. Barker. 1997. Upper echelons and board characteristics of turnaround and nonturnaround declining firms. Journal of Business Research 39(2): 119-134.
Narayanan, M. P. 1985. Managerial incentives for short-term results. The Journal of Finance 40(5): 1469-1484.
Obeng, V. A., K. Ahmed, and S. Miglani. 2020. Integrated reporting and earnings quality: The moderating effect of agency costs. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 60 (April): 101285.
Peng, M. W., S. Zhang, and X. Li. 2007. CEO duality and firm performance during China's institutional transitions. Management and Organization Review 3(2): 205-225.
Pfeffer, J., and G. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper and Row.
Roychowdhury, S. 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(3): 335-370.
Shan, L. 2020. A review of the relationship between agency cost and corporate investment efficiency. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management 10(4): 734-748.
Tran, Q. T. 2019. Corruption, agency costs and dividend policy: International evidence. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 76(May): 325-334.
Weir, C., D. Laing, and P. J. Mcknight. 2003. An empirical analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of UK firms. Unpublished working paper. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Zang, A. Y. 2012. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. The Accounting Review 87(2): 675-703.
Zhang, L., Z. Zhang, M. Jia, and Y. Ren. 2020. A tiger with wings: CEO-board surname ties and agency costs. Journal of Business Research 118(September): 271-285.